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THEISTIC ETHICS: TOWARD A
CHRISTIAN SOLUTION

DAVID

J.

BAGGETT

Despite the theological and popularly conceived connections between religious
devotion and moral living, the difficulties attending theological or religious ethicsthe attempt to tie ethics to theology or religion in some impottant sense-are myri·
ad. Thanks largely to Enlightenment thought, morality has come to be construed as
independent of God, so much so that the majority of moral philosophers today
would without hesitation affirm that even if God exists, morality can exist apart
from God-an ontological critique-and, if the precepts or dictates of morality can be
known at all, they can be known apart from religious orthodoxy or theological
reflection-an epistemological critique.
Since the Enlightenment, at least, and in particular since Kan(s epistemological
dualism, questions of religion and "speculative metaphysics" have often been consid·
ered beyond the ken of rationality.' Kant's motivation, it has been suggested, was to
spare religion from the rigorous scrutiny of the emerging science of his day; but the
actual result proved to be detrimental to religious conviction, for it began to be por·
!rayed as an inescapably subjective affair. Universal truth claims became harder to
reconcile with this kind of epistemology, which is likely the inevitable while para·
doxical effect of implicitly putting religion and science at odds. Religious truth claims
tend to be increasingly construed as devoid of propositional content and rational

evidence and are instead seen as empty faith claims rooted in a person's imagination
or a group's collective psyche.
The understanding of science and religion as essentially and historically opposed,
incidentally, is largely mistaken. Although it is true that certain theologians and
churchmen have historically stood in the way of scientific progress, it is far from true
that all of them have, even a majority; and in fact, as Alfred North Whitehead has
persuasively argued, the origins of modem science, such as faith in the orderliness of
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nature and its ability to be apprehended and described rationally, are largely attributable
to the Medieval and Scholastic effort to rationalize the divinely ordered creation.' Stanley
Jaki goes further in characterizing such foundations of science as the consequence of
orthodox Christology. "A truly divine Logos, in Whom the Father created all, so
Athanasius insisted time and again, could not produce a partially disordered universe."'
Nonetheless the mistakenly perceived tension between science and religion contributed to their artificial separation. It was long thought that morality could be salvaged
from such a fate by being rooted in reason rather than revelation. Indeed, this effort
serves as one effective summary of the Enlightenment: to ground ethics in reason rather
than religion and thereby retain its authoritative force. However, severed from its ontological foundations, morality has proved notoriously difficult to undergird by reason alone, so
much so that the Enlightenment project has recently often been characterized as a failure.
One result is that morality, still often perceived to be in religion's vicinity, is increasingly
absorbed into Kant s noumena\ realm of the unknowable, inscrutable and, for practical
purposes, thereby construed as a purely individual affair. This despite the obvious fact that
Kant himself was no subjectivist in ethics.
Pre-modern and what is often called post-modern thought have in common their
grounding of morality in God, the salient difference being that pre-modems, generally,
believed in God, whereas post-modems, generally, do not. If morality is rooted in a God
who doesn't exist, of course, then morality is largely illusory; and this seems to be an
increasingly common view: that morality is either purely conventional, or a way to keep
the proletariat in line, or a repression of our best instincts, and the list goes on. No wonder that some have tried to show that traditional conceptions of morality can exist independently of any appeal to theology, and I have a certain sympathy for such efforts.
Nonetheless, like many theists, I also have a nagging sense that morality, ultimately, has to
be grounded in God. So, in this paper, what I intend to do is, first, identify some of the
philosophical problems for religious ethics in general and Christian ethics in particular.
Then I will attempt a short defense of a Christian theistic ethic.
REUGIOUS ETHICS CRmQUED

To begin with, morality, as religiously construed, is often thought of as either a requirement or result of salvation. As such it is depicted as necessary for, in one sense or another,
a relationship with God and entrance into heaven. Conversely, an immoral life is characterized in terms of an absence of a relationship with God and punishable by consignment
to hell. As such, a moral life is enjoined by religion, it is suggested, merely, in J. P.
Moreland's words, to "cover one's cosmic rear end to avoid getting flames on it." 4
One criticism of such ethical views is that morality entails a quality of life that ought to
be conducted primarily, if not exclusively, out of a desire to do it and not mainly, if at a\\,
out of a motivation to avoid punishment or earn a reward. The latter, which is argued to

be the thrust behind religious ethics, would constitute an egoistic approach to ethics,
according to which, as seen, moral decisions are made with respect to "what's in it for me."
Moral philosophers, often influenced by Kant, typically bristle, and rightly so, at the suggestion that morality's motivation is one of earning a reward or avoiding a punishment.
Divine retribution or reward seems unable to be a legitimate form of moral motivation, yet
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this condition often seems at the heart of basing ethics on theology. Seemingly altruistic
behaviors, thus motivated, at their root would then reveal self-interested motivations; rather
than feeding the poor, clothing the naked, and housing the homeless out of genuine concern for them and their welfare, the ultimate motivation would instead be sheer self-interest
The power of God to effect his purposes might certainly constitute a motive to live
morally in such a scenario, albeit an ethically dangerous one, but not a rational reason.
Any such purely self-interested moral motivations are necessarily infantile, some have
argued. For they are roughly akin to the truncated ethical perspective of children, who
also, in the earliest stages of moral development, understand morality in terms of avoiding
punishments and earning rewards. Drawing on Piaget's research of young children, P. H.

Nowell-Smith argues for such a parallel between religious moralists and children in the
heteronomous stage of development, since both groups, while lacking in those marks of
moral maturity and adulthood such as autonomy and personal responsibility, view moral
rules as sacred and authoritatively imposed from the outside.'
At the heart of Nowell-Smith's critique of religious ethics is his concern that it tends to be
more concerned with adherence to rules rather than the quality of people's lives and a concern for people's welfare for their own sake. Rules, as seen by the morally mature, exist for a
purpose and fulfill distinct functions. But the heteronomous child and religious moralist both
regard rules as, in essence, ends in themselves, never to be questioned. Even Abraham, the
Old Testament patriarch, is shown laudably willing to sacrifice his own son on the altar at
the whim of the divine. By thus relinquishing one's moral autonomy to divine control; being
excessively concerned, even pathologically preoccupied, about the welfare of one's soul; and
making moral determinations based on God's commands, potentially even capricious ones,
religious moralists betray childish elements in their ethical philosophy.
Even supposing that God does issue a command to human beings, such as the "most
important" command to love God with all of your heart, soul, mind, and strength, and
your neighbor as yourself, another problem immediately arises, one which Kant noticed
and contemporary philosopher Richard Taylor elaborates on.6 Such an edict can't be

issued, for love, as an emotion, can't be commanded. An ought requires a can; no sensible
command requires of us to do that which we are incapable of doing. The command to
love, as a command to assume an emotional disposition toward God or another, treats
human emotion as something under direct volitional control. Since it is not-we can't

directly generate emotions at will-the command is nonsensical. Duty and love seem
incompatible in an ethical system; yet religious ethics conjoin them, another problem with
rooting morality in theology. In this connection, Taylor writes the following:
The insight that love, as a feeling, is incompatible with the incentive of duty, is
plainly correct. In the light of it one can expunge feelings of love from theoretical
ethics, or one can expunge the incentive of duty. Kant took the former course,
and I take the latter.'
Besides those problems associated with religious ethics, one philosophical problem,
more than any other, has been a thorn in the flesh of theologians and religious moral
philosophers since the time of Plato, and has been dubbed the Euthyphro Dilemma, aris-
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ing as it does in the Socratic dialogue Euthyphro. Socrates, Plato's teacher, meets a young
man, Euthyphro, going to the courthouse to sue his father. In ancient Greece, the setting
for this story, loyalty to family was a highly exalted virtue, so Socrates is naturally shocked
at Euthyphro's intention to do this, and remarks that Euthyphro must have a clearly
defined sense of justice to undertake such an ambitious course of action. Euthyphro confidently assures Socrates that in fact he does, and proceeds to define justice, or what we
might call morality today, in terms of the commands of the gods, according to the Creek
conception of a pantheon of gods. When Socrates begins to point out that, according to
the mythical accounts of the gods, their commands sometimes conflicted, problems with
Euthyphro's account begin to manifest themselves.
The problems attending the attempt to define morality in supematuralistic terms soon
become applicable to monotheism as well, as the famous Dilemma arises a little further
along in the dialogue. Socrates asks Euthyphro a pointed question, and one that has
plagued moral philosophy ever since. Does, to put this in monotheistic terms, Cod define
the good, or merely report the good? There is a difference. When you tell another that the
sum of two and two is four, you are merely reporting this to be the case, not somehow
making or defining it that way of your own volition. The question is whether Cod reveals
to us the contents of morality irrespective of his own commands or nature, in which case

he would be merely reporting on morality and not ultimately responsible for its contents
after all, or does He actually define morality, conforming its contents to his own wilP If
we affirm the former option-that Cod only reports the good-then we have to agree
with the thrust of contemporary moral philosophy that has divorced Cod from morality's
ultimate origins. Cod would be commanding something because it is already good prior
to and independent of his command. If we wish to affirm the latter option-that Cod
defines morality (then and only then perhaps reports itl-then we're confronted with a
potential problem. For then something is good because Cod commands it, but suppose
that Cod, tomorrow, were to decree that torturing innocent children for the fun of it is
the moral thing to do. If Cod is the one exclusively responsible for dictating the contents
of morality, there is no recourse for anyone else to claim that such a command is morally
perverse. By issuing the decree, Cod has thereby redefined morality. Morality is thus arbitrary, entirely contingent on the capricious will of heaven.
Of course, the history of religious conquest, holy wars, and inquisitions reminds us that
cruelty in the name of God, ostensibly in accord with his purposes, is no academic discussion. Measured by its own standards, Christianity has fallen woefully short of ethical great-

ness, reminding us that belief in God is by no means sufficient for ensuring a mature ethical way of life, as the number of religious adherents who have perpetrated evils in the
name of God so clearly attests. Nor is religious adherence even a needed precondition for

moral living, it would seem, for many atheists indeed live exemplary lives of moral excellence. Kai Nielsen thus argues that, even if "Cod is dead," it doesn't matter for ethics.
Arguing from features he finds in this world, Nielsen points out that atheists often live
altruistically, find meaning in life, express compassion, thereby going to show that Cod
seems unnecessary for ethics.8 Ethics can get by just fine without him.
Given such glaring weaknesses and strong critiques of religious ethics, it is not surprising that Derek Parfit is one among others who claims that holding on to outmoded reli-
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gious views is an impediment to moral philosophy that had better be jettisoned as soon as
possible. Indeed, some have essentially asserted that theistic beliefs, rather than grounding
our morality and enabling us to determine the normative contents and metaethical justification for our moral convictions, can actually perform the opposite function of blinding us

to morality as rooted in reason or human flourishing or whatever precisely it is that serves
as the true foundation for morality. "Belief in God, or in many gods," Parfit writes, "[has!
prevented free development of moral reasoning." Parfit is optimistic about the possibility
of progress in ethics precisely to the extent we extricate ourselves from superstitious religious beliefs and begin to reason autonomously."
THEISTIC ETHICS DEFENDED

Against such arguments, and contrary to the trend in modem moral philosophy, theistic
ethics will nevertheless now be defended, with the aim to show that the case against it has
yet to be made. What will be provided here, with no pretense that every relevant question is
answered or problem solved, are a few suggestive lines of arguments that show promise in
salvaging a meaningful connection between God and morality in the face of such challenges.
This section will make reference to theistic, rather than religious or theological, ethics to
denote the fact that the type of connection between God and morality that will be
defended, though it will possess numerous practical implications, will generally be at a
higher level of abstraction than the plane on which this topic is usually discussed. It will be
more ontological than epistemological and more metaethical than normative. Too often,
it seems, theistic ethics have to account for the failings of religionists to live morally, or the
successes of atheists in attaining moral excellence, while such phenomena, reflection
shows, do little to discount the possibility that God himself is the Author of morality irrespective of what is done by some of his alleged followers or detractors.
No doubt it is particularly a concern the way religious adherents have too often failed
to live up to even minimal moral standards, but the attempted defense of theistic ethics
provided here will have little difficulty accommodating such empirical sociological realities.
Religious affiliation or mere propositional assent is often a poor indicator of genuine religious life and spiritual devotion anyway, it is to be remembered. "The Old Testament
prophets bear eloquent witness to this, reserving some of their fiercest denunciation for
those who delight in solemn assemblies and external ritual," William Abraham reminds
us. 10 Jesus himself issued his most damning indictments to the religious leaders of his day."
MORAL FACTS

So to begin this defense, it is observed that typically socialized human beings have
rather clear moral intuitions about what is right and wrong, or morally exemplary or
hideous, which are more than just hunches or prereflective expressions of moral attitudes.
As Geisler and Moreland write,
While philosophers differ over a precise definition of intuitions, a common usage
defines an intuition as an immediate, direct awareness or acquaintance with something. An intuition is a mode of awareness-sensory, intellectual, or otherwise-in
which something seems or appears to be directly present to one's consciousness."
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Ethicists like Alasdair Macintyre and R. M. Hare think ethicists have gone wrong whenever an appeal to intuitions is necessary; but I rather agree with Saul Kripke's view: that it
is difficult to see what could be said more strongly for a view than that it squares with
one's basic, reflective intuitions. Philosophy ought to be largely in the business of spelling
out in more rigorous ways what can be intuitively grasped by nearly anyone. Such intuitive appeals seem both unavoidable and epistemologically significant. Though not infallible, they are at least prima facie justified.
The French philosopher jean-Paul Sartre, in an effort to argue for his existentialist
ethics, uses examples like a young soldier deciding whether to go to war or to stay home
and be his mother's consolation." Sartre employs such examples to show the difficulty of
making certain ethical determinations, and writings like his in conjunction with the widespread use of what Christina Hoff-Sommers has called "dilemma ethics"-moral dialogue
focused on trying to decide the "hard cases"-have contributed to the notion that the
whole field of ethics is colored grey. The old certainties are gone; ambiguity wins the day.
Everything is up for grabs when it comes to questions of morality.
Despite the common nature of such views, most decisions in ethics are not fraught
with ambiguity and tensions between commensurate competing commitments. As is
obvious from clear examples of moral behavior, the vast majority of people's moral intuitions remain intact and quite strong. Perhaps ethics are too often thought about in tenns
of the peripheral dilemmas and occasional ambiguities, overlooking and thereby skewing
our perception of the vast intuitive area of agreement that actually obtains both across
diverse cultures and throughout the centuries of human history. Perhaps morality has to
be seen at its best, or at its worst, for it is then our intuitions are felt the strongest and the
distinctive features of moral facts most clearly apprehended, with no ambiguities or heartwrenching dilemmas to cloud our vision. Eventually those dilemmas have to be accounted for as well, but the suggestion here is that they are not the proper place to begin. One
doesn't learn subtle tennis strategy when he first must learn how to hit a groundstroke.
To elicit such commonsensical moral intuitions, consider the following scenario, asking
yourself whether you can affirm the moral propriety of such an action:
They brought the boy out of the guardroom. It was a bleak, foggy, raw day-an
ideal day for hunting. The General ordered the boy stripped naked. The boy [who
while playing had inadvertently injured the General's dog] was shivering. He
seemed paralyzed with fear. He didn't dare utter a sound. 'Off with him now, chase
him'' 'Hey, you, run, run 1' a flunkey yelled, and the boy started to run. 'Sic 'im 1' the
General roared. The whole pack was set on the boy and the hounds tore him to
pieces before his mother's eyes. 14
Those chilling lines from Fyodor Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov sicken readers,
filling them with moral indignation. Common sense moral intuitions declare sue h an act
to be heinous and barbaric. Sartre's point would have been lost had he begun not with a
genuine moral dilemma, but with an appeal to people's moral intuitions, such as by asking
whether the General should have acted in this way. The answer is clear. Something
incongruous is readily discernible about the General's actions, quite irrespective of
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whether the General derived pleasure from the act, perhaps accounting for the characterization of such behavior as inhuman.

Just as there is an unfittingness about the General's action, there is an obvious fittingness and congruity about morally good behavior generally and morally excellent behavior
particularly, resulting in what has been called the "satisfactions of morality." "Moral people
have long testified as to the strength and value of such satisfactions, often claiming that
they are the most agreeable satisfactions we can attain." 15
Behaviors characterized as morally exemplary are typically those which, if an agent
performs them, she is said to be morally praiseworthy, whereas, if the agent fails to perform them, she isn't blameworthy. Such behaviors are thought of as going beyond what is
expected of the moral agent, such as a selfless life of service to the sick, or a sacrifice of a
lucrative medical career to serve the needs of a destitute village. Philosophers call such
actions supererogatory, and sometimes debate whether such behaviors can even be

accommodated according to normative ethical theory. Utilitarianism, for instance, doesn't
merely suggest maximizing utility, but renders the maximization of utility one's moral obligation, thus raising the question of whether there ever really is anything like optional praiseworthy moral action. 16

The aspect of supererogatory actions that will be stressed for this discussion, though, is
different. Irrespective of the relative obligation one thinks attaches to such actions, the less
arguable and most obvious element of supererogatory actions is their laudable selfless
nature that resonates with our, in James Q. Wilson's phrase, "moral sense." Witnessing
such behavior gives us, we suspect, a portrait of humanity at its best, a glimpse into life as
it was meant to be lived, and perhaps one day will be.
Consulting our intuitions, what can we say about the nature of morality and of moral
facts 7 If moral facts exist, they would seem to be, prima facie, ontologically rather odd entities as far as most facts go. Moral facts, in addition to conveying a description of nature,
are also ineliminably prescriptive, normatively involving an appeal to what ought or ought
not to be done. Moral facts thereby direct us to action, confer obligation, in a way that no
merely descriptive fact characterizing some state of affairs can do without being conjoined
with at least implicitly prescriptive ones.
Morality is thought to confer obligations and provide evaluative constraints not just on
particular acts or ways of life, but even on our motivations. Saving a drowning child in the
hope of earning a reward, though resulting in a good consequence, is still generally thought
of as less than morally exemplary behavior. Moral motivations, as earlier discussed, need to
largely transcend the hope of a reward or the effort to avoid a punishment to include genuine concern for the welfare of others, sincere desire to alleviate suffering, etc.
Morality, in its dominant tradition in western culture, involves rights and duties, rights
to which people are entitled and obligations conferred upon people, sometimes at great
personal sacrifice. Morality involves the ascription of moral praise and blame, either for
actions performed or actions failed to be performed. The moral conferring of obligation
and the assigning of blame, it is thought, are not contingent on the satisfaction of the
moral agent's personal interest or advantage, but seem to possess a kind of authority irrespective of such considerations. That morality seems to provide intrinsic motives to virtue
without at the same time always providing instrumental advantages based on prudence
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has been long thought to be one of the great ethical difficulties left unsolved."
The oddness of moral facts is obviously in part attributable to this prescriptive feature
of theirs which, perhaps, is what motivated G. E. Moore to conclude that no naturalistic
proposal for constructing a definition of "good" could suffice.'" Moore characterized the
misguided attempt to define "good" by reducing it to any natural property-such as the
maximization of pleasure or the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people-by
the term "naturalistic fallacy." No merely naturalistic property seems able to accommodate
this prescriptively binding force characterizing morality traditionally understood.
Thought of in terms of this tricky prescriptive element that enjoins a certain kind of
behavior, Moore's point can be construed along the lines of David Hume's writing from
two centuries before, in which he criticized the attempt to derive an ought from an is. Such
a derivation has been described in various ways, such as going from a description to a presaiption, from a faa to a norm or value, or from an indimtive to an imperative. The same idea
would appear later in Kant's insistence that the dictates and imperatives of the moral law
can't be derived from any set of propositions about human happiness or the will of God."
Rather than discussing Moore's or Hume's point at great length, which has been done
elsewhere by numerous writers, here the discussion will instead focus on what constitutes
the best explanation of such ontologically odd entities as moral facts, if indeed they exist at
all. Rather than morality, given its distinct features, needing to be divorced from God's
nature or will, the opposite conclusion has often been drawn, even by no less a thinker than
the influential twentieth-century atheist J. L. Mackie. "Moral properties," the late philosopher
wrote, "constitute so odd a cluster of properties and relations that they are most unlikely to
have arisen in the ordinal)' course of events \vithout an all-powerful god to create them." 20
That is, according to Mackie, moral facts-entities ascribing praise and blame for actions
committed or omitted; conferring duties irrespective of the moral agent's cares and interests; calling for sacrifice of self-interest and, quite independent of outcomes, a purity of
moral motivation-have for their best explanation, assuming they exist, a theistic premise.
Unless God somehow caused such strange facts to come into existence, they are otherwise most unlikely to have developed naturalistically.
As an atheist, Mackie was dubious about the existence of such moral facts; but his sentiment-expressible in terms of the counterfactual conditional "If moral facts exist, then
God probably created them" -could not be more eloquently echoed by any theist. Since
God's nonexistence or irrelevance would negate the consequent of Mackie's conditional,
it is not surprising that he and numerous other atheists before and after him have concluded that their worldview entails a rejection or loss of morality as traditionally understood. Sartre, for instance, expressed such a sentiment:
Towards 1880, when the French professors endeavored to formulate a secular
morality, they said something like this: God is a useless hypothesis, so we will do
without it. However, if we are to have morality, a society and a law-abiding world, it
is essential that certain values should be taken seriously; they must have an a pnon·
existence ascribed to them It must be considered obligatory a priori to be
not
to lie, not to beat one's wife, to bring up children and so forth; so we are going to do
a little work on the subject, which will enable us to show that these values exist all
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the same, inscribed in an intelligent heaven although, of course, there is no God. In
other words ... nothing will be changed if God does not exist; we shall discover the
same norms of honesty, progress and humanity, and we shall have disposed of God
as an out-of-date hypothesis which will die away quietly of itself. The existentialist, on
the contrary, finds it extremely embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no
longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to
think it. It is nowhere written that "the good" exists, that one must be honest or must
not lie, since we are now upon the plane where there are only men.21

Likewise, the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche confidently proclaimed that the
"death of God" should have for one of its practical outcomes a Copernican revolution in
the way we think of ethics. Traditionally exalted moral virtues such as humility, altruism,
and compassion, now seen as expressions of abject weakness, should be eclipsed with the
strong virtues of selfishness, ruthlessness, and pride. In Nietzsche's case, then, upholding traditional morality after the death of God wasn't even a concern; it was his agenda to effect
his transvaluation of values, according to which good might be called evil, and evil good."
Irrespective of one's views of Nietzsche and his legacy, his is one more example of
atheists themselves recognizing the vital link between God and traditionally understood
moral values, between theism and ethics. The violence potentially done to morality by its
divorce from God is not a warning issued only by theists. A number of thoughtful
philosophers, both theists and atheists, have drawn the conclusion that, if God does not
exist, then morality, understood as something more than convention or conditioning

alone, lacks a firm foundation or, to use Paul Taylor's word, "grounding."
W. T. Stace, attributing the emergence of moral relativism to the social, intellectual, and
psychological conditions of our time, diagnoses the situation as follows:
We have abandoned, perhaps with good reason, the oracles of the past Every age, of
course, does this. But in our case it seems that none of us knows any more whither to
tum. We do not know what to put in the place of that which has gone. What ought
we, supposedly civilized peoples, to aim at? What are to be our ideals? What is right?
What is wrong? What is beautiful? What is ugly? No man knows. We drift helplessly
in this direction and that We know not where we stand nor whither we are going"
Many atheists and secularists, however, wish to salvage a meaningful morality from the
unpalatable implications of their worldview, as even Sartre and Nietzsche attempted.
Philosophers thus attempt to defend and account for the existence of moral facts without
any appeal to God, thereby also accounting for why we ought to live moral lives and for
why moral obligations sometimes apply even when they conflict with one's personal welfare. Kurt Baier, for instance, tries this by arguing that morality really is in one's interest
after all, thereby accounting for why we ought to live morally. Richard Brandt, as well,
acknowledging that duty sometimes violates personal preferences, first concludes that
whether such a duty ought to be carried through "may vary from one person to another.
It depends on what kind of person one is, what one cares about" But he then proceeds
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to write, "It is, of course, no defense of one's failure to do one's duty, before others or
society, to say that doing so is not 'reasonable' for one in this sense.""
George Mavrodes responds to such arguments effectively, in my view. In tenns of
Brandt's point, he writes
And this is just to bring the queer element back in. It is to suppose that besides 'the
kind of person' I am and my particular pattern of' cares' and interests there is something else, my duty, which may go against these and in any case properly overrides
them. And one feels that there must be some sense of 'reasonable' in which one
can ask whether a world in which that is true is a reasonable world, whether such a
world makes any sense. 25
In response to Brandt's argument that (a) it is in everyone's best interest to act morally and,
therefore, (b) it is in my best interest to act morally as well, Mavrodes asks whether (a) is

to be understood collectively or distributively. If the fonner, then (b) doesn't follow from
it, for it may not be in my best interest for everyone to act morally, even if it is in the best
interest of the group as a whole, for the interest of the group as a whole may be
advanced by the sacrificing of my interest. If (a) is understood in the distributive sense,
Mavrodes notes that another objection arises, namely, that it seems obvious that personal
self-interest, at least in the short run, will be further advanced in a situation in which
everyone else acts morally but I act immorally, at least in selected cases, than it will in case
everyone, including me, acts morally. 26

It is no doubt to each person's benefit that others act morally, and undoubtedly it is to
each person's benefit that he or she at times act morally. But clearly there are many occasions when acting immorally appears to be in an individual's self-interest (or at least when

acting morally is not in the agent's best interest). It was for this reason that Rene Descartes
expressed the view that
Since in this life there are often more rewards for vices than for virtues, few would

prefer what is right to what is useful, if they neither feared God nor hoped for an
after-lifer
Even Philippa Foot's efforts to argue that morality always gives people some reason to act
leaves unanswered the question of why people ought to live morally when doing otherwise would go undetected. Such a failure to account for a reason to be moral in such a
situation has a significance beyond merely the conclusion that what can be motivated
are not particular acts so much as a general commitment to rules or a moral disposition.

Rather, it goes to show that, even if a non-theistic account motivates altruistic behavior, it
is still deficient to motivate effectively and justify intellectually an altruistic character-a
further aspect of morality, captured by the virtue tradition in ethics, and related to the
earlier mention of motives. 28 In Gregory Kavka's attempt to construct a reconciliation of

morality and self-interest, for instance, his project concerns rules of action or ways of life
rather than motives or reasons for action.
Even if Kavka's reconciliation project-which makes reference to internal sanctions like
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conscience and the satisfactions of morality-succeeds, of course (and I suspect to a large
degree it does), that provides no good reason to think that morality's binding force resides
in its prudential advantages-the practical or pragmatic benefits for those performing the
actions. For such benefits might well be the result of doing what is intrinsically right. Take
the case of feeding the poor. Kavka rightly shows that potential prudential benefits accrue
to the action of feeding the poor, such as a stronger economy, less risk of rebellion, and
greater numbers of competent workers. But clearly the binding prescriptive component of
morality, Kavka himself would probably agree, is not located in such social advantages of
feeding the poor. Morality dictates the intrinsically right action to be feeding the poor,
even if no such social benefits were to result. That they in fact do result does not make
them the grounding of morality, especially in the mind of one like Kavka, it would seem,
who retains such a strong set of traditional moral convictions.
Besides accounts like those to make sense of morality apart from appeals to the divine,
there is always possible an appeal to brute fact, the theory of metaphysical intuitionism or,
perhaps, Platonic realism. Perhaps moral facts, including obligations at times to sacrifice
self-interest, are just emergent facts in this world, synthetic necessary truths knowable a
priori by a moral intuition, with no explanation possible in terms of naturalistic parts. Here
the theist is often confronted with a surprisingly formidable opponent. But the theist is not
obligated to show that a theistic universe is the only possible explanation, but merely the
best explanation. <To show that it's merely a good and coherent explanation would be an
accomplishment in many of philosophy's contemporary quarters') And many atheists,
confronted with the option of this theory of brute facts, on the one hand, and something
like a naturalist's account of the strength of moral intuitions in terms of either deeply held,
habitually conditioned social mores or in terms of moral facts somehow supervening on
natural facts, on the other, have found the latter to be the considerably more rational
option. Objective naturalism, in other words, seems the considerably more formidable
challenge to theistic ethics than intuitionism; and a fuller explication of theistic ethics
would have to confront this challenge more directly. Fruitful lines of inquiry might highlight such challenges naturalism faces in accounting for a sufficiently meaningful free will
to undergird morality, how moral prescriptions can be invested with the kind of qualitative force we think they deserve, or how the quest for reproductive advantage can
explain moral advantage.
It might be suggested that we ought to believe in moral facts for the same reason we
ought to believe in brute epistemological facts-such as the propriety of the principle of
abduction: the principle of inference to the best explanation that is being used in this very
essay to argue for theistic ethics. Or construe the suggestion like this: the line of argument
sketched so far might be applied equally well to epistemology as to morality and thereby
shown unsound. Morality and epistemology do, as a matter of fact, seem to be on a par
in critical respects; alleged facts in each arena contain both descriptive and prescriptive

components, for instance. However, obligations and sacrifices of self-interest are not nearly as involved in epistemology as in ethics; and violations of epistemological principles,
even at their most egregious, simply don't begin to raise people's ire to the degree that the
General's actions do, nor should they. Nor do the most brilliant applications of the principle of inference to the best explanation inspire people (with the possible exception of a
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few analytic philosophers) to the degree of seeing a truly selfless act of love or heroism.
So if we don't view it as odd, morality retains distinctive features which afford it a unique
capacity to inform our understanding of the world.
Of course, some see moral facts as just irredeemably odd, and thus are not convinced
of their reality at all. The very epistemological sort of evidence adduced here in support of
ontological issues about ethics leads certain anti-realists in ethics to deny that such facts
exist apart from the seemingly necessary education of human sensibilities. \These philosophers are not to be confused with those ··realists• who would cite only social ontology.)
However bedrock our moral intuitions may appear, the argument goes, they are not hardwired into human nature. What better proof of this is there, a friend writes, than ••the casuaL even delighted manner in which small children tear the wings off flies and otherwise torture insects and torment pets? Children need to learn what cruelty is, and what counts as
cruelty ... This point is worthy of much attention, but for now just three brief points will be
made. First, to show that a process of socialization is necessary for healthy moral development is not to show it is thereby sufficient to account for moral intuitions and their corresponding contents. Second, Christianity in particular, with its communal theology of the
human condition and its teachings about original sin, seems uniquely capable of accounting
for both the necessity of socialization and the cruelty in men (and boys). Third, ifs not pretended here that the admittedly rudimentary comments to follow are enough to persuade
any committed anti-realist in ethics who would reject even the best explanation of moral
facts as inadequate to justify belief in moral facts. But then again, philosophical argument
may sometimes be the least effective means of reaching philosophers.

A THEISTIC

ACCOUNT

The odd features of alleged moral facts strike many philosophers as strange, leading
them to doubt their existence, as we have seen. What these philosophers do, in denying
moral facts, is conform their understanding of the world to their picture of the way the
world ought to look like. Since they can't make sense of moral facts in a determined
world with no God, no libertarian freedom, no essential human nature, no room for gen-

uine moral responsibility or retributive justice, it is only intellectually honest that many of
them deny the existence of moral facts altogether, chalking moral convictions up to
upbringing and/or society and nothing more.
What will be done here, though, is different: The seeming existence and apparent
nature of moral facts will be used to shape our understanding of the world. Why try to
hammer morality into categories that really presuppose that we already know what the
world is like, all the while turning a deaf ear to morality s instructive nature? Maybe
morality should instead be allowed to affect our view of the world, changing it to include
such entities as moral facts and to accord them epistemic value in our effort at understanding life and its meaning.
If a non-theistic universe fails to provide the best account for the existence of moral
facts, what does? Since morality's existence and prescriptive force seem strong. the best
explanation of such a state of affairs is, I submit, theism. To put it in Stace's terms, our dismissal of the ·oracles of the pas( may have been too hasty. The distinctive features of
moral facts make them more at home, less odd, in a theistic universe than in an atheistic
0
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one, perhaps making God's obituary premature. Morality in its various features-including
its entailment of genuine obligation, libertarian freedom, retributive justice, and sacrifice of
self·interest (at least in the short run), with love and relationship as paramount-has for its
best explanation a creative God who has in some sense inscribed his own loving and rela·
tional nature into the world, fashioning human beings in his image and according to his
intentions, and imbuing them with moral intuitions which, if properly socially mediated,
provide reliable insight into the ethical nature of God, themselves, and the world.
The details of such a theistic account do not pretend to have been derived through sheer
rationality here, out of whole cloth, but are admittedly the salient moral attributes of God as
understood in the great monotheistic traditions, and particularly Christianity. That said, most
all of what is presented here is also fully consistent with an Anselmian conception of deity as
the possessor of the maximally compossible conjunction of the various "omni"-qualities. The
suggestive argument here is that a theistic account of the universe and its creation provides
the best available explanation of our intuitions of morality as possessing an objective exis·
tence and binding prescriptive force. Such an argument if made more fully, would obviously
have to additionally defend theism against pantheism and other religious views that differ
radically from Christianity. Potential help here might be found in specifically Christian doc·
trine about a personal and immanent God offering transforming grace to enable us to cross
the "moral gap," to use john Hare's phrase, and live the kind of life to which he calls us.
Whether God exists, of course, is no small debate; i(s not a question about whether
one more thing exists in the inventory of reality. "It is a question about the ultimate con·
text for everything else," Morris writes. "The theist and the atheist should see everything
differently."" little wonder that Nielsen's arguments, cited earlier, examined features of
this world, with the assumption that God doesn't exist, and concluded that morality can
escape unscathed without him. It is also little wonder that those committed to believing in
God's existence and who find theistic ethics somehow compelling are often unconvinced
by such arguments, thinking them hollow and somehow missing the point. Perhaps
Dostoevsky was right: if God doesn't exist then everything is permitted. But the theist is
only conjecturing in such a case, for he argues that God does exist as creator of theists and
atheists alike; and therefore not everything is permitted, negatively, and moral truth penetrates the surface of this universe to its core, positively.
Reconsider moral intuitions in light of this. Morality, as traditionally understood, entails
not just rights and duties, but also points toward a whole new set of categories that make a
discussion of rights and duties, at best an emaciated caricature of this new set of realities.
Philosopher Eleonore Stump writes that as C. S. lewis maintained in 1he Pilgrim's Regress,
the vision of certain sorts of beauty fills us with an acute if inchoate longing for somethingthe source of the beauty perhaps-and a painful sense that we don't possess it aren't part of
it now.'° Perhaps morality, in certain of its practical exemplifications, is one of those kinds of
beauty, like in the sacrifice of Christ, and its privation or perversion a form of ugliness, like
the General's treachery.
George Mavrodes, perhaps sensing this same longing, writes
I come more and more to think that morality, while a fact is a twisted and distorted
fact. Or perhaps better, that it is a barely recognizable version of another fact, a ver·
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sion adapted to a twisted and distorted world. It is something like, I suppose, the
way in which the pine that grows at timberline, wind blasted and twisted low
against the rock, is a version of the tall and symmetrical tree that grows lower on
the slopes. I think it may be that the related notions of sacrifice and gift represent
(or come close to representing) the fact, that is, the pattern of life, whose distorted
version we know here as morality. Imagine a situation, an "economy'' if you will, in
which no one ever buys or trades for or seizes any good thing. But whatever good
he enjoys it is either one which he himself has created or else one which he
received as a free and unconditional gift And as soon as he has tasted it and seen
that it is good he stands ready to give it away in his tum as soon as the opportunity
arises. In such a place, if one were to speak either of his rights or his duties, his
remark might be met with puzzled laughter as his hearers struggled to recall an
ancient world in which those terms referred to something important.
We have, of course, even now some occasions that tend in this direction. Within
some families perhaps, or even in a regiment in desperate battle, people may for a
time pass largely beyond morality and live lives of gift and sacrifice. On those occasions nothing would be lost if the moral concepts and the moral language were to
disappear. But it is probably not possible that such situations and occasions should be
more than rare exceptions in the daily life of the present world. Christianity, however, which tells us that the present world is "fallen" and hence leads us to expect a distortion in its important features, also tells us that one day the redemption of the
world will be complete and that then all things shall be made new."
Such an account enables an understanding of love in a far less superficial way than any
account whose ultimate components are matter and energy. Jeny Walls writes
Our desire for love and our belief in its importance is supported by the doctrine of
the Trinity, which maintains that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit always existed in a
relationship of perfect love, even before the world was created. So love and relationship are not relative newcomers in the history of the world, which emerged

accidentally from the blind forces of matter. Rather, love and relationship 'go all the
way down' in the structure of reality. 32
To put the same point negatively, a theistic ethic adds a qualitatively different and
morally relevant flavor to blameworthy actions, according to which we don't merely
offend people, but God himself. Now it is even clearer, by the way, why the study of
ethics eclipses epistemology in terms of insight into the nature of the universe: God is
rational, but more importantly God is love. It is into this reality that supererogatory
actions, particularly, provide a window.
Love, as God's nature and morality's pinnacle, while containing an ineliminable affective constituent, transcends mere feeling to encompass attitude, action, and character, a
view actually much closer to Kant's meaning (than Taylor's earlier suggestion) when he
said that love as a duty can be commanded. In this way, love, understood as a duty, can
be coherently commanded after all: not as a mere feeling, but as a practical way of life, a

.
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tangible means of treating others.'' God, aware of our inconstant emotional dispositions,
by commanding love for himself and others confers on us the responsibility to exert what
control we can-over our actions-with the intent being that the appropriate feelings and
proper motivations-character-will eventually be formed within us. As Pascal realized,
again in the words of Morris,

Action creates emotion. How we behave can influence, over the long run and
sometimes even on the spot, what attitudes and emotions are operative in our lives.

And these in tum can open our eyes or blind us to aspects of our objective environment. They can affect deeply our ability to see the world aright."
Think of husbands who claim to have "fallen out of love" with their wives, and the fact
that it is often most obvious that they are not justified to forsake the relationship.
Emotions are notoriously fickle, and can fluctuate too easily with the ups and downs of
life. An important question for such an individual to ask himself before placing too much
stock in his emotions is what actions has he performed or failed to perform which have
contributed to this loss of feeling? Action and inaction create emotions, as well as vice
versa. That emotions drive actions is well known and not denied here, but that a largely
symmetric and reciprocal relation holds bet:\.veen actions and emotions is less recognized.
It should be obvious that none of this is to trivialize feeling, incidentally. /onathan
Edwards issued a warning against such a mistake, depicting it a wicked act
to propagate and est.Dlish a persuasion that all affections and sensible emotions of
the mind, in things of religion, are nothing at all to be regarded, but are rather to be
avoided and carefully guarded against, as things of a pernicious tendency. This lwilll
bring all religion to a mere lifeless formality, and effectively shut out the power of
godliness, and everything which is spiritual and to have all true Christianity turned
out of doors.
As there is no true religion where there is nothing else but affection, so there is
no true religion where there is no religious affection .... If the great things of religion
are rightly understood, they will affect the heart.... This manner of slighting all religious affections is the way exceedingly to harden the hearts of men, and to encourage them in their stupidity and senselessness, and to keep them in a state of spiritual
death as long as they live and bring them at last to death etemal. 35
Love as understood as encompassing both feeling and behavior is indeed commanded in
the New Testament, with the doxastic recognition that the latter can cultivate the former
and the former can impassion the latter.
That behavior can affect sentiments and shape character provides a compelling reason
why, at some stage of moral development. we as human beings are in need of guidelines
and moral rules to establish parameters within which behavior is allowable. Such a recognition enables a defense against Nowell-Smith's charge that obedience of God's commands is necessarily infantile. Eventually adherence to such guidelines can enable the kind
of mature moral life envisioned by Nowell-Smith, though with a different understanding
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of moral freedom. Moral freedom, according to Christian teaching, is not the autonomy
to make up what is right and what is wrong, but the capacity to choose to do what is good
over what is evil. The morally and spiritually free, therefore, are not those who exert
autonomy irrespective of the objective constraints on what is right and wrong, but who
freely choose to do that which is right and good
This understanding of freedom is what may provide a way out of the Euthyphro
Dilemma. Recall that one of the horns of the dilemma, when morality was rooted in God,
entailed the scary prospect of God issuing an immoral command, thereby making it right."
At least a partial solution to this problem is to call into question God's ability to sin; if God
could never issue such a corrunand, the problem never arises. The problem with such a

solution is that it doesn't seem a logical impossibility to consider God issuing such a command, despite Aquinas's attempt to portray it as such. Nevertheless theists like Robert
Adams wish to assert that it remains necessarily the case that God would not, and in some
sense could not, issue such a command. But how can such a limit be placed on the activities
of a God who, in the Anselmian sense, is omnipotent, able to do anything logically possible?
Such contemporary questions presuppose an understanding of freedom as the freedom from the constraints of standard rules or the impositions of others, the autonomy to

do whatever you want. But that construal of freedom is itself rather morally infantile,
more germane to our contemporary political context than to the moral and spiritual

realm. A deeper understanding of freedom construes it as the freedom not to actualize
certain possibilities. Stories abound of people who, in their expressions of personal autonomy, become enslaved to their vices. Genuine freedom is not just freedom to, but freedom from. God is free not to sin, and therefore free not to issue an immoral command.
However, if the statement "God is good" is understood as synthetic and substantive, and not merely analytic and a function of language, then its denial can't be selfcontradictory and therefore remains a broadly logical possibility. So how, you might
ask, can an event (like God issuing an immoral command) which is in some sense a
possibility nevertheless not be actually possible, and a proposition affirming the occurrence of such an event be necessarily false? Because God is the delimiter of possibilities, so that some states of affairs are conceivable, or epistemically possible, but not
really metaphysically possible. In this connection Morris writes
For the Anselrnian holds that God exemplifies necessarily the properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and goodness. Because of this, God has the unique ontological

role of being a delimiter of possibility. To put it simply, some maximal groupings of
propositions which, if per impossible, God did not exist would constitute possible
worlds, do not count as genuinely possible worlds due to the constraints placed on
possibility by the nature of the creator. Certain worlds can be described with full
consistency in first order logic but are such that, for example, their moral qualities
preclude their even possibly being actualized or allowed by an Anselmian God. P
That love and such freedom are the ultimate product of morality thus understood liberates morality from a mere emphasis on rules and regulations. An understanding of
morality emancipated from slavish dependence on laws and guidelines makes sense of
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the inevitable grey areas that can invariably be found in dilemma ethics. In the realm of
rules and duties and such, relativities and exceptions to the rule exist; but that is more tolerable in a system ruled not by an impersonal Kantian law to which human beings need
to be unswervingly committed, but rather a personal God. Not an arbitrary God, exacerbating the Euthyphro Dilemma, but one who always acts in love and keeps his promises,
not out of compulsion, but out of His unchanging nature of love.
The point, again, is not that God isn't free to do otherwise, but that He's free not to.
Preoccupation with whether God is free to do what is evil is a function of what we can
call the Minimalist Strategy: talk of morality just in terms of rules and rights and duties, a

strategy that is sometimes essential, often important, but never ultimate. 38 Morality as construed by theistic ethics points beyond what is penultimate and minimalist to that which
our acute if inchoate longing apprehends. It points to that place of morality on the other
side of rights and duties, where there shall be no occasion for any prohibition, envisioned
by Mavrodes, quoted earlier, where "if one were to speak either of his rights or his duties,
his remark might be met with puzzled laughter as his hearers struggled to recall an ancient
world in which those terms referred to something important." 39
Morality is not the deepest thing ... it is provisional and transitory ... due to serve its
use and then to pass away in favor of something richer and deeper. 40
REWARDS AND PuNISHMENTS

Such idealizations are well and good, but perhaps recall for us the last challenge to theistic ethics that will be briefly treated here: Isn't religious adherence just disguised egoism
to get into heaven and avoid hell? As Alasdair Macintyre writes,
If I am liable to be sent to hell for not doing what God commands, I am thereby
provided with a corrupting, because totally self-interested, motive for pursuing the
good. When self-interest is made as central as this, other motives are likely to dwindle in importance and a religious morality becomes self-defeating, at least insofar as
it was originally designed to condemn pure self-interest."
This type of objection, Jerry Walls notes, has the most force when the sufferings of hell
are seen more as an externally imposed punishment, bearing no necessary relation to the
nature of the moral action involved But the objection loses some of its momentum when
the anguish of hell is seen as a function of a life of evil. ITo some extent, a similar point
may apply to the joy of heaven being a function of choosing good, though the grace of
God that enables heaven goes far beyond any merely natural consequences.) This point
too is vulnerable to a Kantian-styled objection that criticizes moral motivation to avoid evil
simply to avoid the anguish that is typically a natural consequence of such actions and
attitudes in a moral world. To the Kantian must be conceded some ground at this point;
heaven and hell do, at some level, appeal to self-interest."
But not all self-interest is selfish, and proper self-interest is a legitimate part of genuine
moral motivation." This is particularly the case when the self-interested motivation takes
for its normative form the renunciation of self-absorption and -indulgence. Further, an
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action that is in one's self-interest may have been sufficiently motivated by something
other than self-interest to qualify as something for which to be praised." And even Kant
himself insisted that practical rationality demands the postulate of a God who will ensure,
ultimately, that the virtuous are the happy. Mavrodes writes that "what we have in Kant is
the recognition that there cannot be, in any 'reasonable' way, a moral demand upon me,
unless reality itself is committed to morality in some deep way."" Theistic ethics, it has
been argued, is the best explanation of how reality itself is thus committed, thus providing
a liberation from a Stoic commitment to morality without the psychologically vital confidence that reality itself is ultimately concerned about the best interests of moral persons.
Lest this defensive maneuver designed to salvage the connection between God and
morality against Kant's objection lose sight of an important point, it should be remembered that what the theological stance is being criticized for here is the "vice" of solving a
heretofore intractable moral dilemma. That dilemma resides in attempting to reconcile
morality as concurrently requiring sacrifice of self-interest and protection of self-interest.
What has been presented are some steps in the direction of accounting for a meaningful,
coherent, and consistent way to retain both of these moral intuitions in synergistic balance, by distinguishing between short-term and long-term interest and pointing to the
nature of the ethical acts performed in a moral world.
Heaven and hell, thus understood within a matrix of orthodox religious beliefs—
according to which salvation is not earned but received through faith in Christ's sacrifice,
involving both orthodoxy and orthopraxy—can at least potentially offer substantive motivation to live morally, and perhaps even endure sacrifice of personal interest or even persecution. Since it is often agreed that the proper contents of ethics, generally speaking, are
not what is up for grabs so much as any sufficiently motivating factors to do what is right,
the doctrines of heaven and hell may well provide some hard and needed motivation to
live the kind of moral life that makes best sense when understood within a larger context
than this life alone.
CONCLUSION

To sum up, then, theistic ethics, following some of the suggestions in this paper, retains
the potential of being shown to account for moral facts better than secular ethics and to
provide a strong account of moral motivation. Such an ethic need not, and properly
understood does not, entail a simplistic correlation between doctrinal belief or religious
affiliation and moral practice, nor does it of necessity contain elements that are essentially
infantile. To the contrary, it affirms that all human beings, having been created in God's
imago dei, are capable of intuitively grasping and rationally understanding the moral order
which, given its salient features, has for its best explanation a theistic premise, providing
the best available account of love understood in more than a superficial way. Love thus
understood as more than mere emotion indeed can be commanded and thereby facilitate
the process of moral maturity by the reciprocal relationship that obtains between emotion
and action, according to a notion of freedom which also makes possible God's willful
inability to issue immoral commands.'"
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WHY THE HOLINESS MOVEMENT
IS DEAD

KENNETH J. COLLINS

In an important article a few years ago, Keith Drury, a denominational official in
The Wesleyan Church, maintained that the holiness movement, as a movement, is
dead.' He offered eight causes for this unfortunate development:
I . We wanted to be respectable
2. We have plunged into the evangelical mainstream
3. We failed to convince the younger generation
4. We quit making holiness the main issue
5. We lost the lay people
6. We over-reacted against the abuses of the past
7. We adopted a "church growth" thinking without theological thinking
8. We did not notice when the battle line moved.'
Now Drury does not deny that a holiness infrastructure of churches, boards, and
academic institutions is in place, nor that there are many pious souls within them,
but what he does dispute is that the vitality and evangelistic power of the holiness
movement, along with an attentiveness to holiness in preaching, and personal life,
remain to any significant degree. Instead, he conjures up the image of a corpse in
an upstairs room that we visit from time to time and with which we have little chats
as if the body were alive.' In other words, the days of talking about a pulsing, soulwinning, energetic movement are clearly gone.
More recently, Richard S. Taylor, noted Nazarene scholar, entered the fray and
offered a similar jeremiad with respect to the holiness movement. Among other
things, he listed the following evidences of decline and demise:

Kenneth Collins is a professor of historical theology and Wesley studies at Asbury Theological Seminary
in Wi/more, Kentucky.

THE ASBURY THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

FALL 1999

• vol.

54

•

N 0 . 2

28

Collins
1 . The intense focus which originally created a movement has been dissipated by
the diffusion of aims and the influx of a pagan, TV-generated culture.
2. Many—perhaps most—in holiness churches no longer really believe that there is
an instantaneous, supernatural, second work of divine grace.
3. The message of "full salvation" is inherently counter to sinful human nature.
4. There was an inevitable reaction to the excesses of the holiness movement.
5. A shabby demonstration of holiness was offered on the part of many of its professors.
6. When counseling moved in, rugged and radical holiness preaching gradually was
displaced by what pastors thought was more germane to the real everyday
needs of their people.
7. The church growth movement displaced concern for holiness.
8. Holiness folk failed to read holiness literature.
9. Liberal ideas about the Bible and doctrine, acceded to by a younger generation
of scholars, undermined effective holiness teaching.'

As someone who works in the fields of Wesley studies, Methodist theology, and
American religion, I would like to add my own voice to these painful laments, these eulogies, offered by both Drury and Taylor. And though I will consider some different reasons
than either of these two important church leaders has offered, I sense that we are all united in believing that the "pretense" that all is well in the holiness "movement" must at the
very least be dispelled. Acknowledging the painful reality of our situation, in an honest
and forthright way, as well as calling for greater self-knowledge and humility, will be
important first steps so that we may then be empowered, once again, to carry out our historic mission, namely, to spread scriptural holiness across the lands.
Before I get much further in this essay, let me first of all note my different background
and "social location" from some holiness folk. I did not, for instance, grow up in a holiness
church (such as The Wesleyan Church or the Church of the Nazarene), nor did I ever
witness some of the more flagrant abuses and misunderstandings of John Wesley's teaching on sanctification in general and on Christian perfection in particular. On the contrary,
I was raised in the Roman Catholic Church until the age of twenty and witnessed a
whole different set of issues and abuses, some of which those holiness folk who think that
the grass is always greener on the other more "catholic" side of things will eventually have
to face. Today, I am an ordained elder in The United Methodist Church, a communion of
faith which I deeply love, and I am passionately committed to the Methodist standard of
holiness, to the importance and cruciality of holy love in the warp and woof of life. With
this brief background in place, I offer the following considerations as to why the holiness
movement is "dead."
THE AWAKENING HAS RUN ITS COURSE

First of all, there is a natural life cycle to revival movements as William McLoughlin has
so ably argued.' The awakening and insights of the earlier generation, along with its vitality and enthusiasm, eventually become institutionalized in rituals, practices, mores, and
doctrines. This is not to suggest, however, that rituals, practices, mores, and doctrines are
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problematic in and of themselves; they are indeed vital, a necessary part of any movement. But in time, all that unfortunately remains for subsequent generations is the fonn of
religion without its inner power. Some scholars contend that the upper length of this cycle
is forty years; others argue for a figure considerably less. We are, therefore, well into the
"institutional phase" of things.
ENTIRE SANCTIACATION IS DOUBTED

Second, in a way roughly analogous to Puritan New England, several of the sons and
daughters (as well as the grandsons and granddaughters) of the holiness movement were
no longer able-for all sorts of reasons-to make the same profession of perfect love as did
their ancestors. The repetition of the altar call, then, a liturgical form employed in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries as an invitation to Christian perfection, soon became
an annoyance, the reopening of a wound, a painful reminder that the favor of God so
graciously received by the elders of another generation had apparently not been received
by the next.
Given this new setting, which was informed by various levels of unbelief as to what
the enabling grace of God can do, professions of Christian perfection were now looked
upon as graphic examples of "self-delusion." That is, on the one hand, a sincere testimo-

ny of perfect love was often met with incredulity even when there was no significant evidence to the contrary. On the other hand, the unbelieving observer of such a profession
of grace sometimes took great
even joy, in noting any contrary evidence, as if he
or she had found "great spoils" in detecting sin in the life of the professor. This is truly a
wretched state of unbelief and is referred to by the Germans as Schadenfreude, taking odd
delight in the evil of others, rejoicing and taking comfort in the very presence of sin. Sadly
some of these melancholic spirits fill pulpits on Sunday mornings.
For their
the New England Puritans addressed their particular problem of malaise
(which was somewhat different from the holiness one) through the "Half-Way Covenant."
In this compromise, the unconverted could have their children baptized though they themon the other
selves were barred from the sacraments. The heirs of the holiness
hand, took a much different approach, and one that was far more radical: that is, instead of
reaffirming the necessity, indeed, the cruciality of holiness for all believers, several leading
scholars now maintained that entire sanctification was not really a possibility for any believer, anyone who enjoyed the graces of justification and regeneration, but only for older folk,
those advanced in age, thus confusing the high standard of this grace with mature, adult
Christian states. But the evidence from Wesley's own writings belies such teaching on
many levels as I have demonstrated in my recent dialog with Randy Maddox at the 1999
meeting of the Wesleyan Theological Society. If fact, John Wesley attested to the entire
sanctification of both a four-year-old girl as well as a twelve-year-old girl.6
THE LIBERTY OF THE NEW BIRTH IS REPUDIATED

Third, the substance of the preceding observations suggests that the sons and daughters of the holiness movement are far more pessimistic, soteriologically speaking, than
their parents and grandparents ever were. Put another way, an optimism of grace has
been subtly replaced by what is trumpeted as a more "realistic" and "honest" assessment

30

Collins

of the human condition. Here depth psychology and subtle forms of deterministic
philosophies have played an important corrosive role. In particular, attention to the subtle,

nebulous affects of the subconscious is now supposed to preclude even the basic kind of
liberty that Wesley had affirmed for the children of God in his sermons, "The Great
Privilege of Those that are Born of God," and "The Marks of the New Birth;" namely, that
they may be free from the power or dominion of sin. Indeed, "even babes in Christ,"
Wesley proclaimed, "are in such a sense perfect, or 'born of God' ... as, first, not to commit
sin."' Wesley, of course, could be forgiven his error due to the psychological naivete of his
age, but modem people could not.
Other factors to be considered on this head include the cultural predominance of
Calvinism in the United States, especially among Evangelicals. Accordingly, the phrase
"we sin in thought, word, and deed every day" flows much too easily from the lips not
only of Calvinists, who regrettably attempt to provide sophisticated theological support for
such notions, but also from the lips of holiness folk who are a part of a tradition which
has taught them otherwise. Granted Calvinists and Wesleyans have different conceptions
of sin which must be factored in (and several Calvinists are indeed living holy lives) but
even after this is done, the broader soteriological effects of the cultural predominance of
Calvinism remain much the same: many American Evangelicals, and now some Holiness
folk as well, assume that they can remain in the graces of the new birth and regeneration,
despite the ongoing and enslaving presence of sin. Consequently, professions of the liberty
entailed even in the new birth, of aaual freedom from the power of sin (glorifying Christ
for the work that he has done) are now treated as quaint at best; hypocritical at worst.
And silence on these matters is deemed the highest sanctity of all.
THE PROBLEMS OF PAST ABUSE

Fourth, holiness folk have, perhaps, overreacted to some veiy real problems and abus-

es within the tradition such that they are now, "throwing out the holiness baby with the
modem bath water," as Douglas Strong has so articulately expressed it in his March 1999
Wesleyan Theological Society presidential address. Reacting to the tradition of the "jump
and stir" of revivalism, and to the "instantaneousness" and decisiveness of altar calls, some
holiness scholars have championed gradualist soteriologies where the Christian life is
viewed almost exclusively as a process of incremental changes without any crucial events,
and where john Wesley's intricate balance of process and instantaneousness has been
regrettably lost. In particular, justification, regeneration, and entire sanctification have all
been redefined and incrementalized (all changes are ones of degree) such that the cruciality of such lofty graces is often misprized, at times even repudiated. Moreover, when a
gradualist, processive, reading is brought to bear on Christian perfection, itself, it can only
emerge, once again, as maturity, as an adult Christian state, and not at all as a present possibility for the very young among us. In short, there are some theologies currently in place
which may result in the loss of the next generation for holiness. Indeed, some of the
more theologically astute among us have already begun to realize that gradualist soteriologies are actually incapable of carrying all of the theological meaning enjoyed in traditional
holiness life and thought.
Interestingly enough, some of the most vocal champions of gradualist readings of
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Wesley's soteriology have been equally vocal in deprecating conversion and the role that
it plays in Christian life. During the 1980s and 1990s, for example, wave after wave of
debunkers passed through Wesley studies, first deconstructing Aldersgate (it was referred
to as a "non-evenC by Theodore fennings, for example)' and then, not content with this,
they proceeded to deconstruct the reality of conversion itself. Indeed, theologically speaking, things are in such a regrettable state in United Methodism (which contains many holiness folk) right now that my own and subsequent generations might have lost even the
wherewithal to articulate a theology of conversion. And we wonder why the holiness
movement is dead?
A CLIMATE HOSTILE TO TESTIMONY

Fifth, there is some very odd theological reasoning found among younger holiness
scholars, and it is actually inimical to the reception of genuine heart-felt testimonies. To
illustrate, almost any lofty witness to what the empowering grace of God can do is judged
to be an instance of spiritual pride, a lack of humility, as if the perversions of such a witness
in the past must now ever constitute its current expressions. Given this sort of reasoning.
what is far more preferred in some holiness circles is not a bold witness to the liberating
powers of the gospel or to the graces of entire sanctification, but rather a detailed chronicle
of descent into sin along with a rendering of existential, participatory knowledge of the lingering effects of subtle, but no less real, bondages. Such honesty (which is, of course,
always valuable) is mistakenly considered true Christian humility and is judged to be an
instance of "real sanctity." Like the mental patients in One Rew Over the Cuckoos' Nest it is
not wise to tell the psychiatrist something so bold as that you are healed, but only that
you· re making progress, that you· re a little bit better today than you were yesterday.
The problem with this theological reasoning is that it fails to recognize that there are
two kinds of humility, not one. The first is associated with sin and repentance, and it must
be carefully distinguished from the second which alone is called true Christian humility, as
Harald Lindstrom correctly points out.' That is, the former disposition of the heart occurs
in the context of conviction and accusation and is often marked by fear of God, regret
over past sins, and guilt The latter disposition of true Christian humility, however, which
takes rise afrer (or concomitant with) justification and the new birth, grows out of a sense
of "being loved and reconciled by God."'° Simply put, the one grows out of consciousness
of sin; the other out of a consciousness of love. And it is precisely this latter humility, so
deep and rich, which forms the basis for unabashed testimony as what the grace of God
can do. Here Christ, not the self, is glorified by means of this bold and faithful witness.
But some, however, are apparently no longer willing to hear such witness or to add their

voices to such praise.
Moreover, some leaders, oddly enough, have actually grown tired of the testimony
that Christ has set believers free from the guilt, power and being of sin, and they erroneously contend that much "more" is being said if believers would simply focus on the
love of God in their witness. Granted the liberties of the gospel can be discussed in both a
negative and a positive fashion, as freedom from sin and freedom to love, but this last
expression by itself does not, as is mistakenly supposed, say "more" than the first. Indeed,
to be free from the guilt, power and being of sin is to be entirely sanctified, to be washed
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and renewed, and to be in a proper relation with the Most High. Put another way, such
language is simply another way of affirming that one does not commit sins either of omission or commission, that one loves the Lord with all of one's heart, mind, soul, and

strength and one's neighbor as oneself. Again, if sin is a "missing of the mark," then freedom from sin, from all that separates us from the holy love of God, is the very actualization of our high calling and purpose in Jesus Christ. Therefore, to focus exclusively, or
nearly so, on freedom to love, without also considering what believers are free from, is to

remove the normative context of the moral law (which illuminates what freedom from
sin means) from consideration. Such love, then, may in the end be informed not by the
gracious liberty of the gospel, but by mere sentimentality and wishful thinking. As there is
"cheap grace," so is there "cheap love."
INTELLECTUAL DISSIPATION

Sixth, the holiness movement is dead because its children have "come of age," not
only because they have studied at some of the "finest" educational institutions in the

world, receiving impressive terminal degrees and doing significant postdoctoral work, but
also because they are now very much a part of the intellectual cultural establishment and
there is much at stake. For some, the setting of the academy, with its emphasis on objectivity and professional distance, is far more congenial than that of the church. While education is clearly valuable, a tremendous resource which the church so badly needs, and
while I would be one of the last people to develop an anti-intellectualist thesis, I must
nevertheless go on to observe that some key leaders in holiness denominations have, in
reality, substituted the thought of some particular philosopher or theological guru for
divine revelation itself. Here, in other words, human creativity, the intricate projects of the
human imagination, are given as much if not more weight than the revelation of God in
Jesus Christ. Here humble, holy, sacrificial love (emphasis on relation) most often suffers,
a love which was at the very heart of the holiness movement.
ACCOMMODATION AND COMPROMISE

Seventh, some liberal Protestant theologians at the beginning of the twentieth century
offered greater legitimacy for their work (at least in the judgment of the secular cultural
elites to whom they were appealing) by trimming the Christian faith of "superstition," the
supernatural, and personal (read "individualistic") piety. Part of the concern here among
these modem theologians was to continue to be relevant and therefore to enjoy, at least

in some measure, a cultural power that they rightly sensed was already slipping away.
What remained after this process of modernization or demythologization was a core of
social ethics that looked remarkably similar to the ethics, and political judgments, of the
elites to whom the original appeal had been made. Here the gospel was defined (or redefined) almost exclusively in terms of social ethics such that the purpose, indeed the telos,
of the ministry of Jesus, himself, as well as that of the church were deemed to be, for the
most part, the betterment of the social conditions of the disadvantaged.
Though the amelioration of the plight of the poor clearly is a part of the gospel, what was
lost in this modernizing process was the "embarrassing" (read "supernatural") depth dimension of the Christian faith, that faith in Jesus Christ radically transforms within such that the
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dispositions of the heart become remarkably and decisively holy and new. In this latter conthe motivation as well as the goals of ministry were
text, which was in danger of being
viewed not so much in tenns of abstract notions of ideology or justice, but in terms of fostering holy love, which includes, of course, justice and proper relations, among persons as well
as within the broader society. Indeed, it was John Wesley himself who more than two centuries ago pointed out the error of thinking that the very purpose of the Christian faith was
merely or largely social bettennent Accordingly, in a Jetter to Mrs. Bishop on June 17, 1774,
Wesley pointed out that "the regulation of social life is the one end of religion, is a strange
position indeed. I never imagined any but a Deist would affirm this."''
Later in the twentieth century, some of the same intellectuals of the holiness movement who had come of age and who had experienced repeated frustration, even alienation, earlier in holiness churches now looked to the cultural and theological accommodations made by liberalism with renewed appreciation. And so a second, Jess extensive,
phase of legitimization and accommodation set in, this time within the holiness movement itself. This change appears to have been largely a second order phenomenon in the
sense that an accommodation was made to an already existing accommodation, and to a

dying one at that
Though some of these holiness historians and theologians (well placed in holiness institutions by the way) were reluctant to classify themselves as "liberal," they nevertheless
developed themes congenial to theological liberals and tended to be embarrassed, at least
in some circles, about their more humble holiness roots, both socially and intel!ectually.
The irony of all of this was not Jost on some observers who realized the contradiction
entailed as scholars on the one hand deprecated the cruciality of inward religion (or at
least downplayed it) and championed the rights of the marginalized-sometimes in some
very strident ways-while on the other hand they became increasingly embarrassed, both
personally and professionally, when reminded about their own more modest holiness heritage. Indeed, the holiness tradition has been, for the most part, a lower to lower-middle
class phenomenon, invigorated by waves of revivalism, and determined to emphasize the

importance of social reform out of and informed by nothing less than the gracious transformation, the conversion, which occurs in Christ by means of the Spirit, the very beginning of holy love. But what was held together by the fathers and mothers of an earlier
generation was soon dropped by sons and daughters of a later one.
l'ROGRAMMATIC ISSUES

Eighth, though it may seem, at first glance, as if the death of the holiness movement in
North America was brought about simply by theological or spiritual malaise, other programmatic, more structural, elements need to be considered as well.
For one thing, the way many holiness folk coalesced and began to form separate, discreet denominations (whether they "came out" or were "pushed oun during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, ironically enough, planted the seeds of subsequent
demise. In my reckoning, the holiness movement thrived precisely when it was "persecuted," when it remained within larger bodies to which it bore painful, and at times,
annoying witness. Remove that larger, more "catholic" context and you have a prescription for insularity, provincialism, and, unfortunately, decline.
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Though my next observation may at first sight seem to be a theological and not a programmatic one, it is actually the latter. Here I am not initially concerned with the content of
theology (though this is clearly important as well), but with how that theology is structured
or "packaged" so that it can communicate the truths of the tradition. Thus, teaching about
sanctification, the inculcation of holy love, is often presented simply as "holiness." People
then begin to identify as "holiness" folk; zealous pastors preach "holiness" sermons, and energetic theologians write books on "holiness," from biblical, historical, and theological points of
view. And in their late-night thoughts some theologians even begin to wax eloquently and
to imagine that holiness is the veiy "substance" of God. The problem here, though it is often
subtle, is that holiness may in time be considered apart from the love of God.
Though Wesley, himself, often used the simple term "holiness" he always meant by it,
certainly after 1725, nothing less than the holy love of God. Indeed, apart from its "tension" with love, holiness quickly (and almost inevitably) devolves into sociological and
subcultural components, that is, into the stuff of a very human-made religion. Moreover,
with its heightened emphasis on separation from the "other," holiness religion may end
up glorifying a particular social and cultural ethos-which is actually the reflection of its
own social location. Soon the taboos are trotted out, disciplines are packed with strictures,

and legalism continues apace. In this phase, some folk may even begin to conclude that
they are "holy" precisely because all the taboos are kept. In the worst cases, some unfortunates will begin to enjoy, even to relish, the spiritual distance between them and their
neighbors, those for whom Christ died.
In light of this dynamic, holiness folk must agree from the outset, in preaching, teaching, and discipline, never to consider holiness apart from the love of God or to consider
the love of God apart from holiness (the error of "sentimental" liberalism). This is a structural, programmatic failure. Simply put, the tracks down which theology and life will
move are distorted from the veiy start.
LACK OF LEADERSHIP AND VISION

Ninth, during the nineteenth centuiy the holiness movement enjoyed the capable and
steady leadership of Daniel Steele, Phoebe Palmer and Asa Mahan. In the twentieth centuiy, Dennis Kinlaw, Melvin Dieter, Timothy Smith, William Greathouse, and Mildred
Wynkoop as well as others provided both clear direction and an engaging vision for holiness people. But when one surveys the current generation of holiness leadership, those in
their forties and fifties (with but veiy few exceptions), one cannot help but be less optimistic-even fearful-about the future. Indeed, things are in such an unfortunate state right
now that many holiness leaders no longer see even the need for a distinct holiness witness as revealed in such comments as "there are just as many sinners in the holiness
churches as in Lutheran churches" (or in any other denomination for that matter). Now
while there are surely saints and sinners in all Christian denominations, and while some
people live better than their theologies allow, holiness folk should enjoy a more gracious
liberty, and one that they are, therefore, eagerly willing to proclaim to the broader church.
But if it is indeed true that there is little difference between members of mainline
denominations and holiness folk in terms of sanctity, as some leaders suppose, then it
must surely be asked what is the point of the holiness movement in the first place and
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what has become of the mission of spreading "scriptural holiness across the land7
Unfortunately, here we have lost not only our vision, but also our purpose, the very reason God had raised us up in the first place. John Wesley once said, "Give me one hundred preachers who fear nothing but sin and desire nothing but God, and I care not a
straw whether they be clergymen or laymen, such alone will shake the gates of hell and
set up the kingdom of heaven upon earth."" Can we find a hundred such preachers
among us 7 Can we find even fifty?
A RAY OF HOPE

Despite such a gloomy prognosis, there are actually some signs of hope. Some minority voices, theologically speaking, that have been marginalized, ridiculed and stereotyped in
the past, are now being heard and taken seriously in the Wesleyan Theological Society
and in the Wesley studies section of the American Academy of Religion as well as in various organs of publication, including journals and publishing houses. Indeed, the pretense
that all is well in holiness circles is effectively being dispelled. What will be the outcome of
all of this remains to be seen What is clear at this point is that the holiness movement
constitutes a precious legacy. The problem, though, is that it must become more than a
legacy. That is, it must once again become a vital, pulsing
transforming both
the churched and the unchurched alike, and inviting all to enjoy the very highest graces,
nothing less than the wonder and beauty of holy love.
NOTES

1.
Keith Drury, "The Holiness Movement is Dead," Holiness Digest 8, no. I <Winter 1994), pp.
13-15.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 13.
4. Richard S. Taylor, "Why the Holiness Movement Died," Cod's Revivalist and Bible Advocate
I 11, no. 2 (March 1999), pp. 6-27.
5. Cf. William G. Mcloughlin, Revivals, Awakenings, and Reform <Oiicago: The University of
Oiicago Press, I 978), pp. 1-23.
6. Cf. W. Reginald Ward and Richard P. Heitzenrater, The Works of John Wesley, BiC£1'1tennial
ed., vol. 20: Journals and Diaries III (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1991 ), p. 39, and Thomas Jackson,
ed., The Works of Rev. john Wesley, 14 vols. (London: Wesleyan Methodist Book Room, 18291831 ), Reprinted Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1978, 12:333.
7. Albert C. Outler, ed., The Works of!ohn Wesley, vols. 1-4. The Sermons (Nashville: Abingdon
Press, 1984), 2: I 05.
8. Cf. Theodore W. Jennings Jr., "John Wesley Against Aldersgate," Quarterly Review 8 (fall
1988): 3-22.
9. Harald Lindstrom, Wesley and Sanctification <Wilmore, Ky.: Francis Asbury Publishing Co.>, p.
114.
I0. Ibid. Appropriately, Lindstrom explores these issues of humility and true Christian humility
(and repentance after justification) under the broader heading of the "stages" in the Christian life.
11. Jackson, Works, 13:29.
12. John Telford, ed., The Letters of John Wesley, AM., 8 vols. (London: The Epworth Press,
1931 ), 6:272.

,., i'O"'•M•"•tl•"••••••
..
1•,.
. .1.....

hi.\),\

,

POST-SOVIET PROTESTANT
THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION:
COME OF AGE?

MARK ELLIOTT

From not a single Evangelical seminary in the Soviet Union in I 986 to over I 00
on its former territory today, and from no residential students to some 3,000
this has to rank as one of the more dramatic developments in leadership training in
the history of Protestantism. The opportunity for a fresh appraisal of this phenomenon came with a conference of Protestant theological educators, held near Kyiv,
Ukraine, 9· 12 September 1996. Ninety-four delegates (64 from the former Soviet
Union and 30 from the West) celebrated the graduation of nine seminarians from the
first ·ever Russian M.A. program in Protestant theological studies, a joint effort of
Odessa
Seminary, St. Petersburg Christian University, and Donetsk
Christian University. (See the Ea5t· West Church and Ministry Report 4 (Fall 1996), p.
I 4, for the names of candidates and titles of theses) Delegates also witnessed sub·
stantive theological discussion, growing indigenous leadership, and the launching of a
Protestant theological accrediting association with a wide-ranging, ambitious agenda.
Among indigenous conference participants, the average number of years of

involvement in theological education was three-a startling illustration of the infancy
of the movement. Nevertheless, W estem observers who had attended the first such
gathering in February 1993 in Moscow and the second in October I 994 in Oradea,
Romania, commented on the rapid maturation and growing sophistication of the
indigenous leadership. 1

One theme that seminary representatives frequently voiced was the need for
close ties to the church. Peter Penner of St. Petersburg Christian University (SPCUl,
in his "Current Analysis of Theological Education," stated,
Seminaries need to work with the church. The question is how closely. At first,
St. Petersburg Christian University did not emphasize church relations. Then we
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came to understand that we exist for the church; the church does not exist for the
seminary. Now, the president of the Evangelical Christian-Baptist Union of Russia is
on the SPCU board. Now we emphasize student work in churches and church recommendations for students. SPCU has had conferences for the pastors of its students
and has asked pastors how SPCU can help students not to become arrogant.

Aleksei Melnichuk, Donetsk Christian University, made similar points in his review of
"Issues in Church/School Relationships," as did Anatoly Prokopchuk of Kyiv Evangelical
Christian-Baptist (ECB) Seminary: "Be close to the church. It doesn't matter what the level
of education of the school. Independent schools produce graduates 'who are on the
street' with no church to go to. ECB churches may not accept these graduates."

As the present massive level of Western assistance subsides over time, the new seminaries will become ever more aware of their need for close ties with local churches, not only
for reasons of placement, but for financial support. At present, however, church contributions to theological education in the former Soviet Union are quite limited. As Aleksei
Melnichuk noted, many churches are in building programs that are stretching their capacities to the limit. In addition, a lack of a tradition of stewardship and current chaotic eco-

nomic conditions spell limited financial support from believers for local churches, much less
for more distant seminaries. At present, for example, the vast majority of Evangelical
churches do not support full-time ministers. All but six of 75 ECB pastors in the Odessa
region have secular employment Gregori Kommendant. president of the Ukrainian ECB,
hopes half of the churches under his charge will support their own pastors by the year
2000. Peter Deyneka Russian Ministries sponsored a first-ever Protestant conference on
stewardship in Moscow, 24-26 October 1996, but more such efforts will be needed.
Peter Penner noted that "Many schools live just one day at a time. Many administrators just settle [immediate] crises." One of these crises that received attention at the Kyiv
consultation concerned enrollment. Pressure is mounting to enlarge student bodies, not to

increase revenue from quite modest tuition, but at least partly to justify each school's existence in the eyes of Western benefactors. As a result, schools increasingly are competing
for students. Two Western doctoral candidates currently researching post-Soviet
Protestant theological education have shared with this reporter that academic standards
have suffered in the process. Peter Konovalchik, president of the Russian ECB federation,
contended, quite justifiably, that the need now is not to start more schools, but to
strengthen existing ones.

In a debriefing session for Western participants, jack Graves, Director of Research for
Overseas Council for Theological Education, observed that "schools need quickly to move
from dependency to financial independence for there to be true independence."
Indigenous speakers in general sessions made the same argument. Anatoly Prokopchuk, for

example, urged self-sufficiency: 'We thank our brothers from the West for help. But now
we need to think of supporting ourselves. And our Western brothers will rejoice, too."
One reason Protestant leaders in the former Soviet Union fear the present overwhelm-

ing Western influence upon theological education, quietly if not publicly, is theological.
Although the issue did not emerge in plenary sessions, they do consider a minority of
Western instructors to be liberal. Especially troubling to them are those guest professors
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who they feel question the authority of Scripture. Also, Protestant leaders recognize that a
majority of Western instructors are Calvinists, which is not to their liking. Anatoly
Prokopchuk put it bluntly: "We have a problem with liberalism and Calvinism." Aleksei
Melnichuk explained it this way:
Seminary graduates often criticize !Russian and Ukrainian] Baptist traditions.
Western teachers are seen as the source of much of this criticism. Students will ask
a Western professor about eternal security and students will accept the Western
professor's eternal security teaching over their home pastors' freewill position that is
not argued in an educated manner.
It should be noted that the majority of Western Evangelicals active in post-Soviet ministry
are Calvinists, although most do not emphasize the fact and many incorrectly presume,
consciously or unconsciously, that Evange/imJ and Reformed are synonyms. That WesleyanArrninian and Pentecostal interpretations may equally be deemed Evangelical often does
not occur to Calvinists in the West. For their part, a majority of Slavic Evangelicals,
Baptists as well as Pentecostals, are Arminian, although they typically do not use this term.
Naturally, this difference gives rise to considerable tension, and nowhere more quickly

than in Western assistance to post-Soviet seminaries.
Slavic Protestant leaders contend not only with Western theological influences that
they consider harmful, but they also contend in their own ranks with strong anti-intellectual currents that view all theological education with suspicion. Pavel Damian, a Christian
publisher from St. Petersburg, noted that many pastors still feel that the only book their
congregations need to read is the Bible. Sergei Rybikov of the Christian Missionary Union
in south Russia reiterated the "negative view of education" in many churches. Peter

Penner shared that he had written ninety pages defending the spiritual value of instruction
and study. In contrast, the opening address of the conference by a Baptist elder statesman
launched a thinly-veiled attack on study in the West, modem Bible translations, and "intellectualism" in general. While one might be disappointed with this lack of understanding of
the life of the mind in the service of Christendom, it is sensible to be wary of Western
theological education for Slavic seminarians en masse, and it is sensible to be wary of
unwarranted prestige that can lead believers to prefer professors over pastors. Dallas
Seminary professor Mark Young noted, "If [seminary] teachers have little contact with
churches and pastors, then most students will want to be professors, not pastors." One
Western doctoral candidate surveying post-Soviet seminarians has already documented an
alarmingly widespread preference among Slavic seminarians for teaching over preaching.
Yet concern over Western influences in seminaries is not only theological; it also is

political. Some leaders fear the loss of control as Western notions of democratic procedure and freedom of speech seep into the consciousness of newly-educated pastors. One
delegate at the conference, fearing that church members might contract false notions

from various new publications, asked the head of Ukrainian Evangelical ChristiansBaptists, "Is it possible to control the literature we are printing?" When Rev. Kommendant
responded that today it is impossible, applause followed. He continued, "What fruit is
sweet? What is prohibited? Some books should be burned, but we cannot do that.
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Freedom is freedom." At the same time, Russian ECB president Konovalchik volunteered

a more traditional attitude: "We need some control. For example, I saw a Pentecostal
book in a Baptist kiosk. We cannot trust all publishing houses."
Konovalchik's negative reference to Pentecostals leads to a shortcoming of a conference billed as interdenominational: 76.5 percent of participants were Evangelical
Christians-Baptists but Pentecostals, arguably as large as the ECB in the former Soviet
Union, accounted for only five percent. On the one hand, conference sponsors, Overseas
Council for Theological Education and Peter Deyneka Russian Ministries, sincerely
desired broad representation from all Evangelical denominations and all Pentecostal seminaries and Bible institutes received invitations. On the other hand, the indigenous organiz-

ing committee for the conference and the program itself included no Pentecostals. This
reporter learned after the conference, Pentecostals perceived the function to be a Baptist
undertaking and most apparently declined to participate as a result. While many Western
obsetvers at the conference were pained by various critical comments from Baptists about
Pentecostals-not to mention about Calvinists-it must be noted, sadly, that Pentecostal
disdain for non-Pentecostals in the former Soviet Union is at least as intense.
On a more positive note, after considerable discussion, the conference voted to establish a Protestant accrediting association that will be interdenominational rather than exclusively Baptist. In addition, lest the organizing committee be all ECB, Cenadi Sergienko, a
young professor from the Moscow ECB Seminary trained at Dallas Seminary, nominated
Pentecostal Anatoly Cloukhovsky, who was duly included. Others named to the organizing committee were Aleksei Brim.a, R Kheibulin, Nikolai Kornilov, Aleksei Melnichuk,
Fyodor Mokan, Peter Penner, Anatoly Prokopchuk, Vladimir Rialuzov, Sergei Rybikov,
and Sergei Sannikov. The new Protestant theological association will seek affiliation with
the International Council for Evangelical Theological Education nCETEl.
NOTES

1. The present report is a continuation of the author's study of the history of and current
developments in Russian Protestant theological education; Mark Elliott, "Protestant Education in the
Fonner Soviet Union." International Bulletin of Missionary Research 18 (January 1994): 14-22; and
Mark Elliott, "Theological Education After Communism: The Mixed Blessing of Western
Assistance." The Asbury Theological journal SO (Spring 1995): 67-73. For a Russian reprint, see:
"Bogoslovskoe obrazovanie v postkommunisticheskii period: polozhitel'nye i otritsatel'nye storony
zapadnoi pomoshchi." Put' bogopoznaniia, no. I ( 19961: 17-25.

BELONGING TO GOD: THE 01.!EST FOR
A COMMUNAL SPIRITUALITY IN THE
POSTMODERN WORLD

STANLEY). GRENZ

Need a job? Looking for a lover? Feng shui can help' boasted the advertisement
in a New York paper. Through the ancient principles of feng shui (Chinese for
"wind" and "water"), the ad promised, "you can change your environment and
change your life." How? Nancy SantoPietro, the psychotherapist turned feng shui
specialist who placed the ad, offered one example. She counsels people who are
plagued by interpersonal problems to "hang a pink shui crystal on a nine-inch red
string in your relationship comer." 1
THE CONTEMPORARY CONfEXT: PEOPLE ON A QUEST

Relationships ... This topic routinely tops the list of concerns people voice today.
Why? Perhaps because relationships have increasingly come to be viewed as the one
antidote for a deeper longing, namely, the craving for a sense of purpose or meaning
in a seemingly purposeless world. Especially today's younger adults (those whom
Douglas Coupland has dubbed "Generation X") look to relationships to dispel what
GenX writer Tom Beaudoin calls his peers' "intense sense of aloneness" nursed by
their profound "anxiety about a lack of meaning in their lives"' and the "significant
emptiness ... silence, and ... darkness" they feel. 3 Indeed, people of various ages-albeit
in somewhat differing ways-are embarking on a quest to attain this elusive dream. As
the headline on the cover of a recent issue of Canada's leading news magazine,
Maclean's, put "Mainstream North America searches for meaning in life."'
A Confused Quest. Where should we tum in the midst of our anxiety? Today people are plagued by uncertainty as to what they are in fact seeking, let alone where
the goal of this search can be found. This uncertainty is evidenced in Alanis
Morissette's award-winning song "All I Really Want" ( 1996). In the dishevelled lyrics,
Morissette sifts through the competing desires she finds present within and around

Stanley f. Grenz is the Pioneer McDonald Professor of Theology and Ethics at Carey Theological College
and Regent College.

THE AsBURY THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

FAll

1999

v 0 l .

5 4

N 0.

2

42

Grenz

her. Yet between the lines of seemingly disconnected and hopelessly superficial preferences is evidence that her genuine desires lie deeper. Living in a world of picky people,
what Morissette really wants is patience and peace. Feeling herself knocked down and
strung out, she longs for deliverance and some means "to calm the angiy voice." Alone
and frustrated by the apathy and flippancy of others, she desperately yearns for a soulmate, a kindred spirit, someone who truly understands.
Equally confusing is the plethora of proposed remedies for our malaise. Driven by the
consumer mentality indicative of contemporaiy society with its smorgasbord of options,
dazzling array of proposals and chorus of discordant voices calling from eveiy conceivable
direction, today's seekers move en rnasse from fad to fad, following the crowd in a neverending attempt to keep up with the latest "rage." Thus, North Americans gobble up the
"how to" books pushed on Oprah's show and sign up for the latest therapy conferences
that claim to provide the pathway to the realization of their vaguely fonmed hopes.
A "Postmodern" Quest. The new shape of the human quest is indicative of the demise of
the modern world, constructed as it was upon the foundation of a deified science worshiped as the final arbiter of truth and the attendant elevation of the material as the sole
dimension of existence. The twilight of modernism has given rise to a new outlook, the

so-called postmodern ethos.
One subplot of an early episode of Star Trek: Voyager finds Kathryn Janeway musing to
her second officer, Chakotay, how she senses an intense burden as the commander of a

ship lost in space. Later her dutiful confidant offered a solution. Chakotay invited Janeway
to join in an ancient ceremony that would put the captain in touch with her animal guide.
The mantra he recited during the ritual expressed hope that "out there" might be "one
powerful being" who could give the captain "the answers she seeks."
A "Spintua/" Quest. This cultural artifact illustrates one intriguing aspect of the postmodern situation. In a manner unprecedented in the late modern era, contemporary North
Americans appear to be open to the spiritual dimension of life.' People seem to have
grown dissatisfied with what they consider to be the truncated, materialist focus indicative
of the modem world. And as a result they are increasingly ready to search for answers

beyond the realm of the material.
"Spirituality" is "in," however, precisely at the time when participation in traditional

organized religion has nose-dived. Eight out of ten adult Canadians say they believe in
God, eighty-two percent consider themselves to be "somewhat" or "veiy spiritual," and

about half report that their lives have become more spiritual in the last several years.'
Nevertheless, less than 25% attend church regularly. The students in David Batstone's religion classes at the University of San Francisco offered a similar portrait. Although 80%
claim that they are "not religious," the same percentage think of themselves as "spirituaJ." 7

Torn Beaudoin puts a face on this statistic. "By the late 1980s," he reminisces about his
late teenage years, "I was ... alienated from official religion. Despite all this, I still considered
myself unmistakably spiritual."' He later explains the broader generational tendency he
typified: "Xers take symbols, values, and rituals from various religious traditions and com-

bine them into their personal 'spirituality.' They see this spirituality as being far removed
from 'religion,' which they frequently equate with a religious institution."''
Spirituality is indeed "in." Words like "values," "soul" and "spiritual" are common par-
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lance today, even among persons who care little about Christianity. This mood is evident
in Joan Osborne's rnid- ! 990s hit song, "One of Us." Picturing humankind as lost passengers on a bus headed nowhere, the lyrics raise the question as to whether God might be a
co-traveller trying to find his way "back home'' just as we are. But Osborne then asks if all
this requires that we believe "in Jesus, the saints and all the prophets."
This, then, is the context in which we live. Ours is a "spiritual" age. The interest in the
spiritual and the search for spirituality that has emerged as so important to the contemporary ethos has far-reaching implications for us as we seek to point those to whom God
has called us to minister to the true well-spring of spiritual life. And it offers a hopeful context for thinking through what lies at the heart of Christian spirituality.
THE SPIRITUAL QUEST AS THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY

In one sense, the current interest in spirituality is the contemporary, postmodern

embodiment of the
human search for personal identity.
A successful professional in her late 30s, Mary had taken a leave of absence to attend
seminary where she expected to find answers to the gnawing questions that kept emerging within her. At one point in her struggle, she requested an appointment with me.
Thirty minutes into the session she blurted out, desperately attempting to hold back the
tears:"! no longer know who I really am. And I am afraid that if I find out, there won't be
a place for me."
Contemplating the vastness and majesty of the universe, the Hebrew psalmist declared
in amazement, "what are mere mortals that you are mindful of them, human beings that
you care for them?" (Ps. 8:4). As the Psalm suggests, the quest for personal identity is an
ancient one. Yet it is taking on a somewhat different form today. We are witnessing a shift
in the focal point of the search. This shift involves a rethinking of what constitutes the
human person
The Modem Self Whereas the Psalmist placed humans within the context of creation, in
the modem era the human person was pried loose from creation, now understood as
"nature." And in contrast to the Psalmist who viewed human identity in connection with
our "home" within the created order, the modern response to the question of human
identity came in the form of the construction of the self.
In the wake of the
many philosophers declared that lying at the core of
what it means to be human is reason or rationality. Further, in their opinion rationality
entailed being endowed with the ability to disengage from one's natural environment and
social context, so as to be able to objectify the world. Disengagement from the objectified
world formed the foundation for the modernist ideal: individual autonomy, understood
as the ability to choose one's own purposes from within oneself apart from the controlling
influence of natural and social forces.'° In this manner, the paradigmatic human became
the "scientist," the one who observes, categorizes and tests hypotheses about the world,"
together with the technician, the one who refashions the world to create a "home."
The elevation of individual autonomy led to an atomistic understanding of the social
realm. This approach viewed society as a collection of autonomous, independent selves,
each of whom pursues his (and sometimes her) own personally chosen ends. In short, the
modern self is self-created and self-sufficient, the highly centered, "true inner person" per-
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sisting through time and standing above the vacillations and shifting relationships that
characterize day-to-day living.
The Postmodern Demise of the Self Whatever else it may be, the postmodern ethos is
marked by the rejection of--Dr even more strongly stated, the deconstruction of-the modern self. Postmoderns realize that rather than the disengaged, isolated observer who exists
prior to the construction of society and thus forms the primary building block for the
purely contractual social order, the human self is in some sense constituted by social relationships.
Postmodern thinkers routinely picture this engaged human self as a position in a vast
web, a nexus, a point of intersection. The postmodern self is a bundle of fluctuating relationships and momentary preferences. In a fast-changing world, this image leads to a highly unstable, impermanent self. As the French philosopher jean-Francios Lyotard observed,
"each exists in a fabric of relations that is now more complex and mobile than ever
before."" Consequently, the postmodern condition entails the loss of the stability and
consistency that characterized the self of the modem ideal. The modern self has given
place to the decentered, fleeting self constructed in each moment of existence. Hence, the
postmodern condition may be characterized as "psychic fragmentation"-to cite Fredric
Jameson's designation." And this splintering of the self into multiple subjectivities gives
birth to what Johann Roten calls the "chaotic self,"" which "attempts to absorb 'alterity' in
all its forms to overcome separation and isolation, only to find itself in the end in a state
of spiritual chaos.""
The Postmodern Quest for o Self The chaos of identity marks the contemporary spiritual
quest. Viewed from this perspective, postmodern spirituality entails the chaotic self that
emerged from the deconstruction of the autonomous, self-positing, centered self of
modernity seeking some semblance of identity beyond the ever fleeting "now" of existence. As a nexus, a bundle of relationships, the postmodern self looks to relationships for
identity." And this relationally based identity has a narrative character. To cite Lyotard
again, "Even before he is born, if only by virtue of the name he is given, the human child
is already positioned as the referent in the story recounted by those around him, in relation to which he will inevitably chart his course." 17
Communitarians theorize that we view ourselves, others and the world from a specific

perspective. At the heart of this perspective is a set of basic categories, beliefs or funclamental ways of speaking, which together comprise what we may call our "interpretive
framework." Through this interpretive framework we experience, make sense of, and

speak about ourselves and the world we inhabit. This interpretive framework is especially
crucial to personal identity formation, for it provides the categories through which we "tell
our story" and thereby organize the diverse aspects of our lives into what we see as a

meaningful whole. But the plot line by means of which we organize the isolated events of
our lived history is the borrowed plot-the paradigmatic narrative-we derive from the
social group (or community of reference) in which we participate." In short, my sense of
who I am is determined to a great extent by the group of which I am a member." My
acceptance of this community narrative marks my participation in the social group and

forms the basis of my sense of personal identity as a member of the community, which in
turn provides me with at least a fleeting sense of "home."
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Modem sociologists suggest that religion often plays a crucial role in this process.
Writing in 1966, Thomas O'Dea, for example, declared,

Individuals, by their acceptance of the values involved in religion and the beliefs about
human nature and destiny associated with them, develop important aspects of their
own self-understanding and self-definition. Also, by their participation in religious ritual
and worship, they act out significant elements of their own identity. In these ways, religion affects individuals' understanding of who they are and what they are.'°
Similarly, Kingsley Davis noted two decades earlier that a religious community facilitates
identity formation by connecting the individual with something transcendent: "religion
gives the individual a sense of identity with the distant past and the limitless future. It
expands his ego by making his spirit significant for the universe and the universe significant for him.''" More recently, thinkers such as Peter Berger have argued that all transcen-

dent visions lying at the foundation of human societies are in a sense retigious. 22
On the basis of insights such as these, we can affirm the tendency of people today to
understand their search for identity as a spiritual quest. In seeking some reference point
beyond their own fleeting selves from which to find meaning for their lives they are "religious," even though they may at the same time shun organized religion. In short, postmodern spirituality is the chaotic postmodern self seeking an identity in relationships with
others as co-participants in a social group that is the bearer of a paradigmatic narrative.
But the question remains, What-if anything-can provide the telos of the spiritual quest
of the postmodern self' What community narrative-if any-offers the answer to the ofren
unacknowledged desire for a semblance of permanency the postmodern self seeks? More
specific to our purpose, How can Christian faith best respond to the postmodern self ana
the contemporary focus on spirituality?
Goo
For the first piece of this puzzle, we turn to the fifth-century church theologian
Augustine. Augustine spoke for the entire Christian tradition when he concluded from his
own spiritual odyssey, "Thou hast made us for thyself. Therefore, our hearts are restless
until they find rest in thee, 0 God."" Christians believe that God is the telos of the human
quest. But how can we unpack this conviction within the contemporary context?
The Posimodem Que5t for Cod. Douglas Coupland, the best-selling writer who coined the
designation "Generation X," perhaps inadvertently provided a contemporary reformulation
of Augustine's conclusion. In his intriguing, postmodern novel Life After Cod, the author
capsulizes the pilgrimage of the first generation raised "afrer God"-those who have grown
up this side of the demise of the cultural dominance of Christianity and yet find themselves
yearning for some sense of the presence of God. Coupland's literary journey comes to a
climax with the author baring his own soul. For one brief moment he has found an openness of heart that he doubts he will ever achieve again. Speaking from the depth of his soul
he voices an unexpected confession:
THE GOAL OF THE HUMAN QUEST: BELONGING TO

My secret is that I need God-that I am sick and can no longer make it alone. I need
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God to help me give, because I no longer seem to be capable of giving; to help me
be kind, as I no longer seem capable of kindness; to help me love, as I seem
beyond being able to love. "

Coupland's confession finds echo in Tom Beaudoin's observation. He looks at the pervasiveness of sexuality found in pop culture, for example, and concludes, "How deeply

GenX desires God'""
The postmodern interest in God is ofien sparked as well by experiences of the miraculous, that is, by events that defy explanation-a category formerly ruled out of court by the
scientism of modernity. The widely followed TV series, The X-Files, which boasts a faithful
audience of 20 million viewers has repeatedly broached this theme. One episode featured
Fox Mulder and Dana Scully investigating reports of persons who supposedly canried the
stigmata (or Christ's cnucifixion wounds) in their bodies. The claimants turned out to be
hoaxes, except for a boy whose life Scully, the scientific skeptic of the duo, saved through a
series of seemingly coincidental events. Shaken by this, the lapsed Catholic visited the confessional booth and confided to the priest that this experience had awakened in her a fear.
"I am afraid that God is speaking," she poignantly declared, "but no one is listening."
From the perspective of Christian theology, the contemporary quest for spirituality,

reflecting as it does the desire for personal identity together with the valuing of relationships, is ultimately the search for God. As Augustine and Beaudoin concluded, and pop
culture icons like Coupland and Scully evidence, we long for an identity that only God can
give through a relationship that only God can fulfill. We are searching for our tnue identity,
which according to the New Testament is God's gracious gift, freely given to us through an
unimaginable relationship-becoming God's own children. In short, the goal of our quest
for spirituality is a "homecoming," a coming home to God, wherein lies our true identity.
This observation suggests that one of the key theological tasks in the postmodern context is to think through what it means to proclaim that the God of the Bible is the te/os of
our human desire for spirituality. Our challenge is to articulate and to live out the belief
that life in relationship with God constitutes "true spirituality," to borrow Francis
Schaeffer's descriptor. 26

Cod as the Coal of Christian Spirituality. At the heart of the Bible is the narrative of God
acting to bring humans into the fullness of relationship-the tnue spirituality-that is the
goal of our existence. Christians are convinced that coming home to God is the lasting
source of personal identity, the answer to the quest of the postmodern self.
Occupying center stage in the personal identity-confenring aspect of the biblical salvation drama is the Holy Spirit. The Spirit is the one who authors new, spiritual life in us
and in this manner brings us through Jesus Christ into relationship with the one whom
Jesus called "Father" (John 14:16-23). The New Testament writers refer to this Spirit-led
process as "regeneration" rntus 3:5), a word that canries the metaphorical idea of being
"born anew" or "born again" (John 3:1-16). As the agent of a spiritual birth the Spirit
mediates to us a special relationship with God. Through the Spirit we become God's spiritual offspring-God's children (John 1:12-13). This new status allows us to enjoy the most
intimate fellowship possible. In fact, according to Paul, the indwelling Spirit brings us to
address God with the same name of endearment that Jesus himself spoke-" Abba" (Rom.
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8: 15; Gal. 4:6). Consequently, in causing us to be born into God's family, the Spirit brings
us to share in the relationship Jesus enjoyed with the one he called "Father." That is, we
participate in Jesus' own sonship, for we are co-heirs with Christ (Rom. 8: 17).
The Roman Catholic theologian Karl Rahner has argued convincingly that the interplay of the three trinitarian persons in salvation history offers us a window into the eternal
divine life. "Rahner's rule"-the principle that "the economic trinity is the immanent trinity"-suggests that the basis of the dynamic evident in our salvation (our participation in
Jesus' relationship with his heavenly Father) lies in the eternal dynamic of the triune God.
Our salvation is the outworking of the perichoretic dance of the trinitarian persons.
Since the patristic era, theologians have taught that at the heart of this eternal dynamic
is the relationship between the first and second trinitarian persons. Throughout all eternity, the Father loves the Son, and the Son reciprocates the Father's love. Actually, this is the
theological meaning of the language "Father" and "Son," for in ancient cultures, the son
was the heir, the one upon whom the father lavishes all his wealth.
The entire drama of creation, in tum, flows out of--0r is the overflowing of-the eternal
relationship the Father shares with the Son. More specifically, as is suggested by Jesus'
remark in what is called his "high priestly prayer," God's purpose in creating the world
arises out of the Son's desire that others see-that is, know experientially-"the glory you
have given me because you loved me before the creation of the world" (John 17:24). The
Son desires co-inheritors of the wealth his Father bestows on him eternally.
This provides the clue as to why the new birth brings us to participate in the divine
love relationship in the position of the Son. Like the Son who eternally receives the
Father's love, we too are the recipients of the unbounded love of God the Father. As a
result, we are enabled to love God in return, after the pattern of the Son's reciprocating
the divine love that has its genesis in the Father's love. As John the Apostle put it, "We
love ... because [Codi first loved us"(] John 4:19).
We must take this a step farther, however. As Augustine noted, the love the Father
shares with the Son is concretized in the Spirit, the third trinitarian person who "proceeds"
eternally from the Father and the Son, or perhaps better stated, proceeds from the Father
through the Son. The love binding the Father and the Son eternally, the divine Spirit, in
tum, is sent into the world to complete the divine plan. The Spirit's goal is to bring us to
share in the fellowship the Son enjoys with the Father. To this end, the Spirit places us "in
Christ," to cite Paul's favorite designation for our new status as believers (e.g., Rom. 8: l; I
Cor. 1:2; 1:30; 2 Cor. 1:21; 5:17-19; 12:19; Eph. 1:13). As those who are "in Christ"
(and hence "in the Son") we come "home" to the divine life the Father intends for us in
the Son, for in Christ, we are the recipients of the eternal love the Father pours out on
the Son. In short, the Spirit is God at work, guiding us to our home within the divine life
the Father freely shares with us in the Son.
The indwelling Spirit is able to bring us to participate in the eternal relationship the Son
enjoys with the Father, because this relationship is who the Spirit in fact is. The Spirit is
the personal concretization of the love the Father showers on the Son and the Son reciprocates to the Father. For this reason, when the Spirit indwells us-when we participate in
the Spirit-we participate through the Spirit in the relationship the Son enjoys with the
Father, as the co-heirs with the Son of the Father's love for the Son. Because we partici-
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pate in the divine life in the place of the eternal Son, we truly are the beloved children of
our heavenly Father. This identity-being God's beloved children and being named by
God (Rev. 2:17; 3:12Hhat God freely bestows on us in the Son by the Spirit marks the
fulfillment of our deepest longings and provides the telos of our quest for "home."
While this is the central aspect of the story, it is not the entire story.
THE

Focus OF THE HUMAN QUEST: BELONGING TO THE COMMUNITY

One of the most popular 1V programs of the 1990s, the sit-com Friends, centers on a
small group of GenXers who share two apartments across the hall from each other.
Through thick and thin, good times and bad, these friends laugh with each other, hurt for
each other and support one another. But above all the friendship they share gives meaning to their lives. The central message of the series is captured in program's theme song,
'Tl! Be There for You," which expresses candidly the GenX experience, namely, that the
reality of life is a far cry from our anticipations. What the GenXer is experiencing is a joke

of a job, a hopeless financial situation and a love life that's DOA The chorus, however,
expresses the antidote for the aloneness, suffering and brokenness of life. Each member of
the little circle of friends promises always to be "there" for the other, because--to cite the
last line of the song-"you' re there for me, too."

In this way, the sitcom offers a GenX response to what Tom Beaudoin sees as the
most fundamental question of his generation: "Will you be there for me?" According to
Beaudoin, this query touches all aspects of life: "We ask this of our selves, bodies, parents,
friends, partners, society, religions, leaders, nation, and even God." Why? In his words,
"The frailty that we perceive threatening all of these relationships continually provokes us
to ask this question." 27

Identity in Relationships. The popularity of Friends takes us back once again to the insight
that we are fundamentally social creatures. In our quest to discover what we really want,

we eventually tum away from things to people. Ultimately, we hope to find what can satisfy the deep yearning within us-the yearning to find the place where we can belong, and
we hope to discover it in relationships with others. And this leads us to seek out friendships that we hope can provide us with the sense of "belonging" we crave.

Viewed from a Christian perspective, this "tum to relationships" is not misguided. In
contrast to the popular misconception that reigned in late modernity, the emptiness-the
"homelessness" we feel inside us-can never be filled by the abundance of our possessions,
but only in relationships. Indeed, relationships create "place" or "home." People go astray,
however, in the poor relationship choices they make. They often look for belonging in
the wrong places. They mess up their lives by getting hooked up with the "wrong crowd";
they enter into relationships that promise a sense of belonging, but in the end only deepened the feeling of isolation. This, however, is not the main problem. Even the most

delightful human relationships bring us up short, for as we noted already the ultimate goal
of our quest is relationship with God. Because of our finitude and failure we simply cannot create ultimate ''place" for each other; we cannot confer fullness of identity.

Once again, we are led to the conclusion that the ultimate source of genuine belonging is God, that our human quest for spirituality is ultimately the search for relationship
with God. Yet, there is more to the story. Although we belong to God personally, we do
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not receive divine grace and personal identity alone. Rather, belonging to God is closely
linked to participation in community, more specifically, in the fellowship of Christ's disciples-the church.
Unfortunately, many people today-boomers and Xers alike-sense a great distance from
the church. This situation was vividly portrayed in a series of installments of the comic strip
"Betty." Out of curiosity, the couple's teenage son had begun to read the old family Bible.
And as a result. he told his parents that he wanted to be baptized. Having no religious
background whatever, the parents arbitrarily chose a church from the Yellow Pages. In the
pre-baptism interview, the pastor infonned them that for the sake of this event they should
choose a godparent for their son. Faced with this daunting task, Betty realized that they
knew no one who was even remotely religious. In fact, the only acquaintance Betty could
recall who wore a cross was her husband's free-wheeling brother.
This widespread sense of disconnectedness is in part the result of the mistaken ideas
about the church. One prevalent misconception is closely tied to the individualistic character of our society. Many people-including church people-mistake the church for an
organization that a person can join at will, like a civil group or a country club. This is, in
fact, a modernist understanding of the church. It treats the faith community as a conglomerate of self-contained individuals, an aggregate of modem selves.
Christ's Fellowship as our Community of Referr?nce. Rather than a voluntary organization,
the church is the specifically Christian community of reference. As such it plays a crucial
role in the fulfihnent of our quest for identity. In fact. it is with one another that we find
our identity in God.
Belonging to God entails reinterpreting our personal narrative in accordance with a
new plot line. Although the details vary from Christian to Christian, the b.asic plot of
every Christian narrative is the same. Our stories speak about past failure and the reception of God's salvation through Jesus Christ. In these narratives we employ the biblical language of the "old life" and "the new" in keeping with Paul's statement. "Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation: the old has gone, the new has come!" (2 Cor.
5: 17). Hence, Christians resonate with the experience of hymn writer John Newton, who
wrote the lyrics from images found in the New Testament: "I once was lost but now am
found, was blind but now I see."
In the spiritual transformation we earlier referred to with the Johannine term "new
birth," therefore, we come to see ourselves from a new vantage point-from the vista of
the biblical narrative of God's grace in Christ, a vantage point we share together as participants in Christ's community. By reinterpreting our story in this manner we are accepting
the story of the Christian fellowship. And as a consequence we have in fact become a
part of this particular people.
The Church as a Community of Belonging. The church, then, functions as a "community
of belonging." Its gospel message provides us with a new framework for viewing ourselves
and the world. In addition, the Christian message embodies a new set of values, especially
the values Jesus exemplified (e.g., peace, justice, patience but above all love), which we
now desire to live out in our attitudes and actions. This purpose not only marks each of
us individually as a disciple of Jesus, it unites us with each other as the community of disciples who share the same values and the same desire to live according to them.

50

Grenz

Belonging to God also marks a loyalty to God in Christ. Loyalties, however, are never
purely per>onal; an allegiance always links us with those who share it. By pledging our
fidelity to Jesus, we become a part of a new community, the fellowship of all who declare
"Jesus is Lord." Although this new allegiance is "vertical"-it binds us to God-it also inaugurates a "horizontal" bond. Allegiance to Christ unites all who share the same fundamental loyalty. But this bond is more than merely the sense of oneness that arises when we
realize that we all "love Jesus' in our own way. Rather, our common love for God and
our shared allegiance to Jesus forge in us a deep commitment to each other as well. We
come to pledge, I will indeed "be there for you," knowing that you are "there for me too."
Ultimately forging us into a people in relationship is the Spirit's doing. Indeed, the Spirit
is the one who brings us into relationship with God as our heavenly Father through
Christ. But this relationship is not a private matter; it is not something we possess as isolated persons. Instead, because through the Spirit each of us is a child of God, we are related
to each other. We are sisters and brothers-a family-a people in relationship. Further, we
belong to God because the Spirit draws us out of our alienation into a reconciled relationship with God. However, the biblical writers clearly teach that our sinful estrangement
from God taints our relationships on the human level as well. Reconciliation with God,
therefore, sets in motion the Spirit's work in bringing about the healing of these relationships as well. In this process, the Spirit transforms us from a collection of individuals into a
people or "one body," to use Paul's favorite language to refer to our corporate identity.
Hence, the church is far more than an aggregate of "saved" individuals. Rather, we are a

people committed to God and to one another. We are a community, a people among
whom we find true belonging.
But we have not yet mentioned the most foundational dimension of the relationship
between the faith community and our identity. As the Triune One, God is love. God's
goal for us, in turn, is that we be the image of God, i.e., that we reflect the divine nature

<love). According to the New Testament, the focus of this image-bearing function is
humans-in-relationship and more specifically, the church as the foretaste of the new
humanity. God wills that the church be a people who in the midst of the fallenness of the
present show what God is like. God desires that in our relationships with each other we
reflect God's own character and thus shine as the imago dei. And effecting the imago dei
among us is the Spirit's w01k
The attempt to understand this dynamic takes us back to the conclusion of the previous section. In the great mystery of belonging to God, the Spirit brings us as God's children to share in the relationship the Son enjoys with the Father. In this manner, we participate in the love that lies at the very heart of the triune God. Participation in God's eternal
love, however, is not ours as individuals in isolation; it is a privilege we share. The Spirit's

goal, in fact, is to mold us together into one people who participate jointly in the love of
God and by our loving relationships show God's great love to all.
Consequently, in contrast to the partial expressions of community we find in TV sitcoms, the family formed by the Spirit is not merely a group of friends who happen to
share common experiences or even who happen to speak a common language. Despite

all its faults, the church remains a community of believers who, because they participate
together in the Holy Spirit, share together in the eternal communion between the Father
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and the Son. Ultimately this is why God calls us to be a people committed to each other.
We are to be a community of divine love, a people bound together by the love present
among us through God's Spirit. And as a result we find in relationship with each other
true belonging, for together we belong to God in Christ our Lord through the Spirit who
is among us.
In this sense, then, John Fawcett·s old hymn expresses well the essence of the communal spirituality Christians enjoy together:
Blest be the tie that binds our hearts in Christian love;
The fellowship of kindred minds is like to that above. 28
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POSTMODERNISM ON RACE AND
GENDER: AN EVANGELICAL RESPONSE

DOUGLAS GROOTHUIS

The loaded term "postmodemism" covers a vast conceptual terrain, which I shall
not attempt to traverse in this essay. 1 But one salient feature of various forms of postmodernist thought is the rejection of truth as that which corresponds to an objective
and knowable reality. Truth is constructed, not discovered. Many postmodemists take
this notion not to entail skepticism or nihilism, but instead to be an idea with great
social potential for good. I will explore and critique this constructivist claim as it
relates to race and gender. Then I will sketch a biblical perspective that answers the
concerns for justice voiced by postmodemists, but which does so according to a biblical world view that honors and defends objective truth instead of dismissing it as
intrinsically oppressive. I will also address and oppose the often-heard notion that
evangelical egalitarianism is a covert and insidious form of postmodemism.
The postmodernist destabilization and redescription of truth often poses as a
form of liberation from racial and gender oppression. 'Truth," they claim, has been
used to subjugate women and minorities by muting and marginalizing them according to categories that are really no more than reifications or social fictions. Foucault
said, that
which categorizes the individual. .. attaches him to Ian] identity, imposes a law
of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize
in him.... !This] is a form of power which makes individuals subjects.'
This superimposition of categories is what made blacks slaves; what made
women second-rate citizens in a man's world; what fueled white imperialism worldwide for centuries; and what continues to hinder many minorities and women from
appropriate social attainment. This purported "law of truth" stigmatizes homosexu-
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als, lesbians, and bisexuals as "abnormal," "deviant," and "sinful." Zymunt Bauman tersely
states what he takes to be the essential fault of this kind of thinking to be: "The target of
certainty and of absolute truth was indistinguishable from the crusading spirit and the project of domination." 1 The idea of a fixed truth about race and gender is the culprit, the

engine of domination. As William Simon put it,
A quest for some seemingly permanent objective guide to human uses of gender
tends to reveal little more than a history of historically specific human uses. The
quest for a comprehensive species-wide "truth" only reveals a rapidly expanding
pluralization of gender "truths."'
In the shadow of rigid and oppressive gender stereotypes and in the presence of various
liberation movements striving to give voice to the concerns of the sexually marginalized,

postmodemists believe that a new model of gender must be forged, one that realizes that
"gender identity is not so much a thing as a continuing process of negotiation-not only
between the individual and the world, but also between different constructions of the self."'
Anderson claims that the global women's movement is powerful precisely because it has
made "one of the most fundamental and revolutionary discoveries people have ever made:
That any society's customs are constructions of reality." Since they were invented under

various conditions, they can be reinvented when the time comes. 6 Women's gender identities are a process of construction and deconstruction, invention and reinvention, with little
if any mooring to transcultural realities. Anderson grants that there are certain sexual givens
of the male and female body, but norms of behavior and interpretations of sexual identity
are matters of socially constructed gender.' The culture gives and the culture takes away;
nothing is pennanent. "For the postmodernist, there is no true self.'""
These postmodernist claims are daunting issues because of their complexity and consequence. In this article I will consider how the postmodernist view of race and gender is at
odds with the biblical account of truth. However, 1will also argue that the concept of reification, or social construction, can be a useful conceptual tool for analysis from a Christian
perspective. Christians have often succumbed to the worship of ideological idols, or reifications, which have put women and minorities into false and constricting molds not justified by Scripture.
TRUTH, RACE, AND GENDER

Everyone should celebrate the fact that women and minorities are finding a more confident and courageous voice in Western cultures. Scripture affinns that all people are
equally made in the image and likeness of God (Gen. 1:26l, that God is no respecter of
persons (Acts 10:34), that God deeply cares about those who have been oppressed and
abandoned, that Jesus' disciples should not show favoritism (James 2: 1), and that the
gospel message must be brought to people of every racial and ethnic group (Matt. 28: 1820; Acts 1:8-9). However, giving voice to people who have been silenced or muffled
does not entail that they will always speak the truth. Both oppressed and oppressors are,
in the biblical vision, sinners in need of forgiveness and intellectual/moral reorientation by
the Word and the Spirit. We all need large transfusions of objective truth from God to off-
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set our proclivities to self-justification, exoneration, blame-shifting, stereotyping, and so on.
But an objective orientation to truth is a vanishing value in postmodemity.
Thomas Sowell, a wise and rigorous social analyst, comments on the fact that readers
thanked columnist Anna Quindlin for "speaking our truth" on a particular matter.
"However lofty and vaguely poetic such words may seem, the cold fact is that the truth
cannot become private property without losing its whole meaning" This is because truth
"is honored precisely for its value in interpersonal communication." If we relativize truth to
individuals or special interest groups, we would be more honest "to stop using the word
or the concept and recognize that nobody's words could be relied upon anymore."" By
making truth the particular possession of oppressed groups we insinuate that "we should
arbitrarily single out some group !Or different standards, according to the fashions of the
times."' 0 When truth is reduced to a fashion statement, it has no binding force or persuasive power. The apprehension of truth decays when relativized to certain culturally
anointed groups; only a pathetic plethora of opinions remains.
No one owns or controls truth, although opinion is shaped in many ways. Sowell cites
John Adams' comment: "Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our
inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence."" Truth is neither pigmented nor gendered. There is no "black truth" or "white
truth" or "red truth" or "gay truth" or "women's truth" or "male truth." Truth is a property
of only those propositions and beliefs that match objective reality; it matters not who
utters them, where they are uttered, or why they are uttered. The real questions of moral
order fall along these lines: Who is speaking the truth? What are the social and ethical
consequences of truth and of falsity? What rights do all people deserve? How should particular groups be treated with love and justice? Everyone deserves to be heard; sadly, society has not always allowed women and minorities that voice, despite their First
Amendment rights. Yet not all voices speak truthfully or reasonably. We must distinguish
between the importance of free voices and truthful speech.
Arthur Schlesinger, a well-respected senior historian, worries that groups who have not
been adequately recognized in history tend to engage in "compensatory history" in order
to get even for past offenses at the expense of objectivity and dialogue. One writer he
cites, John Henrik Clarke, claims that "African scholars are the final authority on Africa,"
as if pigment and culture dictated truth." This is as wrong as saying that American scholars are the final authority on America. Some multicultural curricula approach history "not
as an intellectual discipline but rather as a social and psychological therapy whose primary
purpose is to raise the self-esteem of children from minority groups." 13 The question of
objective truth takes a back seat to narratives that supposedly empower beleaguered
groups. But only the truth will ever set anyone free, not compensatory constructions lacking factual foundation and rational support.
Historian Gertrude Himmelfarb notes that the postmodernist writing of history makes it
"an instrument for the struggle to power." The postmodernist "historian ... is the bearer of
the class/race/gender 'war'-or, rather 'wars.'"" When history is used as a weapon to counterbalance past evt1s (real or supposed), it fails to focus on a real past and, instead, constructs a useable past for present political and cultural purposes. However, two wrongs
don't make a right; and two lies don't make a truth. Postmodernist history-writing results in
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a quandary; when the quest for objectivity is lost, and everyone is writing from a specific
raciaVethnidgender perspective radically different from and incommensurate with other
perspectives, fairness and justice-professed postmodernist values-are necessarily ruled out.
Ironically, the postmodernist attempt to give a voice to the marginalized results in
incompatible perspectives marginalizing other perspectives. As Himmelfarb notes, all "the
ethnic, racial, religious, sexual, national, ideological, and other characteristics that distinguish people" are rendered divisive and serve only to politicize history. The "pernicious
effect" of postmodernist history is to
demean and dehumanize the people who are the subjects of history To pluralize
and particularize history to the point where people have no history in common is
to deny the common humanity of all people, whether their sex, race, class, religion.
It is also to trivialize history by so fragmenting it that it lacks all coherence and focus,
all sense of continuity-indeed all meaning. 15
Postmodemists typically take this consequence as good, since it brings down "the 'totalizing,' 'universalizing,' 'logocentric,' 'phallocentric' history that is said to be the great evil of
modemity." 16 However, racial, gender, and ethnic fragmentation can hardly encourage

mutual understanding, reconciliation, and civility that are so needed in our increasingly
pluralistic, confusing, and antagonistic world.
Without the concept of a knowable objective truth concerning a reality independent
of our biases, ignorance, and prejudices, history becomes a wax nose that can be tv.risted
in any direction without regard for proper method, objective facts, or implications. All that
remains is partisanship, ideology, power-mongering, image-manipulation, name-calling,
propaganda, and subversion. These are not the essential elements of equitable gender and
racial relations.

It is beyond question that power and prejudice can and do corrupt our understanding
of the truth about race and gender. They can even silence the voices of the oppressed
and rob them of comfort, as the ancient Preacher noted:
I looked and saw all the oppression that was taking place under the sun:
I saw the tears of the oppressedand they have no comforter;
power was on the side of their oppressors-

and they have no comforter (Eccles. 4: I).
Postmodemists face a daunting dilemma when it comes to matters of race and gender,

given their views of truth and the self. On the one hand, postmodernists make truth the
possession of various groups, fracturing truth into ethnic and gender conclaves. 17 On the

other hand, postmodemists reject all forms of "essentialism," the notion that there is an
essential or given identity that is fundamental to any individual or social group. All identity, whether individual or collective, is contingently constructed and is not rooted in any

objective reality beyond culture.
Anderson explains that the efforts of "earnest liberals" to preserve the distinct identity
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of various ethnic groups "are biased in favor of an idea of the naturalness and timelessness
of those cultures, blinkered against recognizing them as inventions that have been turned
into things by the process of reification." 18 Postmodernists cast off all essentialist notions.
Rather, identity (along with every other abstract value or concept) is socially constructed
by specific cultures and communities. Since any person normally moves in and out of a
number of subcultures every day, postmodernist identity is not determined either by the
individual or the group. Instead, identity is indeterminate and protean, and the postmodernist self is really much more se/finvolved than involved with any one social group. Thus
postmodemism scuttles objective truth and furthers the fragmentation of individuals and

communities that began with modernity. 19
SCRIPTURAL TRUTH ON RACE AND GENDER

Christians should rise to the postmodernist occasion by articulating and incarnating a theology of race and gender equal to the task of creating a climate for rational discourse, civil
exchange, and social justice. Without attempting to resolve the debates on affirmative action,
the strengths and weaknesses of multiculturalism, and other highly charged political issues, I
will give the rudiments of a biblical theology of race, gender, and justice that honors individual uniqueness, ethnic and gender identity, and objective truth. All three are indispensable.
The biblical metanarrative begins with God creating the universe by his Word (Gen.
I : I ; I john I : I-3; Heb. I :2 -3). The world is the expression of God's power and design.
The Creator recognized the prehuman world to be good, and deemed humans, who
were made in his image and likeness, to be "very good" (Gen. I :26, 3 I). The first man
and woman are the parents of us all, both in their original goodness and in their original
sin. This couple was charged to procreate, to care for creation, and to cultivate it under
God's guidance. However, both heeded the serpent's lie that the way of disobedience
and autonomy was better than the way of obedience and blessing under God. This
resulted in the fall of humans from their original state of goodness and social harmony.
The world "east of Eden" is riddled with gender, racial, and class hostilities that are rooted not in God's original design for human flourishing, but in human rebellion (Genesis
3; Romans 3).
Humans of both genders and all races are equally sinful as well as equally created in
God's image. Sin takes clifferent forms in different cultures at clifferent times, but women
and men of all races have "fallen short of the glory of God" (Rom. 3:23). Gen. 3:16
teaches that after the fall, man will "rule over" woman. This is not God's moral command,
but a consequence of sin having poisoned the world through human rebellion against
God's character and commands. It is a description of the coarse contours of an alienated
world in crying need of healing grace.
God has not placed one race above any other race. The supposed "curse of Ham" as
applied to blacks has no basis in Scripture, but was derived from a text used out of context
as a pretext for racism against blacks (Gen. 9: 18-27). In his Mars Hill address, Paul states that
from the first human God "made all the nations, that they should inhabit the whole world;
and he determined the times set for them and the exact places they should live." God did
not make one nation superior to another. God's purpose was that "they should seek him
and perhaps reach out for him and find him, though he is not far from each one of us"

58

Groothuis

(Acts 17:26-27). God's election of Israel was not because of their race or their strength or
wisdom, but by God's grace alone, and through them all the nations of the world were to
be blessed (Gen. 12:1-3).
God's redemptive plan brought Jesus to this sin-stained, tear-soaked, blood-caked planet to reconcile creatures to the Creator and to reconcile them one to another. The drama

of the gospel's liberation began with the Jews, but quickly moved out to embrace the
world. Jesus instructed his disciples to receive the Holy Spirit's power and to be his "witnesses in Jerusalem, and in all Judea and Samaria, and to the ends of the earth" (Acts I :8).

The inclusion of Samaria is significant, since the Jews historically took the Samaritans to be
racially and religiously contemptible. These barriers had already come down in Jesus' ministry (john 4) and had to be cleared away completely for the gospel to prosper. Patterns
of prejudice and bigotry had to be broken. Jews and all Gentiles can find unity through
the work of Jesus Christ (Acts IO; Eph. 2: 11-22).
Moreover, men and women are released from the old social structures of domination
and subservience through the life, death, and resurrection of the divine Messiah. Jesus said
that his followers are not to dominate each other (as did the Gentiles), but rather to serve
one another. He scandalized the establishment of his day through his respect for women
demonstrated in many circumstances. Dorothy Sayers captures this poignantly:
Perhaps it is no wonder that women were first at the Cradle and last at the Cross.
They had never known a man like this Man-there never has been such another. A
prophet and teacher who never nagged at them, never faltered or coaxed or patron-

ized; who never made jokes about them, never treated them either as "the women,

God help us 1" or 'Tue Ladies, God bless them!"; who rebuked without querulousness and praised without condescension; who took their questions and arguments
seriously; who never mapped out their sphere for them, never urged them to be

feminine or jeered at them for being female; who had no ax to grind and no uneasy
male dignity to defend; who took them as he found them and was completely
unself-conscious. There is no act, no sermon, no parable in the whole Gospel that

borrows its pungency from female perversity; nobody could possibly guess from the
words and deeds of Jesus that there was anything "funny" about woman's nature. 20
The promise of the Kingdom involves both men and women filled with the Spirit
and serving Christ (Acts 2:17-18; see also Joel 2:28-32). The new covenant, unlike the
old, allows for no principled privileging of men over women as part of God's spiritual
order. Paul enunciates this in his charter of Christian freedom for all peoples and both
sexes. Here he speaks not merely of salvation, but of one's spiritual prerogatives and
responsibilities in Christ 21

You are all children of God through faith in Christ Jesus, for all of you who were
baptized into Christ have clothed yourselves with Christ. There is neither Jew nor
Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus. If you
belong to Christ, then you are Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise
(Gal. 3:26-28).
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COLORIZING CHURCH HlsrORY

Sadly, the voices of women and minorities have not always been heard in the Western

Christian tradition. The oneness in Christ emphasized by Paul has often been neglected.
This injustice should be rectified. Christians should not reject all multicultural concerns in
an effort to guard against the "politically correct" ideology of postmodemists who abandon objective truth and paint Christianity as inherently oppressive and hegemonic. In
1992, historian Ruth Tucker wrote a provocative essay for Christianity Today called,
"Colorizing Church History: A history that ignores women and minorities is a poor reflection of our Christian heritage." Without challenging the notions of objective truth, rationality, or the need for impartial evidence, Tucker asks why our accounts of church history
are dominated by white men when, in fuct, God has powerfully used women and people
of other races to propagate, defend, and apply the gospel through the centuries.
Tucker notes that God often uses the weak and small things of the world for great purposes (Matt. 20:26; I Cor. I :27-28). Thus Christians should recognize that "a history that
focuses on those with prestige and position is not the fullest reflection of our Christian
heritage-in that it is out of step with how God works in the world." 22 She tries to rectify
this somewhat by telling of Katherine Zell's forgotten role in the Reformation. Although
excluded from the clergy, she preached in the streets of Strasbourgh, wrote tracts, supervised a large refugee program, eclited a hymnbook, and took a stand for religious toleration among orthodox Christians, even the often despised Anabaptists. 23 Zell was not as
influential as Luther or Calvin or other male reformers whose gender gave them opportunities unavailable to women of the tiine. However, "her ministry of servanthood-as Jesus

defined servanthood-is worthy of recognition, and her stand against religious intolerance
ought to serve as a model for Christians today.""
Our understanding of church history, and of all history, influences our views of ourselves and others. We are historical beings who need heroes to emulate (Hebrews I I).
Those struggling for recognition and opportunity need strong roles models, such as Zell, for
inspiration. Tucker alerts us that "the standard list of great nineteenth century American
revivalists invariably leaves off men and women of color."" We hear much of Charles
Finney's influence, but little of John Jasper, his African-American contemporary. Both had
dramatic adult conversions, ministered for over half a century, and were recognized as
powerful preachers who drew enthusiastic crowds. jasper began a church in Richmond,
Virginia, with nine members, which grew to over two thousand Although he was a "great
humanitarian and defender of the Bible ... his story has been lost in obscurity.''"
Tucker also writes of Samson Occum, a preacher and evangelist who ministered for over
forty years in eighteenth-century New England and New York. He studied at a school that
later became Dartmouth, ministered in England, and published a hymnal for his people.
Why have we not more heard of him? Why is he omitted from Sydney Ahlstrom's wellrespected work, A Religious History of the Amenmn People? Occum was a Mohegan Indian."
Tucker issues this clarion challenge:
We need to re-examine the lens we use to view church history. Like the writers of
Scripture, we need to focus on the significance of women, minorities, and those of
various cultures. Only by using this more inclusive Jens will we have any hope of
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seeing the full spectacle of what God is accomplishing on earth through his
church-and any hope of seeing him, and each other, more clearly.'"

Tucker does not advocate a quota system for church history or a compensatory model
that vilifies previous heroes (typically white males) to make room for new (nonwhite)
ones. Rather, "Church history must be told anew-not to satisfy certain interest groups,
but to capture the whole picture of the church and to listen to voices that have traditionally not been heard.""
TRUTH KNOWN AND SHARED ACROSS CULTURES

While we must retain the doctrines of biblical inspiration and the objective meaning of
biblical texts, Christians ought to open up the discourse on theology, biblical studies,
apologetics, and ethics to the global Christian community, male and female. The Body of
Christ is multi-colored, multi-ethnic, and of both sexes. God is a global God, disclosing
insights and teaching lessons to Christians around the world. The postmodern condition
of expanded communications and travel allows us greater access to this rainbow of truth

given to the church worldwide. There is nothing postmodernist about pursuing all of
God's truth, as it is refiected through different peoples in different places.
Standard theological works should not be dispensed with because they are typically
written by white, European males. (Saint Augustine, however, was from North Africa, and
may have had dark skin) Nor should minority voices always trump received opinion, simply because they are minority

We don't need an Hispanic theology, an African-

American theology, an Asian-American theology as separate fields of study, any more
than we need a white theology.True theology is the corpus of God's truth that is true for
all, engaging for all, and needed by all. Christians should practice theology by discerning
the proper application of God's objective, universal, and absolute truth to their particular
cultural situation. Rather than any ethnocentric or male-centered or female-centered reading of Scripture, we need a theo-centric reading of Scripture that discerns how God's universal truth applies to all people and all cultures.'"
Women and people of color will often bring different questions to the text of Scripture
and, therefore, find truths neglected or minimized by others. These truths are not constructed, but discovered. Nevertheless, we are all Christians who open the same Bible and
bow before the same universal Lord. The "black perspective" or the "Native American
perspective" or the "Asian perspective," is, of course, experienced within particular cultures; but if these perspectives lay claim to truth at all, they can and should be presented
to and known by others outside of these cultures. This may be difficult and require time
and patience, but if truth is truly truth, the enterprise is possible and worthwhile.
Keith Yandell argues against the claim that knowledge is only contextual and local and
not universal or commonly shared:
The questions to ask are questions about how the perspective of one context allows

its inhabitants to see accurately a common world better than do those in other contexts, and how it prevents its inhabitants from accurately seeing a common world as
well as those who do inhabit other contexts .... But those questions assume a
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knowledge that is not merely contextual, local and particular. No knowledge is
intrinsically local; all is potentially universal."
Dorothy Sayers makes the helpful distinction between special /maw/edge and special ability with respect to "the woman's point of view." In areas where women have knowledge
not typically-or ever-held by men, their "point of view'' is uniquely valuable. Sayers notes
that since some women know more about children than most men, their opinion as
women is valuable, but only in the same way that a coal miner's opinion on coal-mining
and a physician's opinion on disease is valuable. It is because they have special knowledge.
But there are other matters where "the woman's point of view'' has no value or does not

even exist, since the particularities of being female are irrelevant There is no "woman's
point of view'' on Greek grammar or logic or the an of writing a detective story.
However, if a woman derives an insight from Scripture that woukl normally be difficult
for men to perceive, this insight would be true whether received by a woman or a man. For
instance, the Study Bible for Women contains an insightful sidebar about the "crisis pregnancy''
of Mary, which elaborates on facets of her condition that most men would never considersuch as her fears, need for fiiendship, and so on." Although it is more likely for an attentive
woman-especially one who has experienced a crisis pregnancy-to discover these truths, if a
woman knows these truths of Scripture, it means that her belief corresponds to what the
sacred text teaches (which itself is an accurate report of what happened in history).
Although men and women may have, in some cases, different ways of coming to know certain things, there is no "female truth" as opposed to "male truth." If any man or any woman
/mows anything, he or she must know something that is true, something that matches up
with objective reality. Truth itself is not gendered; truth answers to reality.
POSTMODERNISM AND ETHNOCENTRISM

This principle of seeking objective truth about race and gender should be applied more
broadly to all of cultural history. Keith Windshuttle, an Austtalian historian and author of The
Killing of History, a critique of postmodernist trends in history-writing, nonetheless recognizes
that in his nation the "Aboriginal perspective, and the often shocking and disgraceful story of
how Aborigines were treated, was omitted entirely" from history writing until 1970. He
does not question "whether the views of this repressed 'other' should return or be revived."
The question is whether the tools of traditional historiography need to be thrown out in
order to do so-" Wind.shuttle thinks not, and argues against the assumptions of postmodernist historians, which, he claims, work against any hope for understanding between groups
or for building a more just social order.
Postmodemists reject history-writing based on observation and inductive argument as
Enlightenment modernism. They also embrace relativism concerning truth and knowledge,
and most deny that anything can be known with certainty. Each culture creates its own truth.
Most deny that humans can "gain any direct contact with or access to reality." Instead, "we
are locked within a closed system of language and culture, which refers not beyond our
minds to an outside world but only inwardly to itself."" With these assumptions locked in
place, any meaningful communication between, say, Aborigines and white Australians or
white Americans and Native Americans would be impossible in principle. Each culture ere-
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ates truth through its language, and language cannot refer to extralinguistic realities. The
Enlightenment vision of rational observation and inductive argument is merely a cultural prejudice that sheds no light on other cultures' histories. Yet without at least a partially knowable
past as part of our common discourse, neither repentance nor restoration is possible. Ludwig

Wittgenstein's epigram is telling: ''Only someone who can reflect on the past can repent." 15
Terry Eagleton observes that the "postmodernist 'anti-ethnocentrism'" ironically rebounds
into ethnocentrism since it ''leaves our own culture conveniently insulated from anyone

else's culture. All those anti-Western bleatings from the so-called third world may be safely
ignored, since they are interpreting our conduct in terms quite irrelevant to us." 36 This makes
moral discourse across cultures unattainable. The problem ramifies even within pluralistic

cultures, where diverse ethnic and racial groups coexist within a common legal framework
and geographic area. For instance, in Ameiica, a Laotian Hmong man in his thirties kidnaps
a seventeen-year-old woman as part of the accepted marriage-by-capture practice of the
Hmongs." This forces the postmodernist into a sharp dilemma. The traditional Hmong culture endorses this overtly patriarchal abduction as a binding marriage; the Ameiican legal
system considers kidnapping a clime and not the equivalent of matrimony. Who is right?
Whose law should obtain?
The Christian view provides the moral assessment that avoids both the errors of ethnocentrism and postmodemism. The Hmong people are made in the image and likeness of
God and are eligible for redemption in Chiist; but they are just as subject to sin as any other
group. Given that patriarchal abuses flow from the disorder of the fall (Gen. 3: 16), every culture is adversely affected by such abuses, and every Christian needs to work for equal dignity and respect for women and men. The Christian condemns the traditional Hmong practice on the basis of the woman's created dignity as a person with human rights granted by
God. Kidnapping under the Old Testament law was a capital offense (Exod. 21: 16; Deut.
24:7); the creation order for marriage is mutual care and concern in a voluntary, one-flesh
relationship (Gen. 2:20-25); marriage should involve mutual submission, respect, and love
(Eph. 5:21-33; 1 Car. 7:1-7).
One can denounce the Hmong practice as the worst sort of misogyny, not because of
any prejudice against Asians, but because of God's objective and cross-cultural standards.
In fact, Hmong people who are Christians should oppose this practice. Similarly,
Christians oppose female genital mutilation, abortion on demand, institutionalized poverty, racism, and slavery wherever they occur, because they hold every culture accountable
to God, especially their own.
Using one's own culture as the final standard is idolatry. Even the ancient Jews, who
were graciously selected by God from among all the peoples of the earth, could not invoke
their ethnicity to justify themselves or excuse their sins. On the other hand, not recognizing
the gifts God has given one's own culture is sinful ingratitude. Each culture is a complicated
mixture of common grace, sin, and special grace. The wheat will grow with the tares until
the final harvest (Matt. 13:24-30l. The moral assessment of practices enshrined in other
racial groups is not necessarily racist or ethnocentric. Charles Taylor makes this clear:
When we stand with the moral outlook of universal and equal respect, we don't
consider its condemnation of slavery, widow-burning, human sacrifice, or female

Postmodemism on Race and Gender: An Evangeliml Response

63

circumcision only as expressions of our way of being, inviting a reciprocal and
equally valid condemnation of our free labor, \vidow-remarriage, bloodless sacrifice,
and sex equality from the societies where these strange practices flourish.. . . The
moral outlook makes \vider claims, and this by its very nature. For it engenders a
pitiless criticism of all those beliefs and practices \vithin our society which fail to
meet the standard of universal respect. 18
The standard of universal respect is no mere reification, social construct or final vocabulary. We cannot alter it any more than we can create it or destroy it The standard
requires a standard-stipulator, who established the moral law over all nations, peoples,
and for all time. 39

The Christian insistence on the reality of an objective moral standard applicable to all
people does not preclude a development over time of a culture's or individuafs knowledge of moral truth, \vith respect to gender and race. Sadly, American Christians were
divided over the legitimacy of slavery for far too long, \vith each side invoking Scripture
for support. Christians also opposed women's suffrage, supposedly on biblical grounds."
But in both cases the interpreters were in error, not the Scriptures. As has been often said,
"There may yet be more light to break forth from Cod's word."
ARE EGAUT ARIANS POSTMODERN15TS?

Some have claimed that those who reject a gender-based hierarchy of authority and
who hold to the full equality of men and women in marriage, the church, and society
have capitulated to the postmodernist sensibility that texts can be deconstructed to mean
things radically different from their intended meanings. Since the traditional view has
been that the biblical text says that women must submit to their husbands unilaterally (i.e.,
in ways that husbands do not reciprocate) and that women should not be allowed to
serve in the highest positions of leadership in the church, deviation from this view is
deemed a concession to postmodernist ideas; Scripture "clearly teaches" otherwise. It is
feared that some evangelicals have allowed "women's experience" to pollute their understanding of the sacred text The question as to whether the traditionalist view has correctly discerned the objective meaning of the biblical text often is not seriously considered for
these reasons.
Those who make these charges typically categorize belief in biblical equality with all
manner of deviations from orthodoxy. So, Robertson McQuilken and Bradford Mullen
claim that
we are challenged by fellow evangelicals to give up Adam and Eve, role distinctions in
marriage, limitations on divorce, exclusively heterosexual unions, hell, faith in Jesus
Christ as the only way to acceptaice \vith Cod and-most pivotal-an inerrant Bible."
They also accuse egalitarians of "tortuous hermeneutics" in their defense of egalitarian
marriage from Ephesians 5, and claim that the "cultural form of husband/wife,
parent/child, master/servant relationships are part of the mandate in that passage and
indeed define the principle of 'being subject to one another' enunciated as a preamble.""
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Evidently, according to these traditionalists, the authoritarian, patriarchal customs of
ancient Greco-Roman societies-including the absolute rule of the wife

by the husband

and the ownership of the slave by the master-are divinely mandated for all time, and are
to be seen as inherent to and compatible with the principle of mutual submission that the
passage also mandates. This reading of the text is not only rather "tortuous" itself, but
would universally sanction slavery as well as wives' unilateral submission to husbands,
which were the cultural forms, after all. (This was the argument of Christian slave-owners
before the Civil War.) Moreover, evangelical egalitarians do not "give up role distinctions
in marriage," since they affirm heterosexual monogamy and all its sexual distinctions.
Yet the authors fail even to address such responses to their position, thinking they have
dismissed the alternative view as merely tortuous, postmodernist hermeneutics. In this

they commit the fallacy of guilt by association. This certainly inhibits healthy debate.' 1
The debate on gender roles is very complex, and I cannot settle it all here. My point is
that although one may embrace egalitarianism for postmodernist reasons (as we will see
below), a strong biblical case can be made for gender equality that keeps the notions of
biblical inerrancy, objective truth, universal rationality, and authorial intent firrnly in place.
This is significant to understand because Christians often become unfair in labeling egalitarian believers as sub-Christian or even anti-Christian in this respect.
DERRIDA TO THE RESCUE?

Before addressing the specific charges by traditionalists, I want to consider an example
of ill-advised postmodernist influence on the gender controversy. In critiquing the views
of gender held by ). I. Packer, egalitarian Curt Purcell argues that Packer's belief in the

inherent, objective meaning of Scripture is unwarranted. Purcell claims that, on the contrary, all language is equivocal and no language is univocal. "An irreducible moment of

equivocity lies at the heart of all language, ever forcing us to decide how words with
which we are confronted fit into the context in which we encounter them." 44 He then

quotes a passage from Derrida to make his point: "If, in fact, equivocity is always irreducible, that is because words and language in general are not and cannot be absolute
objects. They do not possess any resistant and perrnanent identity that is absolutely their
own."" The last two sentences quoted by Purcell trail off into unintelligibility (as does
much of Derrida), so I do not cite them.'"
To enlist Derrida for the cause of biblical equality is both unnecessary and self-destructive. Derrida removes any objective meaning from texts; their meaning is forever indeter-

minate. This view would render the concept of Scriptural authority void. If something is to
have authority it must be in the intellectual position to demand and receive obedience.
The author's voice must be heard for there to be authoniy. If a text is intrinsically and irreducibly equivocal, its meaning is unavailable and its interpreters can never be judged rationally against the one meaning of the text itself. The author vanishes, and readers are left
adrift. Since Scripture is God's inspired word (2 Tim. 3: 16; 2 Pet. I :20-21 ), it does possess
a "perrnanent identity that is absolutely its own." The divine Author employed human
authors to make truth known. Our concern is how to interpret rightly and truly the objective meaning of the text, to discern how it coheres with the rest of Scripture and how the
text applies to us today.

Postmodemism on Race and Gender: An Evangelical Response

65

A difficulty in interpreting a particular text such as I Tim. 2:8-15 (concerning the place
of women in the church) implies nothing about the text itself being equivocal. Paul, under
infallible divine inspiration, had something definite in mind for his original readers, and
that principle applies to us today, however different our cultural and ecclesiastical situation might be from that of the early church at Ephesus. What Paul meant, and what his
words mean for us, is a matter of intense debate. Egalitarians find a principle concerning
the inadvisability of women in that church teaching and having authority over men,
because of some factor not inherent to their gender-such as ignorance or false doctrine.
Traditionalists find a cross-cultural principle of male spiritual authority. Egalitarians disagree, since we find women in God-ordained leadership over men throughout Scripture.
God would not break his own rules."
Peter did warn that some of Paul's writings were difficult to understand, but he
affirmed that they were still inspired Scripture, and that some had misinterpreted them to
their own destruction (2 Pet. 3: 16; see also )er. 8:8). The very concept of a misinterpretation necessarily assumes an objective and determinate meaning that has been violated by
bad faith or poor reasoning of some kind. Both the egalitarian and traditionalist interpretations cannot be correct; one has missed Paul's original and intended meaning (which is
singular, not plural). However, this does not make the egalitarian view postmodernist,
since evangelical egalitarians reach their conclusions by using essentially the same exegetical methods as traditionalists. Egalitarians maintain that certain cultural prejudices have
hindered traditionalists from seeing the theological, exegetical, and logical evidence against
male authority and for biblical equality. The situation should not be viewed as a hopeless
power struggle, since God's word is "living and active'' to accomplish its purposes in the
long run (Heb. 4: 12; see also Isa. 55: I 0-11 ).
In some limited cases, a particular section of Scripture may be interpreted in two
opposing ways, each of which is equally rational, given the knowledge available at the
time.'" That is, interpretation A and interpretation B may end up being exegetically equal;
both can be rationally accepted by informed, wise, and godly people, and no third interpretation seems plausible. In this case, "It could go either way." But it is either one way or
the other, not both and not neither (unless a better interpretation C is found lated. Even
when an interpretation is difficult, some interpretations can be ruled out. Whatever Paul
meant by being "baptized for the dead" (I Car. I 5:29), and this is much disputed, he did
not mean that we should perform proxy baptisms that somehow apply salvation to those
now dead, as the Mormons teach; for this would contradict clear teaching elsewhere in
Scripture on the need to find salvation before death (e.g., Heb. 9:27)."
These issues in interpretation stem not from the text itself being equivocal (many texts
that seem obscure to us were perfectly clear to the original recipients), but from our interpretational limitations. The meaning of the text remains unequivocal in itself, and with
new arguments and discoveries the equivocity of our understanding of the text may be
cleared up, or at least reduced. The reduction or elimination of ambiguity and unclarity in
our understanding of Scripture should be the goal of biblical interpretation. This, however,
is not Derrida's point. His view in the passage quoted is that word meanings are inevitably
and always equivocal; such a view must be rejected as destructive to biblical authority, to
sound exegesis. As Carl Henry notes, "in the absence of an objective textual meaning, no
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valid choice is possible between two or more conflicting interpretations." 50 The result is
"hermeneutical nihilism."" The purpose of biblical interpretation is to discover the text's
meaning, not to supply or construct a meaning for the text.
Ironically, Derrida has attacked his critics, such as John Searle, for misinterpreting and
misrepresenting his own work. Apparently, Derrida's intended meaning took on an objective identity, which he expected his readers to ascertain. He even claimed that his point
should have been clear and obvious to Searle! 52 Millard Erickson notes that this is "an
incredibly nondeconstructionist nonpostmodern response for someone who maintains

that the meaning of a text is not in the author's intention, but in what the reader finds it
saying to him or her." 53 In response to a deconstructionist reading of Scripture, D. A.
Carson explains that there is always "a link between text and authorial intent. I have
never read a deconstructionist who would be pleased if a reviewer misinterpreted his or
her work: thus in practice deconstructionists implicitly link their own texts with their own
intentions."" If so, why should we exempt the biblical text-or any other text-from this
commonsensical and eminently logical approach?
WHY EGAUT ARIANISM NEED NOT BE POSTMODERNIST

The above postmodernist-leaning defense of egalitarianism does not exhaust the field
of possibilities. I disagree with Packer's conclusions on gender restrictions. However, I find
no need to invoke notions of the intrinsic equivocacy of texts or to conscript Derrida to
the cause. Theologically, I agree with Packer's views of divine inspiration, the objective
meaning of biblical texts, and the classical method of biblical interpretation.
The charge that biblical egalitarians are crypto-postmodemists rests on a few incorrect
assumptions; by identifying them we can clear up some confusions so that a fair debate
may ensue.
I. Egalitarians are accused of simply copying postmodern secular culture and twisting
the Bible to mean what they want it to mean. This begs the question as to what the
Scriptures actually teach. Egalitarians are asking for an alternative analysis of the ancient
text, not an updated or edited Bible. The assumption that egalitarianism is postmodernist
also commits the genetic fallacy, that by discrediting the source of an idea, one discredits
the idea itself. But even if some Christians have been challenged to rethink what Scripture
teaches on gender because of feminist insights from secular culture (although much of
secular feminism is patently unbiblical and rejected by evangelical egalitarians), it does not
follow that Scripture itself opposes every aspect of feminism. Many evangelicals and fundamentalists, such as feny Falwell, initially rejected the civil rights movement as unbiblical
and merely worldly, only to realize later that white Christians should have supported its
nonviolent expressions all along, precisely because that was the biblical thing to do.
2. The charge is made that egalitarians make their own experience or beliefs the final
authority over Scripture. Since they have felt uncomfortable with traditional gender roles,
they have misinterpreted the Bible accordingly. One's experience certainly affects how
one comes to Scripture, but it does not determine how Scripture comes to one. Many
egalitarians, such as my wife and I, were at first reluctant to embrace egalitarianism
because we were not sure it was biblical. Early on we were rightly taught that we should
put Scripture above experience. Therefore, we had to be thoroughly convinced theologi-
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cally and exegetical!y before we could change our minds. Many other cases also follow
this pattern. This is not a postmodernist matter of an individual or a community freely
choosing a lifestyle without any objective criteria or concern for objective truth and rationality.
3. Some also argue that egalitarians deconstruct gender roles and engage in a postmodernist construction of gender without objective constraints. This is why McQuilkin and
Mullen put egalitarianism in the same category as homosexual unions, denying hell, and
so on. 55

It is true that egalitarians believe that many of the traditionalist views on gender are
social reifications and are not rooted in God's created order or Kingdom realities. For
instance, if traditionalists take God to be male in some spiritual sense (and not all do), this
is a reification, since God is beyond gender and sexuality." If traditionalists take maleness
to mean superiority to femaleness with respect to leadership in the home and the church,
egalitarians believe that they have taken a contingent social structure and absolutized it.
Scripture is filled with examples of powerful women leaders (such as Deborah and other
Old Testament prophetesses, and female prophets and leaders in the early church)," and
the New Testament teaches mutual submission and reciprocal Jove in marriage (Eph.
5:21-33; I Cor. 7:4; I Pet. 3:7)."
Egalitarians agree that God has framed our sexuality according to his wisdom. This
means that heterosexual, monogamous marriage is the moral norm and the standard
cross-culturally (Genesis 2). Fornication, adultery, and homosexual relations are intrinsically sinful and must be avoided (Exod. 20: 14; Rom. 1: 18-27: Eph. 5:3-5). Children should
be prized and not aborted for personal preference or career advancement. 59 However,

egalitarians believe that the structure for marriage and ministry is not provided by male
hierarchy but by Christian love (J Corinthians 13), the principles of the Sermon on the
Mount <Matthew 5-7), and the Ten Commandments (Exod. 20: 1-17). These are sufficient for friendship and leadership in marriage, the family, and the church. There is nothing postmodernist here. Further, biblical egalitarianism does not undermine "role distinctions" in marriage; the distinctions are real where they touch on sexual relations.

Everything is not up for grabs if some of the traditional gender roles are challenged.
4. Many also assert that egalitarians relativize biblical passages about the submission of
women by making them "merely cultural"; they make postmodern culture normative and
deny "the clear teaching of Scripture." Hermeneutically, all Christians must fathom how
ancient commands obtain today. Paul said to greet one another with "a holy kiss," that
women should wear veils in church, and that slaves should submit to their masters.
Christians today understand the cultural context of these commands, without rejecting
them as uninspired. The operative question in understanding such texts is, "What is the
principle behind the commands and how do we obey it today?"
Yes, Paul told the Corinthian church that women were not to speak in their worship
service (I Cor. 14:34-35). Does that mean women should not speak in churches today?
The answer to this question requires an understanding of the cultural context of the
Corinthian church. Egalitarians believe that "the universal principle behind Paul's words
is not the permanent silencing and subordinating of women in the church, but the curtailing of practices that disrupt the flow and order of the public assembly of believers.""'
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The above response to these four assumptions only touches the tip of the iceberg. For
an in-depth treatment of the historical, cultural. exegetical, and theological issues involved,
the work of Rebecca Merrill Groothuis should be consulted, as well as other evangelical
egalitarians." The divide between postmodemism and biblical egalitarianism is wide, and
far wider than the divide between evangelical traditionalists and evangelical egalitarians."
BEYOND REIACATION AND INTO POSTMODERNIST CHAOS

Those postmodemists who take all gender identity to be mere reification sometimes
confuse their lawlessness with liberation. Maureen O'Hara claims that a constructivist
view of gender ought not lead to despatr but "an enormous sense of relief, hope, and
responsibility," because
the idea that each of us recreates reality with each encounter fills me with wondrous
hope, empowerment and community connection. If there is no absolute truth "out
there" to create pristine "expert systems" that c.an somehow solve our problems math-

ematically ... then we are called to a new kind of community. If I can make culture I
must act responsibly. If I can only ever be part of the creation I must act humbly.'1
Exuberant academic prose does not justify non sequiturs. If there is no "absolute truth
out there," then there is no possibility of responsibility or community or humility. These
concepts imply that we are moral agents who owe allegiance to an authority beyond ourselves, and that we ought to act in certain ways in relating to one another. O'Hara's postmodernist constructivism eliminates the categories of moral authority and accountability

entirely. Her hope is emptiness constructed upon emptiness--all the way down. This is
what Francis Schaeffer called "semantic mysticism": authors use words with positive connotations that their own world view c.annot rationally accommodate. This is done to mask
their world view's philosophica1 malignancies.64

A BETTER WAY FORWARD
The biblical metanarrative supplies us with form and freedom for women and men of
various races and ethnic extractions. We can live out our micronarratives and personal pil-

grimages as gendered and racial beings within the all-encompassing metanarrative of God's
providence. This is possible through the direction provided by Scripture, by the encouragement of the community of faith, and according to the guidance of the Holy Spirit.
Rather than making our differences our starting point, we should emphasize that we
are first and foremost creatures before the face of our Creator. Christians, in addition, are
redeemed people in Christ. As Paul exclaimed, all of our cultural background, ethnic
inheritance, and even our gender pales in comparison with the wonder of knowing Christ

(Phil. 3: 1-1 I; Gal. 3:26-28). Glenn Loury, an African-American economist and writer, gets
to the heart of the issue:
Who am I, then? Foremost, I am a child of God, created in his image, imbued with
his spirit, endowed with his gifts, set free by his grace. The most important challenges and opportunities that confront me derive not from my racial condition, but
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rather from my human condition. I am a husband, a father, a son, a teacher, an
intellectuaL a Christian, a citizen. In none of these roles is my race irrelevant, but
neither can racial identity alone provide much guidance for my quest to discharge
these responsibilities adequately."
Instead of stereotyping others (or even ourselves) by race or gender, Christians should
"Jet God be God" as he demonstrates his unshakable Kingdom through the marvelous
diversity of his one redeemed people, the Body of Christ (I Cor. l 2: 12-31 ). As these
Kingdom realities are demonstrated, the hollowness of postmodernist posturings can be
exposed in the light of something far greater."
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THE X-FACTOR:
REVISIONING BIBLICAL HOLINESS 1
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STRAWN

"Thus, law implements as social policy and soda/ practice this at1imlation of God. God is
not simply a religious concept but a mode of social power and social organization ....

The reality of God's passion is mobilized in social policy."
-Walter Brueggemann'
"Holiness calls."
- John G. Cammie'

For Dr. Frank G. Carver in honor of his retirement from Point Loma Nazarene College
I. INTRODUCTION
Most students of the Bible would acknowledge that holiness is of critical importance to its subject matter. A text like Lev. 19:2: "Speak to all the congregation of
the people of Israel and say to them: You shall be holy, for I the LORD your God am
holy"' aptly summarizes this perspective. Moreover, the fact that this text is cited in
I Pet. I : 13-16' would seem to underscore that holiness is a concern, even a command, that runs throughout the text of the Christian Bible-that is, the Old and New
Testaments.' But this unity is not uniformity; and the problem of the significance of
holiness-what holiness is and does or what holiness is supposed to be and supposed to do-often goes unexpressed and unexplained. The present study is an
attempt to get at these issues and takes its cue from texts like Ezek. 20:41:
As a pleasing odor I will accept you, when l bring you out from the people,
and gather you out of the countries where you have been scattered; and l will
manifest my holiness [•mznin1l among you in the sight of the nations.'

Brent A. Strawn is an assistant professor of biblical studies at Asbury Theological Seminary in Wilmore,
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Or from the sentiment found in the Jewish prayer, the Amidah, benediction three:
To all generations we will declare your greatness, and to all eternity we will proclaim ['lJi1pJ]s your holiness, and your praise, 0 our God, will never depart from

our mouth, for you are a great and holy God and King. Blessed are you, 0 Lord,
the holy God.
Put simply, these texts demonstrate that holiness has an external fUnction. It can be manifested
among the nations, as in Ezekiel, and is to be proclaimed to all eternity, as in the Arnidah. In
short, it can be and should be communicated. These two points-that holiness is of central
import in Scripture but is diversely expressed therein and that holiness has a communicative function-comprise the central points of this paper and will be addressed sequentially.

II.

HOLINESS MENTAL/Tis VS. HOLINESS ESPRfT

The fact that holiness is a major concern of the biblical witness and as such runs throughout the biblical texts does not require extensive comment. Holiness has often been highlighted
in critical research on the Bible and biblical theology. C F. A Dillrnann in the late nineteenth
century, for instance, determined that holiness was the essential characteristic of Old
Testament revelation." He located this "principle" in Lev. 19:2 and regarded it as "the quintessence of the revelation, and to it he related all other ingredients of Hebrew faith and practice."'° Somewhat later, J. Hanel also located the central idea of Israelite religion in the concept
of holiness.' ' And these two are not alone in the history of Old Testarnent scholarship. Other
names could be added to the list: E. Sellin or T. C Vriezen, for example." Even if scholarship
is no longer locating holiness at the center of the Old Testament-and indeed, the quest for a
or the "center" !Mitte) seems permanently defunct after Eichrodt"-the topic of holiness con-

tinues to receive at least some attention in most theological treatments. 14 And desetvedly so.
What is more important for the purposes of this study, then, is not to discuss the centrality or prevalence of the holiness concern in Scripture-what might be called the Bible's
esprit or spirit of holiness-but rather to discuss the diversity of ways this concept is appropriated or enacted in Israel. For lack of a better term, these latter may be called the various mentalittis or mechanisms of biblical holiness. 15
The late John Cammie, in his monograph Holiness in Israel, has performed this task
quite well and his work can be briefly summarized here. Cammie discussed three major

strands in Israel's understanding of holiness: that of the priests, the prophets, and the
sages. He went on to discuss variations on each of these understandings and then added a
treatment of the apocalyptic writers; this produces a sevenfold perspective on how the
Old Testament views holiness. Cammie found a unity running across the biblical material:

"The holiness of God requires a cleanness on the part of human beings."" But equally as
important, Cammie found not a single doctrine of holiness but a diversity or, at least, "a
unity with a
That is, while cleanness may be a consistent requirement, each of
the three traditions Cammie discussed would seem to stress a different kind of cleanness:

For the priestly tradition, holiness entails a call to ritual purity, right sacrifice, and
separation;
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Holiness for the prophets involves the purity of soda/ justice;
The wisdom literature stresses the deanness of individual morality."
Moreover, there is variation within each of these traditions. For example, even in those portions of Scripture that Cammie identified as "Variations on the Priestly Understanding of
Holiness" (basically Ezekiel, Ezra-Nehemiah, and Chronicles), all of which stand in "remarkable continuity with the normative" Priestly perspective, there is nevertheless significant
variation." In the prophetic material the differences are even more pronounced: according
to Cammie, nowhere in Jeremiah, Deuteronomy, or the Deuteronomistic History, for
example, are there passages that articulate that "the holiness of God requires the cleanness
of social justice."20 Though Cammie went on to offer an apologia for this attenuation, there
is nevertheless a clear difference at work in the understandings of holiness found in the various corpora that comprise the Old Testament. Hence, Cammie concluded:
In the light of the overview of the preceding pages it cannot be claimed that holiness
in Israel is the central, major, or unifying concept of the Old Testament/Hebrew
Scriptures. It is fair to claim, however, that the concept of the holiness of God is a
central concept in the Old Testament. which enables us to discern at once an important unity and diversity. 21
Cammie's assessment is helpful. It should be added, however, that the complexity of
the matter is compounded when one considers the New Testament materials. One can
easily see the issues by comparing say, Ezra's concern with separation with what many
have identified as the radical inclusivity of Jesus and the early community gathered around
him." Of course, one has to be careful here, as texts such as Matt. I 0:5-6 and 15:24 have
led some scholars to say that the ministry of Jesus was originally only to the "lost sheep of
the house of lsrael.' This certainly softens the inclusivity; even so, the Gospels as a whole,
and especially Acts and the ministry of Paul, would seem to register a rather gross disparity
with the concerns for ethnic boundary preservation found in Ezra-Nehemiah. Even so, holi0

"

ness continues to be a concern in the New Testament texts and period. 24
Still, the difference between Ezra and the early Jesus movement is instructive and gets
to the heart of the matter. Simply put, different traditions, penods, situations, peoples, and so
forth, manifest-even require-different understandings and appropriations of holiness. The struggle
for self-preservation and economic stability that characterized the returnees from Exile
under Ezra and Nehemiah is not equivalent to the pressures faced by the early Jesus
movement It is not surprising then, to find that Ezra-Nehemiah and the Jesus community
have different appropriations or menta/ites for holiness; nor is it surprising to find these to
be, in turn, both similar to and different at points from priestly and prophetic understandings. In short, the manifold ways that the concept of holiness is appropriated is cliverse
and dependent to a large degree on different geo-political, sociological, and/or theological
situations." As such, one might look at them as limited, time-bound manifestations or
mechanisms by which holiness is enacted and lived out.
Yet this is not the whole story. The concept of holiness itself is more than the sum total
of these mentalites. Biblical holiness is not, therefore, merely the various understandings and
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implementations of holiness found in the Bible. Rather, there is an esprit that runs throughout the text. For Cammie it is "cleanness." I will shortly discuss difference in similar fashion.
Whatever the exact identification, however, the diversity of appropriation itself is proof of
the esprit's existence. While the diversity may at first seem crippling on the practical level, the
fact that holiness reappears in the various traditions and sections of the Bible-despite and in
spite of the fact that it is differently manifested-underscores the point that holiness is a central biblical concern. Holiness is part of the Bible's fundamental grammar; to borrow Walter
Brueggemann's terminology, it comprises part of Israel's core testimony about God."

III. THE X-FACTOR:
TOWARD AN APPROPRIATION OF THE HOLINESS ESPRIT AND THE HOLINESS MENTALJTts

But what exactly is that testimony? What precisely is the esprit' After the preceding
diachronic analysis, it seems more than a bit perilous to hazard a guess on what the
notion of holiness might mean throughout the entire biblical witness. After all, even if a biblical esprit on the matter does exist, hypothetically or ideally, isn't it bound up inextricably
with the same socio-political realities mentioned earlier? Perhaps so. But the synchronousness of the concept-above all exemplified by its ubiquity throughout and across the texts
and testaments-urges the endeavor. To be sure, it may be that it is the consistent presence of holiness that is the only stable factor-the only esprit, as it were-that can be identified. But such an evaluation, while perhaps accurate on the descriptive level, is hardly adequate on a practical or prescriptive one. That is, if the biblical conception of holiness is to
be recaptured, recovered, or revisioned for the twenty-first century, we must not only find
the biblical esprit, we must also attempt to (re-)forrnulate it in a menta/ite that is, while
faithful to the esprit and within the appropriate range of biblical mentalites, simultaneously
functional and faithful in our own contemporary context.

A clue for doing this can be taken from the second major point of the present paper:
namely, that holiness has a communicatiue or proc/amatory {Unction. In Cammie's words:
"Holiness calls."" Cammie, of course, went on to specify this calling: the holiness of God
summoned Israel to aspire to justice and compassion; thus, holiness calls for and calls
forth cleanness. While this may be true, this calling is not restricted to the holiness of God.
Holiness itself, I would contend, contains this aspect of calling or communication in its uery
nature. Sociological and anthropological studies are of paramount importance at this
point," and it is unfortunate that their presence in biblical scholarship is still a relatively
recent development.2'' While sociology and anthropology are critical tools in assessing all
kinds of religious phenomena, holiness, 1n particular, is an excellent case in point. Socialscientific analyses may even help to explain the various factors at work in the different
mentafites previously described.'"
A basic and oft-cited characterization of holiness from the perspective of these disciplines, at least since the work of Rudolf Otto, is that holiness is fundamentally separation:
The Holy is Wholly Other. 1 ' Yet this insight is not only phenomenological; it is also found
in Scripture as, for instance, in Lev. I 0:%-10: "It is a statute forever throughout your generations: You are to distinguish between the holy and the profane, and between the
unclean and the clean."l2 To be sure, holiness involves more than separation, Otto's analysis includes elements besides the mystenum, and the biblical material discusses holiness in
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ways that lie outside Otto's scheme. 33 Nevertheless, it seems to be consensual (if not consonantaD" that one of the central aspects of holiness is separation.
Thus stated, separation, if not the biblical esprit of holiness, is certainly a major aspect and
dominant part of that esprit Unfortunately, most theoiy stops there. But this insight must be
pressed: What does this separation do sociologically and theologically? Here the biblical texts
must reenter the discussion. The notion of separation, or what might be best called difference, can be illustrated by means of several texts in the Old Testament/Hebrew Bible.
Before undertaking this task, it is necessary to point out that I think that the biblical esprit of
holiness and its various mentalitis can be encapsulated by the notion of "the X-Factor."
An X-Factor is something that differentiates two, otherwise identical, entities.35 Given the
presence of the X, the term is somewhat mysterious. The letter X, as is well known, is often
used in algebra and higher mathematics for a symbol of unknown or variable quality. The
elusive quality of the X has passed over into everyday parlance as terms like "Generation X,"
"the X-Files," or even "Madame X," amply attest" Other examples could be added, but suffice it to say that the X-Factor is something that separates, that differentiates, that is mysterious, and as such fascinates and attracts. In so doing, it also testifies. In my estimation, this
notion can be quite helpful in an attempt to understand the biblical conception of holiness.

"I Am Yahweh": The Holiness Code and Ezekiel
An obvious place to start this task is with Leviticus 17-26, commonly called the
Holiness Code because of its predominant concern with holiness." While it may be an
obvious place to start, it is not an easy one. The Holiness Code comprises a dizzying myriad of laws and commands, almost none of which immediately recommend themselves to
the contemporary (at least contemporary Christian) situation. Or so it would seem.
What is clear, however, is that holiness is central throughout the Holiness Code and is
manifested in a number of ways-indeed, in almost as many ways as there are lawsincluding regulations regarding sacrifice (Lev. I 7: 1-61, sexuality (Lev. 18:6- 23), familial relations (Lev. 20:9), idol worship (Lev. 20: 1-5), priesthood (Lev. 21: 1-24), offerings (Lev.
22: 1-23), festivals (Leviticus 23>, and so forth. Leviticus 19 is a particularly interesting chapter, and probably the most well-known given v. 1800: "you shall love your neighbor as
yourself." The juxtaposition of this verse with a prohibition against mixed breeding shows
that this chapter serves as a microcosm for what one finds throughout the Holiness Code.
What is perhaps most striking about Leviticus 19, besides the rough juxtaposition
already mentioned, is the refrain that echoes throughout the chapter: "I am the LORD"
( 19:3, 4, I 0, 12, 14, 16, 18, 25, 28, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37>. It occurs, in fact, in the
famous v. 18, which reads in full:
You shall not take vengeance or bear a grudge against any of your people, but you
shall love your neighbor as yourself: I am the LORD.
It is also found after other laws, such as "You shall not swear falsely by my name, profaning the name of your God: I am the LoRD" ( 19: 12) and "Do not tum to idols or make
cast images for yourselves: I am the LORD your God" ( 19:4). But it is also found in several
of those laws that seem exceedingly strange. For example, "You shall not make any gash-
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es in your flesh for the dead or tatoo any marks upon you: I am the LORD" ( 19:28) or
"But in the fifth year you may eat of their [the trees'sl fruit, that their yield may be
increased for you: I am the LORD your God" (19:25). What does this refrain mean? Why
is it scattered throughout this chapter and elsewhere in the Holiness Code?"
To answer this question we need to look to the other main locus for this type of
phraseology, the Book of Ezekiel, and to the scholar who has thought longest and best on
the topic, Walther Zimmerli. 1" Zimmerli has demonstrated that the "I am Yahweh"
(NRSV: "I am the LoRD") formula, or what he calls variously the "demonstration/manifestation word," "recognition formula," or "proof-saying" (fnveiswort) functions to reveal
God's being through God's action. In Ezekiel, this formula always precedes God's activity
and Yahweh is always the subject. The purpose of the action in question is to produce
recognition of God's revelation within it. The appropriate response is for Israel and the
nations to recognize, acknowledge, and submit to God. 40 Put simply, the action that
accompanies the phrase "I am Yahweh" functions to reveal God's person and nature to
those who encounter it. 41

This is a fascinating insight and one that has bearing on the instances of the formula in
the Holiness Code, which Zimmerli unfortunately treats only briefly." The point is that
this strange hodgepodge of laws that include both reverence for God, family, and neighbor, as well as prohibitions against wearing clothing made from two types of fabric and
the like, somehow serves to reveal God and more specifically, God's nature and God's
holiness. What an odd God, that God's holy being should be manifested in such ways'
But the earlier question, "What do these laws do?," still remains. If this could be answered,
perhaps it might explain what seems, on the face of it, so odd, arbitrary, and irrational.
In Israel, these laws would seem to bind the people together, uniting them as one people of God, serving and obeying that God in any and every way. Simultaneously, however, these laws serve to separate them and mark them as different from the outside world. In
short, these laws are an X-Factor differentiating Israel from her neighbors."
This is no small point. Boundaries are of critical importance to societal and communal
existence. Witness Ezra and Nehemiah, for instance. 44 But this separation is not an end in
and of itself, for and unto itself. The laws of the Holiness Code, after all, would separate Israel
regardless of the self-revelation fomnula "I am Yahweh." But the presence of that fomnula
gives the legislation motivation and reason for being. The formula is also what gives the
laws their communicative function. After all, Israel-as separate, holy, and different as it was
and could be-was hardly isolated on the geopolitical stage of the ancient Near East. Only
rarely in its history was Israel sufficiently free of foreign domination to develop and flourish
as ·11: would. And even at those rare rnornents of independence, Israel constantly came i11tu
contact with nations great and small throughout the ancient world: Egypt, Aram, Phoenicia,
Philistia, Assyria, Babylon, Ammon, Moab, Edom, and the rest. Furthemnore, the major
trade routes of the ancient world happened to run right through Syria-Palestine and thus
through Israel." Israel could not be geographically separate then, and yet was called to be
sociologically and theologically separate by virtue of its practices. Or better, Israel was called
to be different.'° Again, the purpose for this difference does not seem to have been for its
own sake or because of some unknown disease residing in pork, from which God wished
to spare lsrael. 4 - Rather, the purpose was 7T\jp ,JK, "I am Yahweh," and that means God
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wishes to know and be known by humans. In short, in my judgment, laws like those found
in the Holiness Code fi.tnction both theologically and sociologically to simultaneously separate Israel
unto itself and to attract and call others unto Israel" Furthermore, the recognition formula that
serves as conclusion to and motivation for these laws shows that their communicative
function is part and parcel of the divine economy and plan

"When the Ch11dren/People Ash You":
Deut. 6.20-25, Ezek 24: 15-27, fer 16: 1-13, and the Function of Symbolic Activity !Attraction)
Though the communicative function of the Holiness Code can certainly be debated, the
case can be made rather easily sociologically, if not historically." In brief, it is a naturally
occurring result of the practices in question. Ironically, then, the very barriers that separate
and thus exdude are also the vety structures that make it lat least) possible to allow in and
include. Thus, these laws that seem so obscure and strange in the Holiness Code, not to
mention elsewhere in Scripture, have a sociological function that is communicative, perhaps
one might even say missiological if not evangelical." This statement is true only if and as long
as a means to transition from one side of the barrier to another exists or only if and as long

as there is a message to communicate from one side to another and a means by which this
can be done. This is obviously a source of intense debate in the histoty of Israelite religion."
Even so, I am inclined to think that this difference is pwposefi.tl; that it did create a barrier
but also made it a porous one-indeed, one that exists for penetration and crossing.
While some may remain skeptical, the communicative nature of the legal material can
be demonstrated with even greater clarity within Israel." The problem of transgenerational
value communication, for instance, is a case in point. Children, upon noticing these laws,
often do not understand them and inquire about them. The laws thus produce their initial
inquity regarding the Law. The instructed parental answer is then given and is oriented,
not toward the laws or the Law, but toward the Lawgiver. Note Deut 6:20-25:
When your children ask you in time to come, 'What is the meaning of the decrees
and the statutes and the ordinances that the LORD our God has commanded you?''
then you shall say to your children, "We were Pharaoh's slaves in Egypt, but the LORD
brought us out of Egypt with a mighty hand. The LORD displayed before our eyes
great and awesome signs and wonders against Egypt, against Pharaoh and all his
household He brought us out from there in order to bring us in, to give us the land
that he promised on oath to our ancestors. Then the LORD commanded us to observe
all these statutes, to fear the LORD our God, for our lasting good, so as to keep us
alive, as is now the case. If we diligently observe this entire commandment before the
LORD our God, as he has commanded us, we will be in the right 53
In this text, the child first encounters the system but is then immediately introduced to the
Savior." But the "system-first" situation isn't so bad-even if it isn't ideal-because the
encounter with the system is designed to or at least fi.tnctions to introduce the Savior.
Another example of or analogy to this dynamic is found in the symbolic activity of the
prophets, especially Jeremiah and Ezekiel. 55 In Ezekiel 24 we find the prophet engaged in
yet another symbolic action-something of a personal specialty of his. 56 This particular
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example is especially disturbing. Yahweh says to Ezekiel:
Son of man, with one blow I am about to take away from you the delight of your
eyes; yet you shall not mourn or weep, nor shall your tears run down. Sigh, but not
aloud; make no mourning for the dead Bind on your turban, and put your sandals on
your feet; do not cover your upper lip or eat the bread of mourners (Ezek. 24; I 5-1 7).
The "delight of your eyes"
ll'.lnl'.l) is somewhat ambiguous. To what or to whom
does the phrase refer?" 7 The suspense mounts as Ezekiel responds to the divine word: "So
I spoke to the people in the morning" (Ezek. 24: I 8a). We are not told what Ezekiel said
to the people, but presumably it was a verbatim repetition of the divine message. As such,
perhaps the taking of the "delight of your eyes" applies to the people, not
But
alas, no. The suspense is cut; simply and plaintively v. 18 continues: "and at evening my
wite died. And on the next morning I did as I was commanded" (Ezek. 24: I 8b). The crux
immediately follows:
Then the people said to me, "Will you not tell us what these things mean for us, that you
are acting this way7 " Then I said to them: The word of the LORD came to me ..
(Ezek. 24: I 9-20a; emphasis added).
This is echoed in v. 24:
Thus Ezekiel shall be a sign to you; you shall do just as he has done. When this
comes, then you shall know that I am the Lord Goo.
The prophet's activity thus symbolizes what will happen to the house of Israel: Ezekiel's
wife is taken and so shall Jerusalem be taken. But it also does more: it produces the
encounter with the word and thus the revelation of God-"then you shall know that I am
the Lord Goo" (24:24; cf. 24:27).
/er. 16: 1-13 is functionally identical. There the prophet is told not to marry or have
children (w. 2-4) and not to mourn for the dead (w. 5-9) because God is bringing judgment and disaster on Israel. This lecrls to a turning point:
And when you tell this people all these words, and they say to you, "Why has the LORD
pronounced all this great evil against us 7 What is our iniquity7 What is the sin that
we have committed against the LORD our God?" then you shall say to them.. (/er.
16: I 0-1 Ia; emphasis added).
Here again the sign-action produces a confrontation. The people will inquire and Jeremiah
will respond. Perhaps Israel should have known the reason for Jeremiah's celibacy,'° but
the point is that they did not. The symbolic action becomes the vehicle by which they learn
it-even if they (and the prophets themselves!) have to learn it the hard way. Apparently,
the stubbornness of the people forces Gcxl and the prophets to reconsider their communication strategies and make their message even more severe. 60
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The significance of all this is that God does not forbid Ezekiel to mourn or Jeremiah to
many because these things are wrong or harmful. On the contrary, it is exactly the commonality and nonnalcy of such activities that makes them ideally suited to produce a reaction or
encounter, which the prophets then tum to their advantage in delivering the clivine message.
Marriage was altogether normal and standard, so much so that Jeremiah 16 is virtually the
only example of bachelorhood in ancient Israel." Mourning for the dead is also a common
human process and experience." But these are the things forbidden the prophets; again, not
for any reason inherent in the practices themselves and at the same time not without any
reason whatsoever; but rather in order to lead those unacquainted with the people or word
of God to an encounter with exactly those subjects. This confrontation, in turn, functions to
reveal Israel's God as the proof-saying formula ably demonstrates.°'
Given the presence of "I am Yahweh" in the Holiness Code, the same processes seem
to be at work there. Ancient Israel was demarcated from surrounding nations purposefully,
in order to produce questions like: "Why don't you gash yourself for the dead? Why
don't you sacrifice to Molek? Why don't you gather the fallen grapes in your vineyard why do you leave them for the poor?" The answer was not to be mumbled under one's
breath after clearing one's throat ("Ahem, er, well, ah, because I am an Israelite ... ") and
indeed ultimately has little to do with the Israelite qua Israelite. On the contrary, the
answer is mn• 1<1'1 "he is Yahweh" -that is, "because Yahweh is our God" <see Ps. I 05:7; I
Chron. 16: 14). The Holiness Code is thus like a giant symbolic activity on a nationwide
or global scale that serves, as do the prohibitions in Jeremiah and Ezekiel, to assist Israelite
children as well as foreigners come to the knowledge of Yahweh."
As separation, therefore, the X-Factor serves to attract or to invite. But there is more at
work in this notion and in these biblical texts than outside attraction Furthermore, there is
more to the Bible and to the legal corpus than "don't dos"-or what might be termed neg-

ative difference or separation.65 There are also positive injunctions (positive separation/difference) that may very well still attract, but that are primarily focused inwardly on Israel's
communal life together."

"When You See/( Then You Will Remember": Num. 15:3 7-41 (Accountability!
Since the sociological cohesion produced by boundaries and common legislation is
well-known," this aspect can be dealt with in briefer fashion. Moreover, in some ways it is
subordinate to attraction because the dynamic is the same: positive separation also
attracts, but its main focus is internal-it attracts those already in the group and thus acts as
a mechanism for accountability or memory. This can be nicely demonstrated by Num
15:37-41:
The lDRD said to Moses: Speak to the Israelites, and tell them to make fringes on the
corners of their garments throughout their generations and to put a blue cord on the
fringe at each corner. You have the fringe so
when you see you will remember
all the commandments of the LORD and do them, and not follow the lust of your
own heart and your own eyes. So you shall remember and do all my commandments, and you shall be holy to your God I am the lDRD your God, who brought
you out of the land of Egypt, to be your God: I am the LORD your God.
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Here we find an injunction as strange as those found in the Holiness Code.68 The Israelites
are to put blue cords on the fringes of their garments (cf. Deut. 22: 12) and when they see
these blue fringes, which would presumably happen quite frequently throughout the
course of a day, they are to remember the commandments. The situation works out

rather logically, though perhaps a bit woodenly:
you will see the blue cords,
you will remember all the commandments,
you will do them,
and you will not tum away faithlessly.
Following the tassel, that is, instead of the lusts of the heart and eye, helps one follow
God: "So you shall remember. .. and you shall be holy to your God."
Jn Numbers 15 we find a difference-an X·Factor-that serves as a reminder to incul·
cate a righteous and faithful lifestyle in the Israelites." This aspect, which has to do with
accountability, comprises the second major purpose of the X-Factor. Again, separation or
difference is not an end in and of itself; rather, difference is unto encounter and

proclamation; and it is also unto remembrance and enactment.70 And, as is rather obvious in
the case of Numbers 15, an X-Factor can oftentimes simultaneously do both."

JV. CONCLUSION: REVISIONING AND !lEAPPROPRIATING HOLINESS VIA THE X·fACTOR
Jn sum, then, the differences highlighted here under the rubric "the X·Factor" may
involve abstention from normal involvements or may involve participation in atypical
activities in order to produce twin aspects: attraction unto encounter and remembrance

unto accountability. It is these aspects or purposes of the deep structure of the X-Factor
that give it reason for being. That is, the X·Factor itself is not invariable. On the contrarythe X·Factor changes as often as the biblical mentaliuis do or as often as the symbol "x" sig·
nifies different values in algebra. In fact, the different mentalitis are themselves different XFactors, as long as they serve the purposes of attraction and accountability. So, the particu·
lar action chosen-be it Ezekiel's stoicism, Jeremiah's celibacy, the holy hodgepodge of
Leviticus, or the blue cords of Numbers-will change and vary. These activities are situa·
tion-specific and timebound, limited and temporary. But the difference encapsulated
therein, the separation that produces (or should produce) attraction and accountability
remains constant. The X·Factor, then, summarizes the esprit of holiness (difference), while
also providing a grid that both explains and incorporates the mentalites' content and
method (their ongoing appropriations, revisioning, and so forth).
Several points need to be stressed, however. First, this grid of possible mentalites isn't
infinite." It is certain that if holiness is to be revisioned and relived, it must be done in
such a way that is both comprehensible and relevant today. The X·Factor permits this by
showing how various persons, movements, and periods have lived out holiness in differ-

ing, and not always ideal, ways. We are on good ground, then, to say that the exact man·
ner (mentalitti! in which we enact holiness (the esprit itselfl is of secondary importance to
the fact that we live it out. Thus, as long as the X·Factor, the separation or difference, pro·
duces an encounter and reminds us who and whose we are, its focus and locus, its mech-
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anism and appropriation, will and should vary. But the variation is limited, or should be,
to the range demonstrated within Scripture itself. Or better: it is limited to the dynamic
found within the Scriptural range of menta/ites. This dynamic is properly one that comes
from God. The word of the Lord came to Ezekiel and Jeremiah and told them what to do.
The commandments in the Holiness Code and Numbers 15, similarly, are stamped with
the divine "imprimatur."" So too modem appropriations of biblical holiness should follow
the command of God, expressed above all in Holy Scripture."
This point already anticipates the second, namely, that the X-Factor should be purposeful.
The X shouldn't be arbitrary: It should be designed to lead to the twin aspects and be subject to and take its origin from the command of God. It should also be tied to the character
and holiness of God." Although separation does not exhaust the concept of holiness in
Scripture or in the phenomenology of religion, it does prove helpful at this pain' since God
is nothing if not different--;,specially, the incarnation notwithstanding, different from us."
But Christ nevertheless plays a role here. It is not unimportant to note that our English
letter "X' comes from the Greek letter (ch1l, the first letter of
(Christos), the
"Christ."" Ultimately, for Christians, it is our relationship with Jesus Christ that makes and
marks us apart-as separate and different. One might say that the Gospel itself is our XFactor. That is well and good and as it should be. The purpose of this paper has been to
provide motivation for the concrete manifestations of that relationship and in so doing to
fill holiness with meaning by appealing to the ultimate purpose of communication via
attraction and accountability. The latter two, respectively, provide the opportunity and the

x

n1essage for the former.

To be sure, conceptions of the X-Factor, although not with that label, have long been
around. Difference, separation, "coming apart from the world," refusing to be "of i'" are
all hallmarks of the Christian tradition-especially the holiness variety.'" But rarely, or so it
seems, has the purpose of separation been expressed and unmotivated separation quickly
becomes separatism. This scenario, while rather typical, is exceedingly problematic. But
the X-Factor provides a way out of it. It can serve as a hermeneutical key that motivates
and explains distinctive characteristics (both positive, e.g., care of the poor, and negative,
e.g., abstentions from various practices) that are periodically undertaken by communities
of faith. Moreover, the notion of the X-Factor can function on a transgenerational level,
since its explanation and enactment of the esprit is independent of one particular type or
even brand of mentalite.
If holiness is to be appropriated in the next century, I think it will have to be done in
this sort of way. The X-Factor gets around the problem of unmotivated and thus lifeless
difference and also holds promise for transgenerational and evangelistic communication.
But the X-Factor also poses a threat to the way holiness has been traditionally conceived.
Built into its structure is variability, openness, change-at least on the level of mentaliti.
This has not been a hallmark of the holiness traditions, nor of any other denomination for
that matter, which have tended to demarcate their ethical conduct early in their histories
and modify them only slightly over long periods of time. But, taking its cue from the biblical material, the X-Factor is more pragmatic than idealistic. It encourages, even requires, difference in mechanism of appropriation as long as these mechanisms produce the intended
results: attraction and accountability, encounter and remembrance. As already stated,
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communities of faith-holiness and otherwise-have long practiced these types of mechanisms whether intentionally or unintentionally, sometimes with remarkable effect." Still,
what seems to have been missing is the theoretical support for these practices and especially the motivation (communication and memoiy) that lies behind them.
This, in sum, is what the X-Factor is about and what it does. In my judgment, it has the
potential to help traditions maintain their distinctives while at the same time communicating their message to a broader audience and to the next generation. If so, maybe that
nasty little X in "Generation X" will tum out to be positive after all. Who knows? Perhaps
the notion of the X-Factor will help all generations "proclaim God's holiness to all eternity" (Amidah 3) .80
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16. Cammie, Holiness in Israel, p. 1. Thus stated, "cleanness" would be Cammie's assessment of
the biblical esprit of holiness. Cf. p. 195: "A unity of the Old Testament can be discerned in this unified response to holiness on the part of Israel: holiness requires purity."
17. Cammie, Holiness in Israel, p. 1.
18. Ibid., and cf pp. 4 3, 100, 149, respectively. The apocalyptic material contains a sort of combination of these traditions (see p. 198). for the priestly tradition see further Philip Peter Jensen,
Graded Holinessc A Key to the Priestly Conception of the World, Journal for the Study of the Old
Testament Supplement Series !hereafter JSOTSuppl 106 <Sheffield: Sheffield Unive1>ity Press, 1992)
and Israel Knohl, The Sanauary of Silence: The Priestly Torah and the Holiness School (Minneapolis:
fortress, 1995).
19. Cammie, Holiness in Israel, pp. 69, 196-97. For instance, the first part of the Chronicler's
History places "Jess emphasis on the typically priestly insistence on separation from otter
than in the Books of Ezra and Nehemiah" (p. 196).
20. Cammie, Holiness 1n Israel, p. 123. But see Jeffries M. Hamilton, Soaal jush"ce and
Deuteronomy, The Case of Deuteronomy 15 (Atlanta: Schola1> Press, 1992).

86

Strawn

21. Cammie, Holiness in Israel, p. 197 (emphasis his).
22. See, e.g., Joachim Jeremias, New Testament Theology: The Prodamation of Jesus (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971 ), passim, especially pp. 176-77: ''It does not take long to show how
sharply Jesus rejected all attempts to realize the community of the remnant by means of human
striving or separation .... Jesus does not gather the holy remnant, but the all-embracing community
of salvation of God's new people." More recently, E. P. Sanders has also underscored the inclusive
nature of Jesus' mission to and calling of "the sinners" (jesus and Judaism [Philadelphia: Fortress,
19851, especially pp. 174-2111.
23. E.g., Marcus J. Borg, Jesus: A New Vision: Spirit, Culture, and the Life of Discipleship (San
Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, J 987), pp. 126-27. Sanders, Jesus and Judaism, p. 220: "But the overwhelming impression is that Jesus started a movement which came to see the Gentile mission as a logical extension of itself" (emphasis hisl. Sanders goes on to say, however, that n[wle need not think that
Jesus imparted to his disciples any view at all about the Gentiles and the kingdom" (p. 221 ).
24. See, e.g., Otto Procksch and Karl Georg Kuhn, "iiytoc;, ciyuiSro, ciytacrµ6c;, ciy16tric;,
ciytorocrUvri," in Theological Diaionary of the New Testament [hereafter IDNTI, 10 vols., trans. and ed.
G. W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1964-19761, 1:88-115; Robert Hodgson, Jr., "Holiness
(NT)," in ABD 3:249-54; G. F. Hawthorne, "Holy, Holiness," in Dictionary of the Later New Testament
and Its Developments, eds. Ralph P. Martin and Peter H. Davids (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press,
19971, pp. 485-89; Marcus). Borg, Conflict, Holiness and Politics in the Teachings of Jesus (New York:
Mellen, 1984); David Peterson, Possessed by God: A New Testament Theology of Sanctification and
Holiness (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995); and Rudolf Bultmann, lheo/ogy of the New Testament, 2
vols., trans. Kendrick Grabel (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951-19551, I :338-39: 2: 180,
189, 223. Cf. also note 6 above.
25. Cf. Cammie, Holiness in Israel, p. 196: "Each of these groups set forth its teaching in
response to holiness and what holiness had impressed upon their hearts and minds. No claim of
exclusive apprehension of holiness and the requirements of holiness is possible for any one of the
three groups. The lessons for contemporary religious denominations that look to the Scripture for
guidance are obvious."
26. The language, though not necessarily the sentiment, is taken from Walter Brueggemann,
lheology of the Old Testament: Testimony,
Advomcy (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997). For the
holiness of Yahweh, see pp. 288-93.
27. See note 3 above.
28. See, e.g., Mary Douglas, Pwity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo
(London: Ark Paperbacks, 1989), especially chap. 3, "The Abominations of Leviticus," pp. 41-57;
idem, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology (New York: Routledge, 1996); Emile Durkheim,
The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (New York: The Free Press,
19651; Max Weber, lhe Sociology of Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 19931; idem, Ancient Judaism,
trans. Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale (New York: The Free Press, 1952); Mircea Eliade,
Patterns in Comparative Religion, trans. Rosemary Sheed (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1996);
Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Faaor in the Idea of the Divine and its
Relation to the Rational, trans. John W. Harvey !London: Oxford University Press, 1958); and idem,
Religious Essays: A Supplementto lhe Idea of the Holy (London: Oxford Univer>ity Press, 1931 I. For an
Old Testament theology that incorporates some of Otto's insights and terminology, see Samuel
Terrien, The Elusive Presence: Toward a New Biblical Theology, Religious Perspectives, ed. Ruth Nanda
Anshen (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1978). A recent treatment of Otto's v.10rk can be found
in Melissa Raphael, Rudolf Otto and the Concept of Holiness (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997). For a treatment of Douglas from the perspective of biblical studies, cf. J. F. A. Sawyer, ed., Reading Leviticus: A
Conversation with Mary Douglas, jSOTSupp 227 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996) and also
Edwin Firmage, "The Biblical Dietary Laws and the Concept of
in Studies in the Pentateuch,
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ed.). A Emerton, Supplements to Vetus Testamentum 41 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 19901, pp. 177-208.
tn addition to sociology and anthropology, psychological studies of religious experience can also be
extremely illuminating in matters such as these.

29. For Old Testament studies see, among others, the work of Robert Wilson, Walter
Brueggemann, and Norman Gottwald. Gottwald has been something of a pioneer in this area in
Old Testament studies and has, in tum, provided impetus to scholars like Brueggemann. In addition
to Gottwald's many articles on various subjects, note especially The Tribes of Yahweh: A Soa"ofogy of
the Religion of Liberated Israel 1250-1050 B.CE. (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1979) and The Hebrew Bible: A
Socio-Literary Introduction <Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985). New Testament scholar;hip has also benefited from social-scientific approaches. See, e.g., the work of Gerd Theissen, Howard Oark Kee, Bruce
Malina, Jerome Neyrey, Carolyn Osiek, and John Elliot to name a few.
30. See, e.g, Jerome H Neyrey, "Gean/Unclean, Pure/Polluted, and Holy/Profane: The Idea
and the System of Purity," in The Soda! Sciences and New Testament Interpretation, ed. Richard L.
Rohrbaugh <Peabody: Hendrickson, 1996), pp. 80-1 04; and the works by the other scholar> cited
in the previous note. For the Jesus movement see especially Gerd Theissen, Sociology of Early
Palestinian Christianity (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978); and Carolyn Osiek, R S. C. J., What Are They
Saying About the Social Setting of the New Testament?, rev. ed. (New York: Paulis!, 1992); as well as
the essays gathered in James H. Charlesworth, ed., Jesus and the Dead Sea Scrolls, Anchor Bible
Reference Library (New York: Doubleday, 19921.
3 I. To list citations of this aspect of holiness in secondary literature would take an entire monograph, but see, as representative, Otto, The Idea of the Holy, pp. 25-30 (on the mysteriuml; Cammie,
Holiness in Israel, pp. 9-12 and passim; von Rad, Old Testament Theology, I :205; Douglas, Purity and
Danger, pp. 49-51; and jack Miles, Cod: A Biography (New York: Vintage, 19951, p. 22. From a theological perspective, see recently Ji.irgen Moltmann, The Source of Life: The Holy Spirit and the Theology
of Life (Minneapolis: Fortress, 19971, pp. 43-45.
32. See Gordon J. Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, New International Commentary on the Old
Testament <Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), pp. 18-25 for a convenient summary of the system of
holiness found in Leviticus.
3 3. See especially von Rad, Old Testament Theology, I: 206 for this criticism of Otto.
34. It is often said that separation is part of the etymological meaning of Hebrew w1p (e.g.,
Francis Brown, S. R. Driver, and Charles A. Briggs, The New Brown-Driver-Briggs-Gesenius Hebrew and
Lexicon !Peabody: Hendrickson, 19791, p. 871; TDNT I :89; Douglas, Purity and Danger, p.
49; and much secondary literature). More recent lexica, however, have rightly questioned this.
Ludwig Koehler and Walter Baumgartner (The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament, rev.
by Walter Baumgartner and Johann Jakob Stamm, trans. M. E. ). Richardson, 4 vols. [Leiden: E. ).
Brill, 1996-19991, 3: 1072), for instance, indicate that 1"lj> is "an original verb, which can only with
difficulty be traced back to a root ip 'to cut'; [nevertheless] if this is the case the basic meaning of
w1p would be 'to set apart."' Yet, even if the conception of "separate-ness" is etymologically debated
for utlp, at the very least this notion is clearly involved on the semantic level.
35. This definition is more idiomatic or colloquial than Webster's which defines an X-factor as
"a relevant but unidentified factor" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language Unabridged, ed. Philip Babcock Gove !Springfield: Menriam-Webster, 19931, p. 2644) and
The Compact Oxford English Dictionary [hereafter OEDI, 2d ed. <Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p.
23 53 which notes that the word was originally a military tenn, refening to "the aspects of a seiviceman's life that have no civilian equivalent; pay made in recognition of these."
36. Perhaps, one of the more powerful and controversial X's in recent memory is found in the
per;on of Malcolm Little who upon conversion to the Nation of Islam changed his last name to X
The X in Malcolm's case symbolized the renunciation of a fonner n slavemaster name" and the
anonymity or loss of one's "true African family name that had been taken from every African brought
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to America as a slave. Adding an 'X' to one's name, therefore, is a public sign, a testimony against the
legacy of slavery, where freed slaves either took on the names of their former slavemasters or created
new names entirely" (Garth Kasimu Baker-Fletcher, Xodus: An African-American Male Journey
[Minneapolis: Fortress, 19961, p. 75; emphasis mine). Recently,
has used the X, especially Malcolm's, as a symbol to invigorate African-American male spirituality "outside of the moral

parameters and definitions of European space." See his "Xodus Musings: Reflections on Womanist Tar
Baby Theology," Theology Today 50 I l 9931J8-44, especially p. 43 and, more recently, Xodus, especially pp. xv-xvi, 73-91, and 175-94. Note the proclamatory function of the X in his work.
3 7. For a brief overview of some of the critical issues around the Holiness Code, see Henry T.
C. Sun, "Holiness Code," in ABD 3:254-57_ Not a few scholars have questioned whether the
Holiness Code really existed independently or can be treated separately from the rest of Leviticus.
See, e.g., Erhard S. Gerstenberger, Leviticus: A Commentary, trans. Douglas W. Stott, OTL (Louisville:
Westminster, 19961, p. 18.
38. E.g., Lev. 185, 6, 21; 20:7; 21:12; 22:2, 3, 8, 9, 30, 31, 33; 23:22; 24:22; 25:17; 26:2,
45; etc.; cf. 11 :44-45.
39. Walther Zimmerli, l Am Yahweh, trans. Douglas W. Stott, ed. Walter Brueggemann (Atlanta:
John Knox, 19821. Cf. also idem, Ezekiel I: A Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Ezekiel, Chapters
1-24, trans. R. E. Clements, eds., F. M. Cross, K. Baltzer, and L. J. Creenspoon, Hermeneia
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), pp. 37-40; and idem, "The Message of the Prophet Ezekiel,"
Interpretation 23 I 19691: 131-57.
40. Zimmerli, Ezekiel l, p. 38: "In his action in history Yahweh sets himself before his people
and the world in his own person. All that which is preached by the prophet as an event which is
apparently neutral in its meaning has its purpose in that Israel and the nations should come to a
recognition, which in the Old Testament also means an acknowledgement, of this person who
reveals himself in his name. All Yahweh's action which the prophet proclaims serves as a proof of
Yahweh among the nations" (emphasis mine).
41. Cf. Zimmerli, Ezekiel 1, p. 40: 'The whole direction of the prophetic preaching is a summons to a knowledge and recognition of him who, in his action announced by the prophet, shows
himself to be who he is in the free sovereignty of his prophecy."
42. Primarily in the essay "I am Yahweh" <in l Am Yahweh, pp. 1-28). Zimmerli does point out,
however, that the presence of this formula in the Holiness Code makes the latter quite significant:
"A comparison of the Holiness Code with Ezekiel 20: 7 makes it clear that this indefatigable repetition of 'rry yhwh at the end of individual statements or smaller groups of statements in the legal
offerings is not to be understood as thoughtlessly strewn decoration; rather, this repetition pushes these
legal statements into the most central position from which the Old Testament can make arry statement. Each
of these small groups of legal maxims thereby becomes a legal communication out of the heart of
the Old Testament revelation of Yahweh. Each one of these small units offers in its own way a bit of
explication of the central self-introduction of Yahweh, the God who summons his people-or better, recalling Leviticus 1811. land Ezek. 201, the God who sanctifies his people" I/ Am Yahweh, p. 12;
emphasis mine). This should caution those Christians-scholars and otherwise-who would pass
over the Holiness Code too quickly and ignore it in theological (and even ethical) reflection.
43. Interestingly, Wenham, Leviticus, pp. 261-75 entitles chapter 19 "Principles of
Neighborliness."
44. See Daniel L. Smith, The Religion of the Landless: The Social Context of the Babylonian Exile
(Bloomington: Meyer Stone, 1989) for an excellent treatment that draws extensively on sociological data.
45. Cf. David A Dorsey, The Roads and Highways of Ancient Israel !Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1991 ).
46. This is not to downplay the sociological and theological similarities that, as is well-known,
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abound between Israel and her neighbors in the ancient Near East The prophetic "cleanness" of
social justice for instance (so Cammie) could also be incorporated under difference, but in so doing
one would need to be cognizant that the emphasis on social justice is fairly typical in the ancient

world (see, e.g., Moshe Weinfeld, Social Justice in Ancient Israel and in the Ancient Near East
[Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995]). Even so, Psalm 82 may be an important text at this point.
47. See Lev. 11 :7; cf. Deut. 14:8. See further Douglas, Purity and Danger, pp. 43-45 for "medical" and "meaningless/arbitrary/irrational" interpretations of Leviticus, especially the dietary laws.

Douglas herself opts for reasons relating to locomotion. Firmage <"The Biblical Dietary Laws," pp.
and offered, in its place, an interpretation based on the connection <or
177-2081 has challenged
lack thereof) of the entire animal world to established sacrificial animals. Whatever the case, one
might note that, while pork was prohibited in Israel it was eaten by persons in close proximity to
Israel (notably the Philistines), apparently with no hannful result On the eating of pork in antiquity
generally, see recently Brian Hesse and Paula Wapnish, "Gn Pig Remains Be Used for Ethnic
Diagnosis in the Ancient Near East?," in The Archaeology of Israel: Constructing the Past Interpreting the

Present eds. Neil Asher Silberman and David Small, JSOTSupP 237 (Sheffieldo Sheffield Academic
Press, 1997). The point being stressed here, however, is that there may be no inherent reason for these
laws other than to produce the dynamic outlined above.
48. The notion is certainly not altogether new. Johannes Cocceius ( 1603-1669), for instance, in
his Summa doctrina de foedere et tesamento Dei ( l 648), included the Mosaic law in the covenant of
grace, partially because "it separated the Hebrews as the bearers of the kingdom from the surrounding heathen groups and so preserved the people for Christ" (Hayes and Prussner, Old Testament

Theology, p. 211. Note George Mam Smith, Modern Criticism and the Preaching of the Old Testament
(New York: A.C. Armstrong and Son, 1901 ), p. 142: ''We have seen that the gradual ethical development, which thus differentiated Israel from her neighbors, appears to have begun with the introduction to the nations of Jahweh as their God; and that every stage of its progress was achieved in
connection with some impression of His character. It seems to me that there are here the h'nes ofan
apologetic, for a Divine Revelation through early Israel, more sure and clear than any which the traditional interpretation of the Old Testament ever attempted to lay down" (emphasis mine); and see also
Baruch A. Levine, Levitk:us (Philadelphiao Jewish Publication Society, 5749/1989), p. 257: "The gulf
between the sacred and the profane was not meant to be permanent The command to achieve
holiness, to become holy, envisions a time when life would be consecrated in its fullness and when
all nations would worship God in holiness. What began as a process of separating the sacred from the
profane was to end as the unification of human experience, the harmonizing of man with his universe, and of man with God" (emphasis mine).
49. lbe communicative function of legislation is exponentially increased in the probable historical

location of much of the Priestly writing, namely, the BabjWnian Exile. It

in that context that much of

the legislation <certainly earlier than the sixth century in origin if not composition) takes on new significance as it functions to differentiate a small, forejgn minority group from a larger, dominant host society. See further on this situation Smith, The Religion of the Landless; and Rainer Albertz, "The History of

Israelite Religion in the Exilic Period," in A History of Israelite Religion in the Old Testament Period, 2 vols.,
OTL (louisvilleo Westminster John Knox Press. 19941, 2J69-436. On this point, note Psalm 13 7 and
Daniel 3 and 6-texts that indicate that worship itself was an X-Factor in the diaspora.
50. For the former see Christopher J. H. Wright, "Old Testament Ethics: A Missiological

Perspective," Catalyst (forthcoming).
5 l. See, e.g., Shaye j. D. Cohen, "Crossing the Boundary and Becoming a Jew," Harvard
TheokJg1i:al Review 82 0989):14-33; idem, "Conversion to Judaism in Historical Perspective: From
Biblical Israel to Post-biblical Judaism," Conservative Judaism 36 (I 983U 1-45;
H. Feldman, few
and Gentile in the Andent World: Attitudes and Interactions from Alexander ID /usftnian <Princetono Princeton
University Press. 19931, especially pp. 288-382, 416-46; Beverly Roberts Gaventa. From Darlmess ID
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Light: Aspects of Conversion in the New Testament, Overtures to Biblical Theology <Philadelphia: Fortress,
19861; idem, "Conversion," in ABD I :1131 ·33; Jacob Milgrom, "Religious Conversion and the Revolt
Model for the foJTnation of Israel,'' Journal of Bibfral literature I 0 I (19821: 169·76; Martin Goodman,
Mission and Conversion: Proselytizing in the Religious History of the Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 19941, especially pp. l · l 08, 154-74; Scot McKnight, A Light Among the Centi/es: Jewish Missionary
Activity in the Second Temple Penod <Philadelphia: Fortress, 1991 I; A D. Nock, Conversion: The Old and
the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
19331; and Alan F. Segal, Paul the Convert: The Apostolateand Apostasy of Saul the Pharisee (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1990), especially pp. 1-183, 285-300. While I cannot demonstrate it here in
detail, in my judgment such means did, in fact, exist in early (i.e., pre-exilicl Israel. In addition to the
sociological function of legal and ritual practice that I am describing here (which may well be the
strongest evidence), I would make mention of biblical stories like Ruth, Rahab, Naaman, Jonah, and so
forth, as well as biblical scholars like Gottwald. For the latter, see especially The Tnbes of Yahweh and
idem, "Religious Conversion and the Societal Origins of Ancient Israel.," Perspectives in Religious Studies
15 (1988):49--65. Even so, it must be admitted that we know very few "converts" to Israelite religion
byname.
52. Even those skeptical of the argument here should note that in Ezekiel the proof-saying is
often used for the nations' knowledge of Yahweh. Cf. von Rad, Old Testament Theology, 2:236-3 7: 'This
'manifestation' is therefore much more than simply something inward or spiritual; it is an event
which comes about in the full glare of the political scene, and which can be noticed by foreign
nations as wel.I as by Israel .... The final goal of the divine activity is therefore that Jahweh should be
recognised and worshipped by those who so far have not known him or who still do not know him
properly."

53. Cf. also Josh. 4:5-7, 20-24.
54. I am indebted to Dr. Rueben Welch for this terminology.
55. The classic treatment remains that of Georg fohrer, Die symbolischen Handlungen der
Propheten, 2d ed. (Zlirich: Zwingli Verlag, 1968). See more recently Kelvin Friebel, Jeremiah's and

Ezekiel's Sign-Acts: Rhetorical Nonverbal Communication, JSOTSupp 283 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic
Press, 19991.
56. See Ezek. 4:1-5:17; 12:1-6.
57. Zimmerli is certainly right to caution against overinterpreting "the delight of your eyes"
<Zimmerli, Ezekiel I, p. 505), but at the same time, the Hebrew is at least somewhat excessive. After
all, inuH< could have been used just as easily.
58. Of course, the resulting oracle shows that it applies to both, but the second person forms in
Ezek. 24: 15-17 are singular, while those in 24:21-24 are plural.
59. So Walter Brueggemann, A Commentary on Jeremiah: Exile and Homecoming (Grand Rapids:

Eerdmans, 19981, p. 153.
60. On this phenomenon, especially in Ezekiel and Jeremiah, see Thomas M. Raitt, A Theology
of Exile: judgment/Deliverance in Jeremiah and Ezekiel (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977).
61. Peter C. Craigie, Page H. Kelley, and Joel F. Drinkard, Jr., Jeremiah 1-25, Word Biblical
Commentary 26 (Dallas: Word Books, 1991>, p. 216 go so far as to use the "unusualness of the
prohibition to many'' to argue for the authenticity of the pericope.
62. This is rather obvious, but note also the "house of mourning" (nr1l'.'.l n,:i.l in /er. 16:5. The
Hebrew term marze(a)i) is rare in the Hebrew Bible. It does occur, however, in other ancient Near
Eastern literatures, including that of Ugarit (2nd millennium BCE; see especially KTU 3.9), where it
apparently refers to some sort of funerary association. What Yahweh forbids, therefore, is nothing
less than a long-standing, cross-cultural tradition. See further Theodore J. Lewis, Cults of the Dead in
Ancient Israel and Ugarit, Harvard Semitic Monographs 39 <Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989) and Brian
B. Schmidt, Israel's Benefident Dead: Ancestor Cult and Necromancy in Ancient Israelite Religion and
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Tradit<Jn (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1995).
63. Especially in Ezekiel. Note Ezek. 24:24, 27; cf. )er. 16:21.
64. Note especially on this point that Jer. 16: 14-21 switches to the theme of restoration and climaxes in vv. 19-21 with the "conversion of the nations" <Craigie, Kelley, and Drinkard, Jeremiah 125, p. 216; cf. William L. Holladay, Jeremiah I: A Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Jeremiah,
Chapters 1-25, ed. Paul D. Hanson, Herrneneia [Philadelphia: Fortress, 19861, pp. 480-8 ll. Note
also the use of the proof-saying in Ezekiel for the nations' knowledge of Yahweh and cf. above on
the (heightened) significance of difference in Exile.
65. "Negative" primarily in that it involves abstention from practice'> engaged in hy <>urrounding

cultures. Even so, it goes without saying that at times separation is offensive and that part of the
encounter with the holy may involve dread fascination.
66. See Douglas, Purity and Danger, p. 51 on the Holy as wholeness and completeness, not just
separation.
67. See especially Douglas, Natural Symbols; Smith, The Religion of the Landless.
68. Some scholars have thought that this section is in fact a fragment of the Holiness Code. See
George Buchanan Gray, Numbers, International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T and T Clark,
1903), p. 183; but contrast Philip f. Budd, Numbers, Word Biblical Commentary 5 <Waco: Word
Books, 1984), p. 177.
69. Cf. Budd, Numbers, 178: "In the wider context they lvv. 32-361 function as a fitting conclusion to the section dealing with ]srael's sin, specifically the rejection of the land in Num 14, but
more generally the whole section of disaffection in Num 11-14. The tassels ought to be a safeguard
against these besetting sins."
70. Budd, Numbers, p. 177 entitles this section lassels of Remembrance." Cf. the dual aspects
of remembrance and encounter in Baker-Fletcher, Xodus, p. 75: "The 'X' in this way is a prophetic
symbol of retrieval and remembrance" and has impact not only for African Americans, but also for
Euro-Americans.
71. Cf. Richard Yalantasis' comments on asceticism and the Gospel of Thomas, which exemplify the kind of dynamic I am talking about here: "At the heart of asceticism is the desire to create a
new person as a minority person within a larger religious culture. Jn order to create a new person,
there must be a withdrawal from the dominant modes of articulating subjectivity in order to create
free space for something else to emerge. A redefinition of social relationships must also emerge
from the new understanding of the new subjectivity, as well as a concurrent change in the symbolic
universe to justify and support the new subjectivity. These are all accomplished through a rigorous
set of intentional performances .... My perspective on asceticism looks not only at the negative performances <rejecting wealth or sexuality), ltermed in this paper negative difference or separationl but
primarily toward the positive articulation of the new subjectivity that the gospel presents ('becoming
a single one,' for example) [termed in this paper positive difference or accountabilityl This positive perspective promotes a constructive reading of the text, so that all performances (whether negative or
positive) are interpreted in the context of the larger project of creating an alternative identity within
a larger and more dominant religious environment" (Richard Yalantasis, The Gospel of Thomas, New
Testament Readings, ed John Court [New York: Routledge, 19971, pp. 22-23).
72. I'd like to thank Shane Berg for bringing this point to my attention and discussing it with me.
73. Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1-16, Anchor Bible 3 !New York: Doubleday, 199 P, p. 230.
74. I hope in this way to get around the devastating critique of Christian interpretations of Old
Testament legal material raised by Jon D. Levenson, The Hebrew Bible, the Old Testament, and
Criticism: fews and Christians in Biblical Studies !Louisville: Westminster/john Knox, 1993),
pp. 52-53, 54. My proposal does argue for an appropriation of the legal material that is, in some
ways, alegal and therefore Christian/Protestant and subject to Levenson's critique. Yet at the same
time, my proposal is also trying to do justice to those same laws and situations, especially the
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dynamic at work within them and thus does not, or so it seems to me, fall under Levenson's judg·
ment.

75. I'd like to thank David Stubbs for bringing this point to my attention and discussing it with
me.
76. Cf. Lev. 20:26; Isa. 31:3, 8 (cf. I 0:151; Hos. 11 :9; etc., as well as Karl Barth's comments in
the preface to the second edition of his Romans commentary: "My reply is that, if I have a system, it
is limited to a recognition of what Kierkegaard called the 'infinite qualitative distinction' between
time and eternity, and to my regarding this as possessing negative as well as positive significance:
'God is in heaven, and thou art on earth'" (Kari Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C.
Hoskyns !London: Oxford Univeo;ity Press, 19681, p. IOI. More recently, see Moltmann, The Source
of Life, pp. 43-45.
77. See OED, p. 2352; cf Baker-Fletcher, Xodus, pp. xvi, 80-81. Note that Greek x, like XP,
can be an abbreviation for Christ (QED, p. 2353).
78. See, e.g., Vinson Synan, The Holiness-Pentecostal Tradition: Charismatic Movements in the
Twentieth Century !Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 19971.
79. Note, for instance, the Nation of Islam's moral code (for some of its forbidden and positive
aspects, see Baker-Fletcher, Xodus, p. 77; cf. p. xvi) and the impact this group has made on some of
the worst inner-city situations of urban America. I would also mention various practices found
among the Mormons (the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints): special
undergarments (accountability?), CTR ("choose the right") rings (attraction?), and so forth. Often Christian
youth culture is effective at selecting these types of practices: witness the WWJD ("What Would
Jesus Do?"l paraphernalia for sale at Christian book stores. For a different example, cf. the comments of Richard Swinburne, "The Vocation of a Natural Theologian," in Philosophers Who Believe:
The Spiritual journeys of 11 Leading Thinkers, ed. Kelly James Clark <Downers Grove: lnterVarsity,
1993), pp. 179-202 who discusses the practice of philosophy and the public identification of oneself as both a Christian and a philosopher in similar terms.
80. Cf. Baker-Fletcher, Xodus, p. 76: 'as Malcolm recounted to Alex Haley: 'Mr. Muhammad
taught that we would keep this 'x' until God Himself returned and gave us a Holy Name from His
own mouth." See Malcolm X and Alex Haley, The Autobiography of Malcolm X (New York:
Ballantine Books, 19651, p. 217.
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Achtemeier, Elizabeth. Preaching Hard Texts of the Old Testament. Peabody, MA:
Hendrickson, 1998.
Elizabeth Achtemeier shares with us, yet again, the fruits of a life of solid biblical
scholarship. In Preaching Hard Texts of the Old Testamen' she brings a freshness and a creativity to the text that is consistently rooted in a posture that honors the nonnative character of the text. While conversam with recem trends and "fads'' in biblical studies, she
discerns and delineates their inadequacies and detennines to wrestle with the text with
integrity. For example, her discussion of Gen. 3: 14-19 (pp. 11-16) and the relationship
between the sexes will not pass muster as being "politically correct," but it is both faithful
to the text and to the greater biblical message: "The battle between the sexes will
undoubtedly continue in our society ... but in the church we know that the battle has
been stilled and the love of Christ has joined women and men together'' (p. 15).
Dr. Achtemeier begins on a lofty note: "I have always thought and in fact taught
that if we have some problem with a passage in the Old Testament it is not the Bible's
problem. It is ours." Does she carry it of!7 Strictly speaking, no. But when one realizes
that she operates as a biblical theologian, then the answer is, "Yes, she does." Again
and again, Achterneier urges the Old Testament text to a fuller exposition in light of
the New
never distorting or negating the meaning of the Old Testament
text While for some odd reason unknown to me, academics have hailed the death of
biblical theology, it is a joy to see its influence yielding such fruitful results in this scholar's work. See her discussion of the sacrifice of Isaac. At some level, this biblical word is
"incomplete'' without the fuller explication of the sacrificial work of Jesus. Similarly she
(rightly) subjects Ezra's teaching on divorce to the fuller light of Paul's teaching (pp. 8085); and the message of Psalm 137, "Dashing the children on the rocks ... " is superseded by Jesus' word of forgiveness in Luke 23 :24 (pp. I 05-1 l 0).
Achtemeier will not "trade in" biblical metaphors easily in the name of current
sensitivities. Rather, she plumbs their depths for relevant meaning as she does on
p. 28 with her discussion of God as Warrior and military language. Her wisdom
on Sophia (pp. 111-15) is much needed today. Her discussion of Theophanies on
p. 31 and Uzziah and the Ark (p. 73) are a needed corrective to the current,
folksy religion that shares more in common with the self-help psychology section
of a major bookstore than it does with vital biblical faith. Her treatment of the
tragedy of Saul reflects her approach as one of vigorous honesty which allows the
text to engage us in the real struggles of our world, never resorting to simplistic
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answers, such as "obey and everything will be all right."
Once again, Dr. Achtemeier has provided a great resource to the church.
DAN G. JOHNSON
Trinity United Methodist Church
Gainesville, Florida

Longman, Tremper, Ill. Making Sense of the Old Testament: Three Crudal Ques6ans. Grand
Rapids, Ml: Baker Book House, 1998.
The volumes of the "Three Crucial Questions" series are derived from seminars by the
same name, sponsored by Bridge Ministries of Detroit, Michigan. The editors assert that the
books (and presumably the seminars) are based on the realization that "imperfect Christians
seem to have no final answers" to certain critical issues related to our faith (p. 9). These volumes offer tentative answers to such crucial questions in the hopes of advancing the
Christian faith in our times. Previous volumes have offered answers to three questions about
Jesus (Murray J. Harris), the Bible (Grant R. Osborne), the Holy Spirit (Craig S. Keener), spiritual warfare (Clinton E. Arnold), and the last days (Daniel J. Lewis). The editors promise
forthcoming volumes on topics of interest to all believers: three questions about women,
black theology, the Trinity, salvation, moral reasoning. and racial reconciliation.
The topics chosen for the seminar and book series are indeed "crucial" to our faith,

and as the history of interpretation demonstrates, none is more crucial to biblical

hermeneutics than the way Christians relate to the Old Testament. Since Christians frequently raise tough questions about the Old Testament, this new volume is a welcome
contribution. The book has a simple structure. There are three chapters, one devoted to

each of the following questions. First, what are the keys to understanding the Old
Testament° Second, is the God of the Old Testament also the God of the New
Testament? Third, how is the Christian to apply the Old Testament to life?
The first chapter surveys the attractions and obstacles of Old Testament study and presents nine principles for successful interpretation, which the reader is to assume provide

the "keys" to understanding the Old Testament. This portion of the volume is a lay-level
introduction to biblical hermeneutics, and is a convenient summaiy of the author's earlier
publications on this topic. The first principle is a defense of the traditional interest in

authorial intent. Longman carefully navigates between newer approaches, many of which
often abandon entirely the pursuit of authorial intent, and those who equate the human
author's intent with God's intent (notably Walter Kaiser). Longman's conclusion is that the
human authors sometimes "wrote better than they knew," meaning that "God's intention

may surpass the conscious intention of the human author" (pp. 28 and 29). Other principles for reading the Old Testament include context, genre identification, attention to history and grammar, and so forth. At times Longman adopts a Christocentric (rather than
approach to the Old Testament, as in his discussion of principle 8:
"Discover How the Scripture Passage Presents Jesus Christ" (pp. 52-53).
In the second chapter, Longman addresses the perceived contradictions between the
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Testaments. In other words, Christians often have difficulty with the Old Testament
because they perceive Yahweh as a vindictive, anger-filled despot, who seems to delight
in punishing helpless victims. The chapter exposes the erroneous nature of such
approaches to the Old T
by surveying three metaphors for God in the Bible:
God as covenant king, God as warrior, and God as Immanuel. By stressing the continuity
between the Testaments concerning these metaphors, Longman is able to conclude that
the God of the New Testament is clearly the same God of the Old Testament, and that
he revealed himself progressively through time (p. I 0 I ).
The third and final chapter addresses the issue of how the modern Christian is to apply
the Old Testament to life. Longman begins the chapter with a brief survey of opposite
extremes regarding Old Testament law: dispensationalism versus theonomy. In essence,
the former overemphasizes discontinuity between the Testaments while the latter sees only
continuity. The truth, Longman argues, lies somewhere between these extremes. The heart
of the chapter then explores the most difficult part of the Old Testament to apply to modern Christians, namely, the laws of the Pentateuch. Relying on the well-worn distinctions
between the moral law (the Ten Commandments), the ceremonial law (sacrificial and ritualistic regulations) and civil laws (societal legislation), Longman argues that the specific ceremonial and civil laws flow from the general moral laws of the Decalogue. Since the ceremonial and civil laws are defined culturally and presented in a specific redemptive-historical
setting, they are no longer applicable to modern believers. Nevertheless such specific casuistic and ritualistic laws illustrate ethical principles that are still relevant
Longman has a casual and easy-to-read style, which will make this a useful volume
among lay-people and students interested in the Old Testament But 1 was left wondering
if he has asked the right questions, or to put it another way, if he has asked them specifically enough. Are these three general questions the questions plaguing modern Christians
with regard to the Old Testament? There no doubt that the most troubling question
those of us in ministry hear today about the Old Testament is the problem of violence,
particularly concerning the conquest narratives. The author's second chapter certainly
addresses this question by affirming that Yahweh of the Old Testament is the same God
as in the New. Particularly pertinent is his discussion of the metaphor of the Divine
Warrior as a continuity between the Testaments. But there is much more that needs to be
said on this point, especially concerning the centrality of the justice of God in both
Testaments, and the modern misconception and overemphasis on the love (or better, the
perceived sentimental drivel) of Jesus in the New.
Likewise, another important question concerning the Old Testament is its applicability
to modern life. Longman' s third chapter is instructive at this point, but leaves us with further questions. For example, while the time-honored distinction between moral, ceremonial, and civil laws of the Pentateuch may be a useful starting point for discussion, it is inadequate to finally settle the question. What of sabbath-keeping? Observation of the sabbath is
certainly part of the Decalogue, and by this definition is part of the moral law of God. But
why then do so many Christians (in fact, all but the Seventh-Day Adventists) routinely alter
this particular law7 Some laws are both moral and civil, such as laws against adultery, stealing and bearing false witness. Others are both moral and ceremonial, such as laws against
idolatry and sabbath-breaking. The lines between the categories are not always easy to
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determine. The moral-civil-ceremonial categories are a helpful start, but such distinctions
are extra-biblical and are a bit arbitrary. It is better to accept some laws of the Pentateuch as
broad and generally intended for all societies, while others are specific applications to
Israelite culture and society. Rather than rely on an arbitrary distinction to determine when
a law is applicable, is it not better to evaluate each law on a case-by-case basis?
Part of our difficulty in the West is our own context, specifically our industrial-urban setting. Much of the two-thirds world today (the majority of the world's population!) is closer
to ancient Israel than we may think (and than we are). The specific applications of civil law
are not so far removed from the culture and society of much of the world today. It may
not be as satisfying initially, but I believe it is better to assert that the Old Testament law is
God's word for us, though not his command to us in every situation. It is better to accept
ancient Israel as the model and example of how God's revealed law is applied in that particular time and place. As we compare our own situation to theirs, we accept Pentateuchal
law as confirmed by Christ (Matt. 5: 17), and with the help of his Holy Spirit, the specifics
of how we ought to love God and neighbor should become clear (for more on this
approach, see Christopher). H. Wright, Cod's People in Cod's Land, Family, Land, and Property
in the Old Testament !Grand Rapids, Ml: Eerdmans, I 9901, pp. 260-65).
Longman has put us in his debt for addressing the most difficult topics involved in
making sense of the Old Testament. This little volume will not settle those questions once
and for all. But that would be too much to ask from any single volume, even one written
by a scholar as gifted as Tremper Longman.
BILL T. ARNOLD
Asbury Theological Seminary
Wilmore, Kentucky

Cunrid, john D. Ancient Egypt and the Old Testament Grand Rapids: Baker Books, I 997.
The historical reliability of the Old Testament has been a matter of sharp debate for
generations. Scholars continue to be divided and scattered between two extreme poles:
one being the minimalist view that most, if not all, of the historical material in the Old
Testament is quite late (dated to the Persian period and later) and heavily dependent on
other ANE cultures; the other claiming that the biblical presentation is altogether sound
and historically accurate. Cunrid's work leans heavily toward this latter position and is an
attempt to refute those denying the Old Testament's historical veracity. He does this, in
particular, by presenting the Egyptian backgrounds to those portions of the Old Testament
which deal in some respect with Egypt. Since certain scholars believe that much of the biblical material is a late creation, it naturally follows that those Hebrew writers would have
known virtually nothing of the era about which they were writing G.e., Joseph or Moses in
their respective Egyptian settings). Cunid wants to correct this notion by showing that the
Egyptian backgrounds to these particular Old Testament passages, many of which, he
argues, are polemical in nature, do indeed validate the authenticity of the biblical history.
Cunrid arranges the book in five parts. Part One is the introduction, wherein the author
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asserts that, contrary to the opinion of many modem scholars, the ancient Hebrews were
very well informed about Egyptian life and culture. He rejects the common idea that the
Hebrew cosmology accounts are heavily dependent on their Mesopotamian counterparts,
and stresses rather the dissimilarities between the two. Part Two, Egyptian Elements in the
Pentateuch, is the bulk of Currid' s work, not only in length but also in his efforts to prove the
historicity of those particular passages in the Pentateuch involving Egypt. Part Three, Contacts
between Israel and Egypt in the Historical Books, deals mainly with Solomon's reign (his marriage to Pharaoh's daughter, administration, etc.l and Shishak. Part Four, Egyptian Wisdom
Literature and the Poetical Books, is basically a discussion involving the parallels between the
"Instruction of Amenemope" and Proverbs. Part Five, Egyptian and Israelite Prophecy,
describes Egyptian divination and examines certain Hebrew prophecies against Egypt.
It is unfortunate that Currid's Introduction and opening chapter of Part Two G.e., the
first three chapters of the book) are the weakest parts of his work These sections deal with
ancient cosmologies: those of Mesopotamia, Egypt and Israel. There are three basic faults.
First, in an attempt to rescue the Old Testament from the claims, now quite dated, that the
Hebrew account is completely dependent upon much earlier Babylonian lore,' Currid
endeavors to de-emphasize the similarities between the two cosmologies and place greater
emphasis upon their differences. The problems in doing so are multiple. To begin with,
since such a powerful display of similarities does, in fact, exist between the Hebrew and
Mesopotamian cosmologies (particularly the creation accounts), to emphasize their dissimilarities in an effort to prove their relative independence only weakens the polemical aspect
which the Hebrew cosmology is leveling against the other. In other words, the similarities
to the Babylonian material (though restricted for theological/polemical purposes) are the
entire point of the Hebrew cosmology. Currid seems to impair this particular polemic,
while he later depends on polemical arguments that are based on the similarities between
Israel and Egypt Interestingly, today there seems to be a growing understanding within
scholarship which maintains that similar cosrnologicaVmythological forms found in different cultures are not dependent upon direct borrowing. To note similarities between
Mesopotamian and Levantine motifs says nothing about Israelite dependence on a
Mesopotamian culture.' Furthermore, once Currid de-emphasizes the similarities between
the Hebrew and Mesopotamian cosmologies, he then, in an effort to further distance the
two stresses all the similarities between Hebrew and Egyptian cosmologies. These similarities seem more general and less impressive than he imagines. Ironically, he emphasizes an
Egyptian milieu to the point that one could see a Hebrew dependence on Egypt1
A second basic fault in Part I is Currid's treatment of the Hebrew cosmology itself. For
example, beri!'sit is given the standard definition of "in the beginning" without any mention of other possible readings. 1 The creation is understood to be ex nihiio, which is based
more on theological presuppositions than Hebrew syntax. Such an understanding of these
concepts allows Currid to make a strong comparison to Egyptian cosmology, which portrays Ptah as speaking everything into existence.
One final fault, which tends to run throughout the book, is Currid's tone. He is quite
inflammatory towards the "liberals" and the "revisionists." His work tends to be 'preaching to
the choir' more than dialoguing with the scholarly community. Ultimately, he damages his
own endeavors, as well as those of other conservatives, by fueling the 'fundamentalist stigma.
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Apart from these cosmologicaVcosmogonic issues, the rest of Currid's work is lucid and
insightful (Part 2: Egyptian Elements in the Pentateuch; Part 3: Contacts between Israel and
Egypt in the Historical books; Part 4: Egyptian Wisdom Literature and the Poetical Books;
Part 5: Egyptian and Israelite Prophecy). He is much more comfortable dealing with those
biblical passages with direct Egyptian contact, and his understanding of Egyptian cultural
backgrounds is thorough. In these chapters, Currid reviews the history of Egyptological
scholarship, often supplying his own opinion on the matter. A few examples would be
chapter 4, Potiphar's position in society; chapter I 0, Shishak and the Bubastite Portal (a
partially legible inscription which records the Palestinian cities he conquered or subjugated);
and chapter I 2, Egyptian divination. His strongest work tends to be in Part Two, Egyptian
Elements in the Pentateuch, and in particular his treatments dealing with serpents. In chapter 5, for instance, Currid discusses the first confrontation of Moses with the magicians
(Exod. 7:8ffJ, and in chapter 8 he deals with the episode involving the fiery snakes and the
Bronze Serpent (Nurn. 2 I :4ffJ. In both cases Currid delivers powerful and original arguments for a polemical understanding of these incidents. Having provided the Egyptian
background regarding serpentine lore, he demonstrates how both instances could be interpreted as Yahweh mocking the Egyptian culture, religion, pharaoh, and ultimately the
Egyptian gods. Yahweh displays his authority over <Exodus 7) and through <Numbers 2 I)
serpents, 4 which, in Egyptian culture, were endowed with various powers.
Overall, Currid' s work is perceptive and vigorous. Although it is somewhat defensive
in tone, it nevertheless provides valuable insights into the Egyptian backgrounds of the
Hebrew Bible, as well as fresh approaches in interpreting various biblical passages with
direct Egyptian connections. This volume is an excellent source for background material
and would also be a fine resource for college and seminary students.
NOTES
I. Cunid is especially sensitive to Friedrich Delitzs<e,.h' s castigation of the Old Testament writers for
their outright plagiarism of Babylonian material. See nure 16, p. 28. Also see Delitzsch, Babel and Bible

!New York: Putnam, 19031, pp. I49, 175, 176.
2. See Dorothy hvin, Mytharion: The Comparison of Tales from the Old Testn1nent and the Ancient Near
East (AOAT 32; Kevelaer/Neukirchen-Vluyn: Butzon and Bercker/Neukirchener, 1978), esp. p. 112;
Susan Niditch, Folklore and the Hebrew Bible (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1993); W. G. Doty,

Mythography, 7he Study of Myths and Rituals ITuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1986).
3. Gen. I: I is understood by many as a circumstantial clause, dependent on verse 3, while
verse 2 is parenthetical: "When God began to create ... (now the earth was formless and void ... )
God said .... " Others see verse I as a title or caption of the whole creative process. Currid fails to
acknowledge the complexity of these verses. For a thorough discussion see G. Wehnam, Genesis 115 (Word Biblical Commentary; Waco, TX: Word, 19871, pp. 1 1-17.
4. Healing, a common characteristic of Egyptian serpent gods, was only possible here through
Yahweh's command.

PETER HERBERT DONGELL
Hebrew Union College
Cincinnati, Ohio
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Hill, Andrew E. Molochi: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. Anchor Bible
250; New York, NY: Doubleday, 1998.
The editor and publishers of the Anchor Bible series have a tradition of producing large
commentaries on small biblical books (e.g., 979 pages on Amos and 70 I pages on Hosea),
but Andrew Hill's contribution on Malachi takes us to a new level: 436 densely-printed
pages on 5 5 verses.
In the introduction, the author includes sections on textual, canonical, literary, and historical considerations, as well as brief discussions of the date of Malachi's oracles and the use of
Malachi in subsequent Jewish and Christian literature. This introduction is followed by an
extensive bibliography that includes many works not directly related to Malachi, and 260
pages of meticulous commentary relying upon the author's new translation. The book concludes with appendices on a variety of topics related to interpreting the prophet, as well as

extensive indices.
Most sections in the introduction survey the history of interpretation on a given topic and
conclude with the author's position. On the question of the nature of "Malachi" as either a
contrived appellative for the anonymous person responsible for compiling the book or a
proper name of the author of the oracles, Hill sides with those scholars who take it as a
proper name, probably meaning "my messenger." He further speculates that it may be an
abbreviated theophoric name in the same vein as "Zechariah," that is, without a connecting
"-1'" vowel. Hence, the original form might have been something like mafiikyah(u), or
s"Malachiah," meaning "messenger of Yahweh" (pp. 15-18). In terms of the specific type of
prophetic oracles found in Malachi, the author agrees with Claus Westermann and classifies
it as prophetic disputation speech formula, part of the standard Old Testament prophetic
judgement speech against the nations. The speeches contain the prophetic declaration, followed by the hypothetical audience rebuttal, and conclude with the prophetic refutation.
As a scholar who posits "the person and presence of God" as the theological center and
organizing tenet for the Old Testament, Hill sees Malachi "as primarily a theology of
Yahweh" (pp. 46-4 7). As much as we may appreciate this emphasis in the prophecies of
Malachi, the perils of postulating such a center for the Old Testament generally are well
known. One wonders how helpful it is to postulate a superintending Mitte (center) as vague

as "divine presence."
After surveying scholarship on the date of Malachi's composition, Hill turns to a purely
linguistic analysis, which has the advantage of being more objective (pp. 80-84). Relying on
previous studies that establish a continuum between Classical Biblical Hebrew (the
Deuteronomistic History) and Late Biblical Hetrew (secondary extensions to the priestly
corpus), Hill proposes a round figure of 500 B.C. as the most reasonable date of composition for Malachi. This proposal stretches the consensus opinion, which places Malachi in the
first half of the fifth century, and it precludes those positions that place Malachi after
Nehemiah. The author also provides a healthy overview of the Persian period's history and
its implications for interpreting Malachi, including four maps and four charts (pp. 51-7 6).
There is an eight-page glossy insert with photographs and line art to shed light on the Persian
period (found at p. 2 12).
At times the reader gets much more than expected from a commentary. For example, in
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the introduction's section on "unity" (pp. 18-23), the author begins by describing three
approaches to the Bible: the historical, the theological, and the literary. After discussing each,
he explains how the theological approach to the Bible continues in the work of modem
canonical criticism, especially as defined by James Sanders and Brevard Childs (even though
Childs disavows the terminology). After a brief explanation of the differences between
Sanders and Childs, the author uses two more pages to describe what all this means for
interpreting Malachi. Most of these discussions are quite useful as surveys of various trends
and emphases in the discipline, and few commentaries can afford the luxury of so much
background and survey material. The author includes other such summaries in the text-critical presentation (pp. 3-12), his discussion of canonical considerations (pp. 12-1 Sl, the problem of genre classification in Old Testament studies (pp. 23-2Sl, a survey of scholarly work
on prophetic disputation speeches (pp. 3S-37l, and to a lesser degree, a survey of recent
developments in Old Testament theology (pp. 46-4 7). One wonders, however, if all of
these items-as informative as they are-are necessary for a commentary on Malachi, especially one intended for a scholarly readership.
This volume will no doubt be of enormous benefit to beginners in the field as well as
professionals, though scholars may actually find it tedious to work through. All in all, however, we must be grateful for at least a few academic publishers and editors who allow such
extensive treatment and space devoted to such a small biblical book. In this sense, the commentary is a rarity. Like most commentaries being produced today, this one will be most
widely read for its introduction and turned to subsequently as a reference tool on the text of
Malachi. Hill's commentary itself is painstakingly exhaustive, perhaps the most comprehensive biblical commentary I have ever seen. He is to be commended for an impressive
amount of work. The result is a volume that will become one of the stock reference tools
on Malachi, more because of its extensiveness than its innovations.
BILL T. ARNOLD
Asbury Theological Seminary
Wilmore, Kentucky

Dunn, James D.G. The Theology of Paul the Apostle. Grand Rapids/Cambridge, UK:
Eerdmans, 1998.
In this major new treatment of Paul's theology, James Dunn of Durham University
makes an impressive contribution to Pauline studies and New Testament theology. This is
certainly a text to be included in all New Testament collections, and it will be of interest
to all students of Paul's writings. Especially significant is the book's rare combination of
clarity, incisiveness, and scope. Dunn writes clearly enough for a mature college student

to grasp, and yet he engages the giants in the field productively, contributing effectively on
their level. In twenty-five sections Dunn covers seven major themes (including chapters

on God and Humankind, Humankind under Indictment The Gospel of Jesus Christ, The
Beginning of Salvation, The Process of Salvation, The Church, and How Should Believers
Live?) introduced and followed by a helpful prologue and epilogue. Exhaustive bibliogra-
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phies introduce each chapter, and the work is marked by fitting thematic progressions
and appropriate topical excursions along the way.
Having discussed thoughtfully the question of whether a theology of Paul can be written, Dunn's approach begins with Romans, arguably the greatest theological work of the
greatest Christian theologian. From thence, Dunn develops a model of theology as a dialogue or sets of dialogues-not simply an abstract set of ideas-wherein Paul's theological
views and frameworks were forged. After all, what we have to work with is the letters of
Paul, and these were produced as epistolary responses to specific issues within particular
contextual settings. Nevertheless, Romans offers the most fitting template from which to
construct one's presentation of Paul's theological work, as it is here that Paul's explorations are most comprehensive and far reaching.
This move leads Dunn to a fit ordering of his own explorations, beginning with Paul's
treatment of God. Highlighting the provenance of Jewish monotheism, combined with Paul's
personally transfonnative experience, Dunn moves from Paul's lively theism to a thoughtful
discussion of the dialectics of human experience. Here the realities of human fallenness lead
to discussions of "sin and death" and their effects. The law, of course, serves to define sin and
convict humanity of it, but sin turns law into gramma, changing it from a gift of God to an
instrument of death. The Gospel of Jesus Christ, however, proclaims the new era of the
"eschatological 'now"' in which transfonnation is indeed possible. Nonned by the ministry of
Jesus, effected by his death and resurrection, worshipped as the preexistent one, and anticipated as the eternal Lord, christology is the pivotal center of Paul's theological platfonn.
In chapters 5 and 6, Dunn poses what may be one of his most creative treatments of
Paul's thought: "The Beginning of Salvation" followed by 'Tue Process of Salvation." This
juxtaposition allows Dunn to develop meaningful discussions of such topics as justification by faith, participation in Christ, the gift of the Spirit, baptism, and other topics in
chapter 5, while such topics as eschatological tension and Israel are reserved for chapter
6. This sort of division allows the full treatment of the "already'' accompanied with the
"not-yet" character of Paul's theology. It also brings works and transfonnation into the
discussion meaningfully without compromising the importance of salvation by faith.
Dunn then goes on to discuss matters related to the church and ministry, and then
ethics, in chapters 7 and 8.
The great strength of Dunn's outline and approach is that it allows him comprehensive
treatments of major issues in Pauline theology, and in doing so, he is able to sketch helpful connections between the relevant themes. While particular scholars will take issue with
Dunn on one matter or another, this book is well worth considering on the whole, and
on specific matters as well. In his postlegomena, Dunn comments on the importance of
taking into account at least three levels of dialogue within Paul's theology-the reflective
dialogue within himself, his dialogue with his Jewish tradition and convictions, and his
many sets of dialogues with members of his communities of faith. Keeping these levels of
engagement in mind helps later interpreters appreciate more fully the dynamic character
of Paul's epistolary theologizing-a worthy interest indeed-as is this book 1
PAUL N. ANDERSON
Yale Divinity School
New Haven, Connecticut
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Pfitzner, Victor C. Hebrews. Nashville: Abingdon, 1997.
Worship lies at the center of the Christian life, and according to Victor C. Pfitzner, a
call to true Christian worship is the central message of the Epistle to the Hebrews.
Pfitzner, professor of New Testament and principal of Luther Seminary, North Adelaide,
South Australia, has contributed a rhetorically, literarily, and theologically sensitive volume
to the Abingdon New Testament Commentaries Series. The aim of this series is to
address the needs and interests of pastors, theological students, and other church leaders,
taking into account the technical scholarly literature but communicating in a way that can
be understood by non-specialists. Pfitzner fulfills this aim admirably. The volume has three
basic divisions: an introduction, the commentary proper, and a select bibliography.
The introduction treats the standard questions of author, date, historical situation, and
structure, all quite vexing issues with this epistle. The discussion of authorship is necessarily inconclusive. However, Pfitzner is bolder regarding the date, departing from the (rough)
consensus dating of the mid-90s and arguing convincingly for the late 50s or early 60s,
based in part on Hebrews' silence about the destruction of the temple (AD 70). In addition to these standard questions, the introduction contains excellent summaries of
Hebrews' literary and rhetorical qualities and its "World of Thought"
The structure of the commentary proper is threefold: literary analysis, exegetical analysis,
and theologicaVethical analysis. Generally, Pfitzner does well in all three areas, but, as one
might expect with this particular epistle, his literary and rhetorical analysis is especially
detailed and nuanced. Hebrews is the most self-consciously rhetorical writing in the New

Testament Inclusions, alliteration, hookwords, and a dozen other tropes abound. But even
with Hebrews, commentators have occasionally "found" more than is there. This is especially true with the rhetorical structure known as chiasm (A, B, C. C', B', A'l. While
Hebrews no doubt uses this technique, Pfitzner on occasion seems to create them by see-

ing dubious relationships between clauses (pp. 48, 195). But in general his judgments are
sound and his observations insightful. Inclusions, used pervasively by Hebrews (see esp.
4: 1-16 and I0: 19-23), are regularly noted by Pfitzner. Transitions, preparations, and special
occurrences and concentrations of words are effectively mined for their exegetical yield.
Pfitzner offers a thorough exegesis of the principle argument in Hebrews: a series of

amplified comparisons demonstrating the superiority of God's Son over angels, Moses,
the Levitical priesthood, etc., and the lesser to greater argument for faithful endurance
ensuing from those comparisons. At one point, however, he includes the enigmatic

Melchizedek in the list of comparisons (p 21) and later suggests that Hebrews' use of this
figure constitutes an implicit lesser to greater argument, i.e., that Jesus is greater than
Melchizedek (p. I 04). But as Pfitzner's own exegesis makes clear, Melchizedek is a type
of Christ The author's argument is not that Jesus is superior to Melchizedek (although
presumably he would have thought this), but that Jesus' superiority to Abraham and to
the Levitical priests is prefigured in Melchizedek.
Pfitzner's novel contribution to the study of Hebrews lies in the prominence he gives

to the theme of worship. Neglect of worship leading to apostasy is seen as the "real issue"
behind the letter (p. 27). Indeed, the whole lerter can be seen in the light of its conclusion
(12:18-13:25) as "a call to worship" (p. 182). It is certainly the case that the recipients'
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reinvigorated faith ought to express itself, among other ways, in worship. It is also true
that at certain climactic points in Hebrews (4: 16; 10: 19-25; 12:22-24; 13: 15-16) exhortations are framed in liturgical language of "approaching the throne of grace," "entering the
sanctuary," etc. This being granted, there are occasions when Pfitzner's definition of "worship" is too expansive, and almost any doxological, eschatological, or ethical affirmation
becomes an aspect of it (pp. 52, 83, 191). If the entirety of Christian existence can be
subsumed under the category of "worship," then it would be surprising if Hebrews did not
make it a central concern. Nevertheless, worship in a distinctively Christian mode is critical to this epistle, and Pfitzner rightly calls attention to it.
The commentary is uncluttered by footnotes, using instead parenthetical references to
works in the bibliography. The concluding bibliography then gives full information about
both significant monographs and articles (all English or English translations) and commentaries (mostly in English, but also the most noteworthy German and French works). The
latter group includes brief annotations that will guide those wishing to do further study.
Among those "mid-range" commentaries that make no claim to be full reference volumes but aim at well-informed, accessible exegesis, Pfitzner's is among the best. Pastors,
students, and conscientious lay persons will find Ptitzner's Hebrews to be an intelligible,
learned, and reliable guide.

N. CLAYTON CROY
Trinity Lutheran Seminary
Columbus, Ohio
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